Syria is fighting yesterday’s corruption, not today’s

Taken together, these accounts point to a broader pattern: a closely connected group of recently established companies gained extensive access to public oil infrastructure through contracting arrangements that received little meaningful scrutiny.

Syria's exceptional circumstances may have required emergency or direct contracting. But urgency can explain accelerated procedures; it cannot justify the absence of records and review. The more exceptional the procedure, the stronger the obligation to document why it was used and who benefited.

A blind spot

The inspection authority's detection of these alleged violations is encouraging. It demonstrates that Syria's oversight bodies can act against misconduct committed under the new authorities. Nevertheless, the country's broader anti-corruption drive remains largely retrospective, concentrating principally on Assad-era figures and patronage networks.

This focus is understandable. The former system was built on illicit enrichment and the fusion of political influence with economic power. Dismantling those networks and recovering public assets are essential parts of the transition.

Yet the Deir ez-Zor case demonstrates that illicit enrichment and privileged access to state resources are not merely historical problems. Corruption risks are already emerging within new institutions and around new centres of power, while efforts to identify and investigate them remain limited.

This imbalance is particularly evident in the reported work of the Illicit Gains Committee, which has focused almost exclusively on Assad-era actors and networks. Holding them accountable remains crucial, but it cannot be the sole priority of Syria's anti-corruption agenda.

The committee's mandate, as publicly described, covers illicit enrichment involving public employees and companies linked to suspected wrongdoing. Yet there is no indication that it is investigating wealth accumulated through misconduct during the transition.

Transition-era contracts require systematic review to determine whether emergency provisions were justified, appropriate safeguards were applied, and misconduct occurred.

The Central Authority for Control and Inspection can play an important role in this process, but it is unlikely to have the resources to scrutinise every state institution and public company, particularly while contracting procedures and award decisions remain opaque. Other anti-corruption bodies must share this responsibility by examining transition-era contracts systematically rather than waiting for misconduct to be uncovered through isolated investigations.

Missing safeguards

Investigations matter, but so do safeguards that reduce the opportunity for wrongdoing. Syria's transitional authorities have yet to develop a comprehensive preventive framework. Their approach remains largely reactive, centred on inspections, settlements, and asset recovery after public resources have already been lost. An effective strategy must also identify risks and disrupt illicit activity earlier.

The few preventive measures announced so far have been ad hoc and limited in scope. One example is the finance minister's recent instruction requiring directors-general of institutions under his ministry to disclose kinship ties with employees up to the fourth degree. Although welcome, the measure applies only to employment relationships within finance ministry bodies and does not cover officials' financial or commercial interests.

A more consequential gap is the absence of a publicly announced system requiring senior officials and procurement staff to declare their assets, business holdings, and other interests upon appointment and update those declarations annually. An independent authority should verify the information provided, while clear rules should require officials to recuse themselves whenever their private interests overlap with their public responsibilities. Such a system would make unexplained wealth and other warning signs easier to identify and investigate.

Authorities must also make transparency the default in public contracting. For contracts above a reasonable threshold, the state should publish tender notices, technical requirements, bidders, evaluation criteria, award decisions, contract values, beneficial owners, amendments, and implementation reports through a searchable online portal.

Emergency awards should be permitted only under clearly defined conditions, supported by written justifications, and automatically audited within a fixed period. Signed contracts should also be published, with narrow redactions only where legitimate security or commercial concerns require them.

These reforms would not eliminate corruption, but they would make it harder to conceal and give inspectors, journalists, and civil society organisations the information needed to expose it. Transparency is not a concession to critics; it is an essential part of the state's own control system.

Preventing tomorrow's oligarchs

Syria's greatest future corruption risk may lie not in old files, but in new deals. The country is entering a period in which reconstruction contracts, investment agreements, state assets, and public-private partnerships will shape both its economy and its political settlement.

A campaign-driven approach can deliver immediate results. It can recover assets, discipline officials, and demonstrate a commitment to reform. But it cannot, by itself, transform the opaque procedures, concentrated discretion, and privileged access that allowed corruption to flourish.

The transitional authorities have created genuine anti-corruption momentum. The challenge is to convert it into transparent procedures, independent oversight, and meaningful checks on executive power. Otherwise, Syria's anti-corruption drive risks remaining a campaign rather than becoming a durable system.

The transition will be judged not only by how much Assad-era wealth is recovered, but by how effectively public resources are protected today. The most credible break with the past will not be measured by the number of former elites pursued, but by whether current officials and businesses face rules strong enough to prevent tomorrow's oligarchs from emerging.