The arrest of Syrian media activist Bakkar Hamidi by the Military Police on 12 July has sparked both protests and problems for the authorities, as they continue to emerge from the shadows of a long civil war where feelings remain strong. Hamidi is well-known within Syria for his social media posts, in which he ‘names and shames’ those suspected of crimes under the former Assad regime, which was finally deposed by those leading the current government in December 2024.
No official explanation has been given for Hamidi’s arrest, but reports suggest that it was linked to sectarian incitement against Alawite and Murshidi towns in rural Hama’s al-Ghab area, which he portrayed as complicit in former regime violations. His detention quickly sparked protests in his area, where many saw it as an unjustified move against a revolutionary voice at a time when accountability for regime-era crimes remains slow and incomplete.
Hamidi’s arrest exposes one of the key dilemmas facing Syria’s transition: how to confront sectarian incitement and vigilante violence without appearing to criminalise revolutionary voices or protect former regime loyalists from accountability. It is a careful balancing act. Many victims of Assad-era crimes still see those responsible for their abuses living freely. In such an environment, the demand for justice is not abstract; it is personal, urgent, and often raw. But that is precisely why the line between accountability and revenge must be defended.
The vigilante trap
Since the fall of the Assad regime, many areas in Syria, particularly in Homs and Hama, have witnessed repeated incidents of vigilante and sectarian violence. Hundreds of people are believed to have been killed during the transition. Although such killings appear to have declined, they have not disappeared. Their persistence shows how easily unresolved grievances, sectarian tensions, and weak law enforcement can turn into cycles of bloodshed.
In this context, online incitement is not just speech in the digital void. Publishing names and images of alleged regime affiliates, or implying that entire towns or communities are collectively responsible for past crimes, can have real consequences. In a fragile security environment, it can function as a target list and give moral cover to revenge attacks, deepening fear among communities already vulnerable to collective blame.
The authorities are therefore right to treat incitement seriously. Those who fuel sectarian hatred or encourage vigilante violence should be held accountable. But how the state acts matters as much as whether it acts. Arrests without explanation, and enforcement without consistency, risk undermining the very purpose of accountability.
Opacity weakens justice
In Hamidi’s case, the absence of official transparency is damaging. It allows his supporters to present him as a victim. For those who protested his arrest, he is not a danger to public order but a revolutionary activist speaking out against former regime networks. If the authorities believe his posts crossed the line into incitement, they need to explain the legal basis for the arrest, the nature of the offence, and the harm they believe was caused. Without that, the case risks being read as arbitrary punishment rather than legal accountability.
