Syria's ban on alcohol imports is counterproductive

Persistent demand

Border interceptions can disrupt individual shipments, but they do not address the demand that sustains the trade. Tougher enforcement may increase the costs and risks facing smugglers. Yet persistent demand can preserve the margins that make those risks worth taking.

When one shipment is seized, or one route becomes more difficult, suppliers have an incentive to find another. That produces a familiar whack-a-mole dynamic. The individuals, routes, or methods may change, but the underlying incentive remains.

Alcohol smuggling across the Lebanese-Syrian border predates the new restriction. Long before 2011, residents of impoverished border communities moved whisky and other goods into Syria by car, pickup or mule. But smuggling was only one source of imported alcohol.

Lebanon was also an important legal supplier. In 2010, Syrian customs recorded at least $4.5mn in beer, wine and spirits imported from Lebanon alone. That was not Syria's entire imported alcohol market; supplies also came from other countries. But it shows that foreign alcohol once entered through official channels on a meaningful scale, allowing the state to collect duties and exercise some oversight over the supply chain.

The restriction has closed that route for new foreign shipments while giving smuggling networks another product with steady demand. The recent interceptions show how it can move alongside other goods: The September shipment contained alcohol and hashish; the August cargo reportedly included alcohol, tobacco and clothing. One journey can serve several markets.

Cons outweigh pros

The economic cost of banning alcohol imports is also difficult to justify. Syria needs money to pay salaries, restore services and rebuild. Every bottle that bypasses customs generates none of the duties, taxes or fees the government could collect on a legal import. Instead, the value of getting it across the border goes to traders and the networks moving their goods. The ban has given smugglers a protected market while denying the state a share. For their part, retailers are caught in the middle. They can sell foreign brands but cannot obtain new stock from licensed importers, so they can only turn to the black market.

Officials may fear that imports will consume scarce foreign currency or undermine local producers. Those concerns deserve attention. But a blanket prohibition is counterproductive—especially when imported brands remain available. Quotas, differentiated tariffs, or limited licences could manage imports while still allowing the state to oversee and tax them. As it stands, Syria pays the price of prohibition without reliably keeping foreign bottles off its shelves.

The risks extend beyond the treasury. Legally imported alcohol can be tested, labelled and traced to a supplier. A smuggled bottle has no reliable chain of custody. It may have been badly stored, diluted, refilled or given a forged label. The brand a customer recognises offers no assurance about what is inside. Adulterated alcohol can cause severe illness or death.

Foreign alcohol is already being sold in Syria. The government can either regulate the route it takes to shops and bars or leave that supply to traders who evade customs. So long as sales remain legal, banning imports leaves part of the market beyond official oversight. Syria should therefore regulate and tax the trade instead of forcing it underground. A government trying to shut down smuggling routes should not give smugglers another reason to keep them open.