The Middle East: three dates, one uncertain future

29 October, 1956

The second date is 29 October 1956, when Britain, France and Israel went to war over Suez, pursuing different objectives, among them the overthrow of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the restoration of control over the canal. Their armies advanced, but US President Dwight Eisenhower halted the war. Abdel Nasser survived and emerged more ambitious. The war exposed the decline of the British and French empires and the rise of American influence.

In previous columns, I have examined the parallels between Suez and Hormuz. But this anniversary brings other questions into focus about geography, alliances, and the balance of power. Does Egypt's national security still begin and end at the Suez Canal, or has it now extended to its neighbours, the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab? Will Washington restrain its Israeli ally from launching another war, or join it? And do China and Russia see America's involvement in Middle Eastern wars as an opportunity to weaken its influence, just as Washington benefited from the crisis that engulfed Britain and France?

Trump is no Eisenhower and awaits the new balance of power in Congress. Netanyahu is no David Ben-Gurion and awaits the new balance in the Knesset. Nor is the America that inherited the influence of the European powers 70 years ago the same country that now urges its allies to take greater responsibility for their own security.

A few days ago in Doha, Trump's envoy Tom Barrack outlined the contours of this shift. He said the US should reassess its traditional role as the guarantor of regional security and urged regional countries to take greater responsibility for their defence and forge new alliances. He also recalled the failures of American interventions and attempts at regime change in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria.

The paradox is that Trump's envoy speaks of the failure of past attempts at regime change while Netanyahu advocates precisely that in Iran. Washington also urges its allies to take greater responsibility for their security, even as American military decisions and its relationship with Israel remain among the principal factors determining it. Meanwhile, Trump's decisions, tweets and policy reversals continue to catch those allies off guard.

3 November, 2026

This brings us to the third date, 3 November. The US midterm elections could shift the balance of power in Congress and affect Trump's ability to implement his policies for the rest of his term. Foreign policy, of course, is not determined by congressional elections alone. But domestic politics influences calculations about war and negotiations, the balance of power between branches of government, and political divisions.

Between the Israeli and American elections, Middle Eastern countries face conflicting possibilities: another war or a settlement with Iran; the survival of old alliances or their reshaping; a continued US military presence alongside its declining willingness to bear the burden of its allies' security; and wars launched without consulting the partners left to bear the consequences.

In 1956, Suez marked a moment when the centre of global power shifted from Europe to America. Seventy years later, no single power appears ready to succeed Washington. America remains the strongest, China is advancing, and Russia is taking risks. Meanwhile, countries across the region are seeking new regional alliances and greater freedom of action in their dealings with the major powers.

Three dates and 70 years. Elections and military preparations. In the Suez War, those who fired the first shot did not have the final say. Today, between the ballot boxes in Israel and America, the naval blockade of Iran, preparations for war and diplomatic initiatives aimed at a settlement, who will have the final say this time?