Why this Yemen battle is different

As Iran-backed Houthi rebels launch a fresh offensive to gain control of the country's Red Sea coast, government forces push back. This time, they are better prepared and unified.

The Yemeni army's drone unit.
Yemeni Army Military Media
The Yemeni army's drone unit.

Why this Yemen battle is different

The Iran-backed Houthis launched their offensive on Thursday in western Taiz and along Yemen’s western coast, seeking to reach the high ground overlooking the coastline and move closer to Bab al-Mandab. Control over this key maritime chokepoint would give it strategic leverage, which would benefit Iran in its ongoing war with the US.

For its part, government forces pushed back on Friday and began mounting counterattacks. By Saturday, it shifted from defence to offence and expanded its operations into Hodeidah, Al-Bayda and Al-Jawf, dispersing Houthi forces and disrupting their lines.

This round of fighting already appears markedly different for a variety of reasons. Al Majalla lays them out.


1. More centralised government decision-making. The Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council’s decision at the beginning of the year to revoke the membership of former Chairman of the Southern Transitional Council, Aidarous al-Zubaid, along with restructuring the council and its forces, helped reduce competing centres of authority and strengthen coordination across the front lines.

2. Broader participation by anti-Houthi forces. Reinforcements from the Southern Giants Brigades and the Nation’s Shield Forces arrived on the western Taiz and western coast fronts, alongside the army, the National Resistance Forces and the Joint Forces. This gave the government greater military weight across several fronts.

AFP
A fighter from forces loyal to the Yemeni government near a pickup truck in Hays district, south of Hodeidah, Yemen, on 5 April 2026.

3. Ability to push back. The Houthis launched the offensive, but government forces pushed back quickly. They not only regained the initiative, but also opened simultaneous fronts in Al-Bayda, Al-Jawf, Taiz, and Hodeidah, forcing the group to spread its forces and reserves.

4. Territorial gains. The government announced that its forces captured positions in Al-Nasifah and the high ground overlooking Al-Zahir district in Al-Bayda, advanced toward Al-Hazm in Al-Jawf, and took control of Naqil and Jabal al-Kawrah in western Taiz. In Hodeidah, the forces completed their takeover of the remaining rural areas in Hays district and began pressing towards Al-Jarrahi, as fighting continued on some fronts.

5. New air and drone capabilities. The government expanded its use of combat aircraft to strike Houthi positions, launch platforms and reinforcements. Several government-aligned formations simultaneously deployed drones for reconnaissance, target acquisition, artillery fire correction and munition drops, producing a tangible battlefield effect and boosting the morale of anti-Houthi forces.

Economic pressure in Houthi-controlled areas has hurt its ability to finance a prolonged war

8. Economic pressure in Houthi-controlled areas has hurt its ability to finance a prolonged war. These areas face liquidity shortages, deteriorating public services, delayed salary payments, and expanding levies, which have fuelled public discontent and pressured the group's ability to finance a prolonged war.

9. US pressure on Iran and the weakening of its regional network. Tehran faces an economic blockade and mounting US pressure after losing its ally in Syria, while Hezbollah has been weakened in Lebanon and Iran-aligned factions in Iraq have come under increasing pressure. These developments have meant that the Houthis now bear the brunt of responsibility in Iran's so-called 'Axis of Resistance' as one of the last standing militias.

Amr Abdallah Dalsh/Reuters
People visit the site damaged by an Israeli airstrike that killed Lebanon's Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Dahiyeh, Beirut's southern suburb, on 6 December 2024.

10. A new regional and maritime defence umbrella. This battle differs from previous rounds because of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye in August 2026. The agreement stipulates that an attack on any one of the three countries will be considered an attack on all three.

Saudi Arabia has also announced the creation of a multinational maritime defence coalition, endorsed by 14 countries, to protect shipping, trade and energy routes in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab and the Gulf of Aden. This agreement is defensive, however, and does not entail Turkish or Pakistani participation in ground operations inside Yemen.

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