Politics

The Gulf and Iran: two models that seem irreconcilable

Tehran prioritises foreign power and influence, whereas the Gulf states prioritise economic development and stability. The presence of foreign bases in the Gulf is just an excuse.

This handout satellite image, courtesy of Vantor, shows damage following a drone attack on a high-rise apartment building in Bahrain's capital Manama on 2 March 2026.

The Gulf and Iran: two models that seem irreconcilable

Nawaf al-Yassin

last update on 08 Jun 2026

Iran's recent attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain rehashed an old question that analysts had previously grappled with. Are tensions between Iran and the Gulf states about passing political and security conditions, or do they reflect a deeper dispute rooted in their broader visions and projects?

It is difficult to view these attacks as isolated or exceptional incidents, given the history of flare-ups and threats in the Middle East over past decades. Kuwait and Bahrain have long been exposed to Iranian targeting, whether directly through military operations or indirectly via Tehran’s regional proxies. The incidents now making the headlines are less a new turn in Iranian policy than the continuation of an approach that has existed for many years.

Since it was attacked by the United States and Israel on 28 February, Iran has not just targeted military installations or security sites in the Gulf. On various occasions, it has hit civilian infrastructure, too. Kuwait International Airport is a prominent example, having been targeted three times, alongside other civilian facilities. In Iranian calculations, the traditional distinction between civilian and military targets appears hazy. The targeting of civilian installations appears to have a psychological aim.

Anyone who follows the relationship between Iran and the Gulf states will notice that Tehran has not relied solely on instruments of hard power. It has also sought to build networks of political, security, and social influence in several Gulf and Arab societies. In Kuwait and Bahrain, security agencies have announced the discovery of cells linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or that were sympathetic to it.

This is neither new nor incidental. Iran’s strategy has been to create long-term instruments of influence in Gulf societies. This explains why countries like Kuwait and Bahrain are sensitive to Iranian activity in the region. For these two states, what is happening now is a continuation of an old Iranian project that regards the Gulf as a vital sphere of Iranian influence.

Gulf states, some of which host US bases and/or have normalised relations with Israel, have sought to address these challenges through a hard-and-soft approach towards Iran. Article 2/4 of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states, while Article 51 recognises the inherent right of self-defence as an exception, provided that an actual armed attack has occurred and that the principles of necessity and proportionality are observed.

MAHMUD HAMS / AFP — Smoke rises from an area in the direction of Al Udeid Air Base, which houses the Qatar Emiri Air Force and foreign forces including the US, in Doha on 28 February 2026, following a reported Iranian strike.

Limits to interpretation

International legal doctrine, however, limits the interpretation of this right, so that it does not extend to targeting other states merely because foreign forces are present on their territory, unless it is proven that those forces were actually used in hostile acts or that the host state was directly involved in military operations.

Accordingly, characterising Gulf states as parties to the conflict because of this military presence remains legally contentious, particularly since they are not direct parties to the war and have affirmed their commitment not to allow their territories to be used for hostile acts.

Characterising Gulf states as parties to the conflict because of a foreign military presence remains legally contentious

Similarly, the existence of military cooperation agreements between Gulf states and certain foreign countries, or the presence of foreign military bases, is not sufficient to hold Gulf states responsible for the military actions of those countries against Iran, unless direct involvement is proven. Nor does it justify resorting to the use of force against them. On this basis, Iran's targeting of these Gulf states under such a pretext falls outside the scope of self-defence.

Iran's inclusion of civilian or economic targets in the Gulf states is a breach of international law, particularly the principle of distinction set out in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and does not meet the requirements of necessity and proportionality governing the use of force under international law.

Photo by NORBERT SCHILLER / AFP — A tugboat puts out a fire on 23 November 1987, on the Romanian-flagged freighter Fundulea, which was hit by an Iranian warship, causing severe damage, off the coast of Oman.

Historical record

The narrative linking Iran's conduct toward the Gulf to the American military presence or to current security alliances does not withstand scrutiny when measured against the historical record. In the early 1980s, before foreign military bases in the region had assumed their present form, Kuwait was attacked by Iran. In 1981, the Umm al-Aish satellite station came under Iranian attack, and in 1984 the Shuaiba oil facilities were targeted amid the escalation linked at the time to the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88).

