Seen from Washington, the map of Iraq's Kurdistan Region appears deceptively simple: oil and gas fields, pipelines, companies and investments, borders with Iran, Türkiye and Syria, and a partner in the fight against terrorism. On the ground, the picture is far more complex. There is a history of bloodshed with Baghdad, uprisings and internecine warfare, political, class, and tribal rivalries, families that inherit power and perpetuate old feuds, and parties with their own armed forces, security services, and spheres of influence. Beneath it all runs a bitter sense of injustice, born of geography and the realities of living among powerful neighbours.
Can America safeguard its interests through fleeting visits and temporary engagements in societies still carrying the scars of historical betrayals and the tyranny of geography?
The question has resurfaced in Iraqi Kurdistan amid renewed tensions between Sulaymaniyah and Erbil. Speaking in London a few days ago, US envoy Tom Barrack offered his assessment of the dispute between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). He described the crisis as "a series of family disputes" and urged the two sides to move beyond their "tribal differences". His advice was blunt: "Get over it."
President Donald Trump's envoy left little doubt about his priorities. He said attacks on the gas field were "unacceptable," and that American and international companies generating revenue for the region should never be held hostage to its internal disputes.
For Washington, the quarrel is an obstacle to investment. For the Kurds, it is another chapter in a long history of conflict. Kurdish divisions predate the oil and gas industry and the present rivalry between the Barzani and Talabani families. Their roots reach deep into the Kurdish movement itself, through divisions between traditional leaders and modern political currents, countryside and city, rich and poor, tribal loyalties and the left. Behind them stand competing visions of how Kurdish society should be organised and who should lead it.
The KDP grew around the historic leadership of Mullah Mustafa Barzani and established social and tribal networks. Much of its legitimacy derived from the history of armed struggle and the nationalist symbolism of the Barzani leadership. The founding of the PUK under Jalal Talabani reflected a different political tradition, drawing on nationalist and leftist currents and a substantial social and political base in Sulaymaniyah. These ideological and social differences were profound. They helped forge two distinct political identities within the Kurdish movement, each with its own institutions of power and networks of influence.
The Kurdish civil war of the 1990s deepened those wounds. The region split into two administrations, while internal rivalries became entangled with interventions by Baghdad, Tehran, Ankara and Damascus, four capitals opposed to the emergence of a Kurdish entity. Washington intervened to broker an agreement between the two parties. The administrations were eventually reunited, but institutional integration remained incomplete. Security agencies, armed forces, and networks of vested interests remained divided between the rival centres of power in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah.
