A few months ago, US President Donald Trump raised with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa the possibility of sending Syrian troops to Lebanon to help disarm Hezbollah. Diplomats said the proposal came with a package of incentives, including a US pledge of $300bn for Syria’s reconstruction, American air cover, advanced weapons and intelligence cooperation, as well as an Arab and Islamic coalition to provide political cover for the operation. Some even proposed sending the foreign fighters stationed in Syria to Lebanon to fight Hezbollah.
However, after al-Sharaa met Trump in Türkiye last July, Damascus took a different course, focusing on securing the border with Lebanon, stopping the flow of weapons, fighters and drugs, expanding technical and intelligence cooperation with international and Lebanese institutions, and improving relations with Beirut.
A few days ago, similar proposals emerged over Yemen. Reports emerged that sending between 10,000 and 20,000 Syrian fighters to join Yemeni forces against the Houthis was being considered. There was also renewed talk of using such a deployment to remove foreign fighters from Syria, echoing the earlier proposals for Lebanon.
In both cases, some of the proposals seem to draw on Syria’s past regional roles. Lebanon brings to mind Syria’s military intervention in 1976, followed by the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Yasser Arafat and Damascus’s control over political decision-making in Beirut. Yemen, in turn, recalls the Syrian army’s symbolic participation in the coalition that drove Saddam Hussein’s forces out of Kuwait in 1991.