Several NATO member states have entered a new phase in their joint space operations, launching a series of multinational initiatives designed to connect national capabilities within a more integrated and resilient network. The programme, which does not include the United States, aims to strengthen their capacity for military communications, reconnaissance, early warning, and missile tracking.
At the forefront of these efforts is the Hybrid Alliance Layered Operations in Space (HALO) initiative, unveiled by eight countries during the defence industry forum held alongside the NATO summit in Ankara. It will combine their individual military satellites into a larger constellation. This will help them share costs and extend their coverage. Although the states’ military satellites will now be connected within a unified space network, each country will continue to own and control its assets.
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Türkiye launched HALO on 7 July 2026. It was announced alongside the expansion of programmes focused on rapid satellite launch and continuous space-based surveillance. Canada, Spain and Türkiye also declared new contributions to NATO’s space infrastructure.
It points to a deeper shift in the Alliance’s strategic outlook, as space becomes more central to NATO’s defence planning. The networked satellites will support high-speed military communications, intelligence gathering, and missile tracking, while reducing the financial burden of constructing a fully integrated national space fleet in isolation.
Modern warfare has increased the importance of a country’s ability to connect its satellites with those of its allies and operate them as part of a resilient network capable of exchanging data and remaining functional even under attack, such as by jamming. Similar efforts are underway in other international alliances, fostering a rivalry among interconnected space networks and coalitions. The advantage may ultimately belong to those best able to connect systems, manage them efficiently, and exploit the data they generate, rather than those with the largest satellite fleets.
Connectivity and integration
NATO does not have its own satellite constellation. From 1970-93, it launched eight dedicated communications satellites, but from 2005 it gradually moved away from operating satellites under its own ownership and began relying instead on services supplied by the national military satellite systems of member states. Today, NATO operates through the sixth generation Satellite Communications Services (SCS) programme, which began in January 2020 and will run until the end of 2034.
The programme gives the Alliance access to four national military systems: France’s Syracuse, Italy’s SICRAL, Britain’s Skynet, and the United States’ Wideband Global SATCOM system, commonly known as WGS. Three levels of communication are provided by SCS. The first carries large volumes of data to military bases and deployed units; the second is reserved for tactical communications among forces in combat; and the third provides more secure and resilient communications immune from jamming.
The NATO Communications and Information Agency distributes user requirements across the satellite capacity supplied by the four participating countries. Through this arrangement, the Alliance gains access to a shared satellite communications service without owning the satellites themselves or exercising direct control over them. HALO is intended to expand and develop this model, rather than replace it.
Instead of relying solely on the purchase of communications capacity from national satellites, the eight participating countries will connect their military satellites within what NATO has described as ‘a vast and interconnected constellation’. Once the project strengthens connectivity and operational integration, the network is intended to support high-speed communications, the transmission of intelligence data, and missile tracking.
NATO is not proposing to launch a satellite called HALO. Rather, the initiative is about creating a network layer connecting military space systems that already exist (or may later be developed). NATO has not said how many satellites will be incorporated, whether data will be exchanged directly between them (or routed through ground stations), or what their operational orbits will be. Similarly lacking was information about frequencies, communications protocols, encryption, budget, or timetable.
Distributing the burden
NATO’s Deputy Secretary-General has described HALO as an exploratory initiative examining the feasibility of developing such a constellation, but the purpose seems clear. A constellation operated by a single state may be vulnerable to cyberattacks, jamming, or physical destruction, while also facing limits in its ability to transmit large quantities of data independently.
Through HALO, the Alliance can distribute communications, intelligence gathering, and missile tracking across satellites belonging to several countries. Should one system or asset be disabled, the network could allow some functions or data to be redirected through other assets. This makes it harder for an adversary to disrupt operations by striking a small number of critical satellites.
The HALO model accords with NATO’s wider space policy, which makes clear that the Alliance does not aspire to become an independent space power and has no plans to develop satellites of its own. Each member-state retains full sovereignty over its satellites and space capabilities, while providing data and services to the Alliance voluntarily and in accordance with national law. HALO therefore gives NATO a means of expanding its capabilities without acquiring and managing a centralised constellation, while leaving sensitive space assets under the direct control of states.
NATO’s space strategy encompasses more than the protection of satellites from jamming and attack. Since designating space as its fifth operational domain in 2019, the Alliance has sought to integrate space-based services more fully into military operations and to establish a shared picture of activity and threats in orbit. It also aims to share information among members, enhance interoperability, and preserve communications, navigation and missile warning systems during crises and war.
In its 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO pledged to strengthen its ability to deter, detect, counter, and respond to threats in space, while improving the resilience of the systems on which collective defence depends. These efforts are coordinated through NATO’s Space Operations Centre at Ramstein Air Base in Germany, which operates within Allied Air Command. The centre assumed its present form in 2024 and serves as a link between NATO commanders and national space centres and agencies. It gathers requests for imagery, communications, and other space-derived data, then coordinates their provision by member states.
HALO fits within this framework by giving the centre access to a broader network of interconnected national satellites, instead of requiring it to deal with each national capability separately. The initiative therefore accelerates the delivery of data to commanders, expands coverage, and reduces the risk that military operations could be disrupted by the loss of a single satellite or national system.
Contest for control
Other alliances are pursuing similar integration. In 2014, the US, UK, Australia, and Canada (four of the five-member ‘Five Eyes’ grouping) established the Combined Space Operations (CSO) initiative. France, Germany, and New Zealand (the fifth member) later joined, followed by Italy, Japan and Norway. The CSO initiative coordinates military activity in space, aligns planning, improves the interoperability of national systems, and facilitates the exchange of information on satellites and threats in orbit.
