Syria’s wheat price crisis needs more than a presidential fix

In response to public anger, President Ahmed al-Sharaa issued a decree on 21 May granting an additional bonus of 900,000 (old) Syrian pounds, equivalent to about $65, for each tonne delivered to state grain institutions. The new price brought the total to nearly $400 per tonne, but still fell short of many farmers' demands. Many had argued that the price should be no lower than $450 per tonne to cover expenses and provide a fair profit.

A fix with costs

Nonetheless, the amended price achieved its immediate objective: it eased public anger and helped stop the protests. The issue, then, is not the price adjustment itself, but how it was made. Because the initial rate was issued by the Ministry of Economy, the correction should have been issued by the same institution. After all, wheat pricing falls within its mandate.

A presidential decree to address economic issues may not be unusual in Syria, either before or after the transition. But it sends a damaging message: when institutions fail, only the president can fix the problem. That message may strengthen the president politically, but it weakens the officials and institutions that are supposed to govern.

The additional bonus is likely to be seen as a gracious intervention by the president to correct the ministry's mistake, even if the original price was shaped by budget constraints. Going forward, the minister remains associated with the unpopular decision, while the president gains credit for the fix.

Over time, such presidential interventions can erode public confidence in government institutions. They encourage citizens to look past ministries, unions, and administrative bodies and see the president as the only figure capable of solving problems. That may settle one dispute, but it reinforces the very weakness that produced it.

Pricing without process

Beyond the question of who gets credit, fixing problems without addressing the institutional gaps that produced them does little to prevent their recurrence. In this case, the deeper problem lies in how the pricing decision was made.

As with many other policies, wheat pricing appears to have been decided with limited, if any, input from stakeholders. When such decisions are announced, those directly affected are often taken by surprise. Excluded from the process, they were left with few options other than protest.

Amending the price by presidential decree may ease tensions by treating the symptoms, but it does not address the underlying problem. The same episode occurred last year, when a decree issued by President Sharaa in June 2025 added a $ 130-per-tonne bonus to the initial price set by the Ministry of Economy in March 2025, which had set the rate at $320 per tonne. The repetition shows that the problem is not simply the price. It is the absence of a credible process for setting it.

From decrees to process

Rather than correcting the rate from the top, the president could have instructed the economy minister to reopen the decision, consult with farmers, and ensure they are more involved in future pricing decisions. A transparent mechanism, grounded in real production costs and regional differences, would have made the backlash less likely and the final decision more credible.

The president could also have empowered the farmers' union, which remained largely irrelevant throughout the dispute, to play a more active role. Instead of leading efforts to negotiate a fair price with the government, the union was sidelined. That left farmers without an institutional channel to express their concerns and pushed the dispute into the street.

The last thing Syria needs is to be trapped in a cycle of institutional failure: ministries issue unpopular decisions, citizens take to the streets, and the president steps in to contain the crisis. It needs institutions that can listen, adjust, and act before anger spills over. Presidential intervention may settle a dispute; institutional reform can stop it from erupting at all.