RSF defections may tip the balance in the Sudan war stalemate

The powerful militia controls half the country, battling the Sudanese Armed Forces for the rest, but has had several setbacks as of late, including defections to the other side

A Reuters reporter displays a video of RSF commander al-Fateh Abdullah Idris, known as Abu Lulu, on his phone.
REUTERS/Amr Abdallah Dalsh
A Reuters reporter displays a video of RSF commander al-Fateh Abdullah Idris, known as Abu Lulu, on his phone.

RSF defections may tip the balance in the Sudan war stalemate

A flurry of defections from a powerful Sudanese militia, combined with a recent military victory by the Sudanese Armed Forces in the south, has led some to wonder whether the tide may finally be turning in one of Africa’s deadliest civil wars.

It comes after the army said it had recaptured the town of Khor Hassan in the south-eastern Blue Nile state, which borders Ethiopia. The region, which has become a flashpoint, is key geographically, as it provides direct access to central Sudan. It is also mineral-rich, with gold deposits.

Since April 2023, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti), has battled the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in a brutal conflict. The RSF finally seized all of Darfur, a huge region in the west, late last year with the siege and capture of the regional capital, El Fasher.

The RSF has used extermination, looting, terror, and forced displacement as part of its methods, killing around 6,000 people in just three days in October, in what many have described as war crimes. With financial and logistical support from Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (both of which deny helping), the militia had looked unstoppable, but over recent weeks, cracks have appeared.

Among the most damaging setbacks has been a chain of defections from senior RSF leaders, beginning in October, as the SAF moved in to liberate Gezira state. Abu Aqla Keikel, the RSF’s supreme commander in Gezira, announced his defection to the SAF. After he did so, villages in eastern Gezira were subjected to a campaign of violence and revenge by the RSF, which relies on collective punishment and fear.

In April came the defection of Maj. Gen. Al-Nour Ahmed Adam (known as al-Qubba)—a co-founder of the militia and widely considered its third most powerful figure. An RSF court quickly sentenced him to death in absentia. Al-Qubba brings valuable intelligence regarding RSF supply lines across Sudan’s borders with Chad and Libya, as well as the locations of RSF air defence vehicles, drone launch sites, and weapons stores.

In May 2026, Ali Rizqallah (known as al-Safna) said he had left the RSF. Al-Safna played a major field role in the battles of Kordofan and in the siege of El Fasher. He later said the RSF was living through a state of collapse and internal fragmentation, and that Hemedti’s decisions were now being dictated by external instructions. He added that he was prepared to face “accountability before the courts” for his role during the war, after acknowledging his participation in the capture of areas in Kordofan.

 RAPID SUPPORT FORCES (RSF) / AFP
RSF members reportedly detaining a fighter known as Abu Lulu (L) in El-Fasher, in war-torn Sudan’s western Darfur region, on 30 October 2025.

Loyalties and interests

To understand the context of these defections, it helps to understand that the RSF built its power on a network of tribal loyalties, financial interests, and external protection, rather than on a unifying national doctrine or a stable institutional structure. This network allowed it to expand swiftly. In the early months of war, looting was bountiful, supplies flowed, and external discourse provided the militia with political cover. Slowly, the spoils of war grew rarer.

The group has sought external support. In February 2026, it was reported that Ethiopia had been hosting a secret RSF training camp in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, close to the Sudanese border.

A flurry of defections from the RSF has led some to wonder whether the tide may finally be turning in one of Africa's deadliest civil wars

The camp is described as having a capacity of up to 10,000 fighters and contained around 4,300 trainees in January 2026. These forces have attacked the border city of Kurmuk in south-eastern Sudan, and drone attacks have recently been launched from Ethiopian territory.

As commanders splinter, loyalties waver, and losses accumulate, the RSF has looked to recruit mercenaries from other countries, look for a new transit route and border airstrips, and restock on drones. Asosa Airport has reportedly been upgraded to include facilities linked to drone operations. Up to 60% of RSF fighters are now mercenaries from abroad. The war's cross-border supply network teems with activity.

EBRAHIM HAMID / AFP
Sudanese army soldiers celebrate as they patrol in Salha, south of Omdurman, two days after the Sudanese army recaptured it from the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), on 22 May 2025.

Successive SAF victories

The Sudanese army's successive victories, from the liberation of Khartoum and Gezira to the recent lifting of the siege on strategic positions in Kordofan, weigh heavily on the militia, whose political alliance is called Tasis. What can truly stop the war is the termination of the RSF's institutional existence, including dismantling its military structure, cutting its funding and armament lines, ending its external sponsorship, and stripping its political project of the capacity for armed blackmail.

This can happen peacefully and through negotiation once those who feed the militia's illusions and political ambitions stop doing so. That means cutting it off from weapons, military equipment, and political ammunition. Some Sudanese refugees have been bitterly disappointed by the army's pragmatic decision to welcome RSF defectors who may be guilty of war crimes. The SAF now has to balance its priorities of defeating the militia and ensuring justice for its victims.

The state may pardon the public-law offence but cannot extinguish individual rights; the path to litigation and the pursuit of justice, therefore, remains open to citizens and civil society actors harmed by these commanders. Yet in the broader calculus of the state, preventing the greater harm of their continued presence in the militia's trench is the priority. Some are sceptical. Bakri al-Jak, a Sumud alliance spokesman, said anyone who believes the war will end through defections "will wait a long time".

The defections do alter the balance of power. They may not write the war's final chapter, but they tear out some of its darkest pages

In politics, as in war, partial steps are judged not by whether they deliver the final outcome at once, but by whether they shift the balance of power. The SAF's aim is to weaken the RSF until it has no choice but to negotiate its own peaceful dismantling. These defections do alter the balance of power. They may not write the war's final chapter, but they tear out some of its darkest pages.

Sudan today faces a double task: to open the door to all those who wish to leave the RSF, and to close the road to its political or regional recycling. Dismantlement does not mean chaos; accountability does not mean obstructing defection; and sovereignty does not mean denying the need for a political settlement. Yet such a settlement must begin with truth, not a false equivalence between the state and the militia.

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