A death in custody exposes gaps in Syria’s security reform

A three-day inquiry cannot identify the broader institutional failures that may have allowed a detainee with a known medical condition to be beaten, questioned without a lawyer present, and left without adequate treatment until his injuries became irreversible. Nor can it determine whether similar weaknesses exist in other police stations and detention facilities.

Treating the case solely as misconduct by a handful of officers risks turning individual accountability into an institutional alibi. The point isn't to dilute the responsibility of those who allegedly harmed Ghumaira, but to examine the system that enabled the abuse. Otherwise, the authorities may remove several individuals while leaving intact the rules, incentives, and oversight gaps that make further violations predictable.

Ghumaira's death should therefore prompt a sector-wide review as the starting point for comprehensive security-sector reform. Syria's security institutions have been rebuilt and expanded rapidly since the fall of the Assad regime, with recruitment outpacing training, vetting, and oversight. The need for reform extends beyond new recruits. Personnel who previously served in opposition-run security institutions also require retraining under uniform national standards because those institutions often lacked adequate safeguards against the mistreatment of detainees.

Reform cannot wait

Security-sector reform must be a central pillar of Syria's transition, not a technical exercise that can be postponed until the country becomes more stable. Unaccountable security institutions do not produce lasting stability. They erode public trust, deepen grievances, and make future violence more likely.

The authorities have taken some useful initial steps. The Interior Ministry issued a code of conduct prohibiting torture and degrading treatment. It has also organised training for new recruits and selected police units.

But these measures remain fragmented. A code of conduct is only as effective as the mechanisms used to enforce it, and isolated training courses cannot transform institutional culture on their own. Nor do these initiatives constitute a coherent, publicly articulated reform program linking recruitment and vetting to detention procedures, command responsibility, disciplinary systems, complaints mechanisms, and independent oversight. Better-trained officers working within weak institutions can still commit abuse.

Prevention must begin at the moment of arrest. Detainees should be informed of the legal basis for their arrest, brought promptly before a judge, granted access to counsel before questioning, and permitted to contact a relative. Independent medical professionals should document any health conditions and injuries upon admission, transfer, and release. All interrogations should be audiovisually recorded, and no one should be held in an unofficial or undisclosed facility.

Reform needs partners

Oversight must also extend beyond the security chain of command. An independent inspectorate should have unannounced access to every place of detention. Parliament should establish a permanent committee empowered to inspect facilities, summon officials, obtain detention data, and publish its findings. Syrian human rights organisations and international monitoring bodies should also be granted access under clear procedures.

These safeguards must be embedded in a comprehensive strategy covering every institution authorised to arrest, detain, interrogate, or use force. The strategy should define institutional mandates, establish common recruitment and vetting standards, clarify command responsibility, regulate the use of force, and create enforceable systems for discipline and civilian oversight. It should also include a public timetable, measurable benchmarks, and regular reporting so that progress can be evaluated rather than merely announced.

Syria's limited resources, shortage of specialised expertise, and long list of competing priorities make it unlikely that the authorities can carry out such an ambitious transformation alone. The government should therefore seek structured assistance from Syrian civil society and international partners with experience in professional policing, detention management, institutional vetting, and civilian oversight. That support should strengthen governance and accountability, not merely provide equipment or tactical training.

Security-sector reform must remain Syrian-owned, but national ownership should not be confused with self-sufficiency. Accepting assistance does not mean surrendering sovereignty. It means acquiring the expertise and institutional capacity required to exercise state power responsibly.

Preventing the next death

For Ghumaira, reform will come too late. A prosecution may establish the truth, punish those responsible, and offer his family a measure of justice. But it cannot return a husband, father, and rescuer who survived years of war only to die after entering a police station in the new Syria.

What can still change is what his death comes to mean. If the response ends with a committee report and several convictions, it may satisfy immediate demands for accountability without changing the conditions that allowed the alleged abuse to occur. If it produces enforceable safeguards, independent scrutiny, and a serious program of security-sector reform, it could help spare another family the same loss.

The real break with Syria's past will not be measured by how forcefully its officials condemn torture after it occurs. It will be measured by whether they build a state in which abuse is harder to commit, easier to detect, and impossible to hide. The duty now is not only to secure justice for Ghumaira, but to prevent anyone else from sharing his fate.