How Syria should help Yemen

Instead of sending troops beyond its borders, it can secure those borders, strengthen the state, rebuild its security and economy, and restore relations with its neighbours

How Syria should help Yemen

A few months ago, US President Donald Trump raised with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa the possibility of sending Syrian troops to Lebanon to help disarm Hezbollah. Diplomats said the proposal came with a package of incentives, including a US pledge of $300bn for Syria’s reconstruction, American air cover, advanced weapons and intelligence cooperation, as well as an Arab and Islamic coalition to provide political cover for the operation. Some even proposed sending the foreign fighters stationed in Syria to Lebanon to fight Hezbollah.

However, after al-Sharaa met Trump in Türkiye last July, Damascus took a different course, focusing on securing the border with Lebanon, stopping the flow of weapons, fighters and drugs, expanding technical and intelligence cooperation with international and Lebanese institutions, and improving relations with Beirut.

A few days ago, similar proposals emerged over Yemen. Reports emerged that sending between 10,000 and 20,000 Syrian fighters to join Yemeni forces against the Houthis was being considered. There was also renewed talk of using such a deployment to remove foreign fighters from Syria, echoing the earlier proposals for Lebanon.

In both cases, some of the proposals seem to draw on Syria’s past regional roles. Lebanon brings to mind Syria’s military intervention in 1976, followed by the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Yasser Arafat and Damascus’s control over political decision-making in Beirut. Yemen, in turn, recalls the Syrian army’s symbolic participation in the coalition that drove Saddam Hussein’s forces out of Kuwait in 1991.

The upcoming visit of Iraqi PM Ali al-Zaidi to Syria is especially important. It could pave the way for restoring Iraqi oil routes to the Mediterranean through Syria

A changed Syria

But Syria is no longer under Assad, and the Middle East is no longer the region it was in the 1970s or the early 1990s. The "new Syria" has emerged from years of war and now faces the task of rebuilding state institutions, unifying its armed forces, reconstructing the country, reviving the economy and restoring security.

That does not make Damascus neutral in the region's conflicts, nor does it place Yemen's legitimate government, the Houthis and Iran on an equal footing. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are allies of Damascus and members of the "Mecca Alliance." Syria's strategic alignment is therefore clear. Damascus recognises the crucial role Saudi Arabia has played in restoring Syria's Arab and international ties and in backing efforts to lift sanctions. It also sees Gulf security as essential to the stability of the region.

Damascus is well aware of the danger posed by Iran's proxies, having experienced it first-hand. It sees confronting the Houthis in Yemen as no less important than driving Iranian militias out of Syria, and the liberation of Sanaa as no less significant than that of Damascus.

The fall of the Assad regime cut one of Tehran's most important links to its allies in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region. It was a strategic shift with repercussions far beyond Syria. Damascus is now laser-focused on strengthening security at home, controlling its borders with Lebanon and Iraq, and preventing Syrian territory from serving as a route for weapons, fighters, drugs, and Iran-linked networks.

The "new Syria" can help Yemen by firmly establishing its break with the Iranian axis, cutting the supply lines and channels of influence Tehran has long used

Iraq and Lebanon

The most promising developments may lie in Syria's relations with Iraq and Lebanon. The forthcoming visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi to Syria is especially important. It could pave the way for restoring Iraqi oil routes to the Mediterranean through Syria, developing energy networks, enabling Iraq to import fuel oil, and expanding trade and road transport. These projects could help revive economic ties weakened by years of war, sanctions, and political conflict.

In Lebanon, reorganising border crossings, improving electricity, gas and transport networks, and strengthening security cooperation between state institutions could help build a very different relationship from the one that prevailed during decades of Syrian tutelage, when security agencies and armed groups overshadowed the state.

This is not to say that economic cooperation alone can disarm Hezbollah, hand militia weapons over to the Iraqi state, or end Houthi influence. Each case has its own circumstances and calculations. But stable relations between Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad, together with a reduced Iranian ability to use Syrian territory as a route to its allies, would change an important part of the regional environment from which Tehran has benefited for decades. The impact would reach well beyond the three countries, bolstering security in the Gulf and the Red Sea and, indirectly, limiting Iran's ability to coordinate its influence across the region.

In 1976, the Syrian army entered Lebanon and went on to play a decisive role in the country, eventually taking control of political decision-making in Beirut. In 1991, after the collapse of its Soviet ally, Damascus sent troops to join the coalition that liberated Kuwait.

In 2026, Syria can play a different role. Instead of sending troops beyond its borders, it can secure those borders, strengthen the state, rebuild its security and economy, and restore relations with its neighbours.

This is how the "new Syria" can help Yemen: by firmly establishing its break with the Iranian axis, cutting the supply lines and channels of influence Tehran has long used, building a network of shared interests linking Damascus, Baghdad and Beirut, and reaching out to Sanaa as it seeks to break free from Iran's grip.

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