What if Türkiye shot down an Israeli jet?

A direct confrontation between Israel and Türkiye, two US allies, would put the US in a very tough spot

What if Türkiye shot down an Israeli jet?

The latest Israeli strikes on Abu al-Duhur airbase in northern Syria destroyed its runways, yet they came perilously close to igniting something far more consequential: a direct confrontation between Israel and Türkiye, two allies of the United States.

The story began several days before the bombing, when Israeli officials told their American counterparts that they had intelligence indicating Türkiye was preparing to deploy military assets at Abu al-Duhur. Washington examined the claim and concluded that the available information did not substantiate Israel’s account. The United States then facilitated contacts among Mossad, Damascus and Ankara in an effort to allay Israeli concerns and avert escalation.

Two days later, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani met US envoy Tom Barrack in Istanbul. Their assessment was that the crisis appeared to be heading towards containment, much as an earlier confrontation had before an Israeli strike on a base near Palmyra in central Syria. There was even a sense that the door might reopen to Syrian-Israeli negotiations, suspended since the beginning of the year, and to further developing the "coordination unit" established in Amman for intelligence-sharing on common threats.

The following day, however, everyone was taken by surprise when Israeli fighter jets took off and struck the runways at Abu al-Duhur, after which Barrack and Netanyahu announced the operation. Ankara had not been informed of the mission. When Turkish radar detected the aircraft heading north, it knew neither their destination nor their intended target.

That was the most dangerous moment. The fear was not of a war Ankara and Tel Aviv had chosen to fight, but of a confrontation that neither side intended. What if Turkish fighters had scrambled to intercept the Israeli aircraft? What if the Israeli pilots had failed to heed their warnings? And what if a Turkish pilot, judging the aircraft to pose a threat, had fired a missile and brought one down?

Such a question is hardly unfamiliar in Syrian skies. At the end of 2015, a Turkish fighter shot down a Russian bomber near the Syrian border. Ankara said the aircraft had violated Turkish airspace and failed to respond to repeated warnings. Vladimir Putin described the incident as a "stab in the back." Moscow imposed punitive measures on Ankara and severed military channels, yet both sides stopped short of confrontation and later agreed on rules of engagement.

The 'new Syria' seeks to extricate the country from other people's wars, yet its geography continues to draw those wars back onto Syrian soil.

Three years later, Syrian air defences accidentally shot down a Russian aircraft over the Mediterranean during Israeli raids near the Hmeimim and Tartus bases. The missile was Syrian, but Moscow held Israel responsible for creating the circumstances that led to the aircraft being brought down. Relations deteriorated sharply before the crisis ended with an Israeli apology and new understandings on rules of engagement that preserved Israel's freedom to pursue Iran in Syria.

Now there has nearly been a third incident, and another potential "stab", except that this time the aircraft that might have been shot down would have been Israeli, and the missile Turkish. If an Israeli fighter entered Turkish airspace, Ankara could invoke the same argument it used in 2015: the defence of sovereignty and borders. If the aircraft were over Syrian territory, however, the calculus would shift entirely.

Competing visions

For years, Netanyahu has maintained that Israeli forces must retain freedom of military action to prevent threats from emerging north of Israel's borders and to preserve access to Iranian airspace. Türkiye, meanwhile, regards northern Syria as an essential component of its national security and maintains troops, bases, interests and allies on the ground. Damascus insists that both its airspace and its territory are Syrian.

Three distinct security visions intersect in the same sky, and Washington is trying to reconcile them. If Ankara were to shoot down an Israeli aircraft, the next question would be how Tel Aviv would respond. It is difficult to imagine Netanyahu, in an election season, treating the loss of an Israeli fighter as an ordinary incident. The episode could open the door to retaliation and counter-retaliation, turning Syria into an arena for Turkish-Israeli confrontation.

Washington would then find itself between two of its regional allies. Both Israel and Türkiye are US strategic allies; the latter is a NATO member with a US military presence.

Wars do not always begin because leaders want them. Sometimes they start when an aircraft enters the wrong place, and a pilot is left with only seconds to decide.

Caught between allies

What would Trump say to Netanyahu if Türkiye shot down an Israeli jet? And what would he say to Erdoğan if Israel retaliated by striking Turkish forces? Would he side with Israel, with his NATO ally, or press both sides to absorb the blows and halt the escalation?

Then there is Damascus, which would stand to gain from such a confrontation while also paying a high price.

The gain would be that Israel might discover, for the first time in years, that its freedom of action in Syrian airspace has limits, and that Türkiye's presence in the north has drawn a new line that Israeli aircraft cannot cross without additional calculation.

The cost would be that Syria itself would become the arena of confrontation. Damascus would find itself caught between its ally Ankara, its negotiations with Tel Aviv, and its determination to restore sovereignty over its entire territory and airspace.

Here lies the paradox of the 'new Syria': it seeks to extricate the country from other people's wars, yet its geography continues to draw those wars back onto Syrian soil. The Americans are now trying to establish a mechanism to prevent friction. The Syrians want to return to negotiations. The Turks do not want a war with Israel. The Israelis, meanwhile, are still living in a post-October 7 world.

The danger is that wars do not always begin because leaders want them. Sometimes they begin with an aircraft entering the wrong place, a radar detecting it, and a pilot left with only seconds to decide. Netanyahu's calculations as elections draw nearer, and Erdoğan's as he approaches his own decision over elections, suggest that further tests may lie ahead.

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