During what became known as the Tanker War, Iran attacked commercial vessels and oil tankers, affecting the Kuwaiti and Gulf economies and threatening the security of international navigation and the movement of energy through the Arabian Gulf. Kuwait also witnessed the attempted assassination in May 1985 of the late Emir Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, the bombing of popular cafés in the same year, and the December 1984 hijacking of the Kuwaiti Airways aircraft Al Jabriya. These were linked to terrorist groups supported by Iran, such as Islamic Jihad.

Iranian hostility towards the Gulf states predates the presence of foreign bases, which Iran uses to justify attacks on them. The Gulf's oil and regional economic stability were already in Iran's crosshairs long before today's pretexts. Indeed, Tehran's policies and those of its regional proxies have deeper political and security origins.

Efforts at Gulf-Iranian rapprochement failed to end this chronic state of tension. In recent years, Gulf states have invested political, economic, and diplomatic effort in building more stable relations with Iran, producing periods of openness, dialogue, exchange visits, and economic cooperation, all grounded in the conviction that good neighbourliness and regional understanding offer the best path for all parties.

Yet tensions persisted, attacks never came to a definitive halt, and mutual suspicion endured despite repeated attempts to build confidence. This was not due to a lack of communication, but to the nature of the political project that shapes Iran's view of its regional role. There is a profound divergence between the two political models (the Iranian model and the Gulf model) that differ in both their aims and their means.

Fadel Senna/AFP — The moon rises behind skyscrapers in Dubai on 16 November 2024.

Competing visions

The Gulf states have prioritised economic development, political stability, and improved living standards, a choice that is reflected in major infrastructure projects, urban development, the expansion of transport and energy networks, and investment in education, health care, and public services. They have sought to diversify their sources of income beyond fossil fuels by supporting tourism, industry, technology, and financial services, attracting foreign investment and creating globally competitive economies by modernising their legislative and administrative frameworks.

By contrast, the Iranian model prioritises the regional and ideological dimensions of foreign policy, while placing security and military power front and centre. It regards Iran's regional power and the expansion of its spheres of influence as a strategic priority that outweighs other considerations. Yet this approach produces tensions with its neighbours, laying the foundations for years of conflict.

An economic development project requires a stable, secure, and predictable environment, whereas military expansionist projects often operate in climates of conflict, tension, and instability. This is the underlying conflict between the two models. For this reason, genuine harmony is difficult to achieve. In parallel, regional tensions help the Iranian regime deflect responsibility for its own domestic and economic challenges.

KUNA/ REUTERS — Kuwaiti officials inspect damage inside a terminal at Kuwait International Airport following a drone and missile attack, in Kuwait City, Kuwait, on 3 June 2026.

Greater cooperation needed

To move beyond this paradigm would require a shift in Iranian priorities away from the logic of permanent conflict and towards development and regional cooperation. For their part, Gulf states have sought to avoid sliding into open conflict whenever possible, knowing its detrimental impact on stability. To this end, they have worked towards greater coordination and integration within the Gulf. Events have shown that Gulf security is a single, indivisible whole, and that the challenges facing one Gulf state quickly affect the others.

Strengthening joint Gulf action is therefore no longer a political option that can be postponed; it is a strategic necessity. Since the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), there has been the prospect of Gulf integration. The path of integration has faced challenges tied to national interests and sovereignty, but worldwide experience demonstrates that successful regional blocs require a degree of mutual compromise to secure a greater collective interest.

Ultimately, the issue is larger than a political dispute between Iran and the Gulf states; it is a clash between two visions for the region's future

Today, the need for Gulf integration appears more urgent than ever. Building a unified Gulf position politically, militarily, and economically is the best way to protect the interests of the GCC states and strengthen their ability to face future challenges. Ultimately, the issue is larger than a political dispute between Iran and the Gulf states; it is a clash between two visions for the region's future. One is of stability, development, and economic prosperity. The other is a quest for expansion and military conflict.

The future of relations with Iran will remain contingent on Tehran's willingness to redirect its priorities toward domestic development, good neighbourliness, and regional cooperation. Failure to do so means these two irreconcilable projects will continue to clash into the foreseeable future.

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