The end of the SDF's anti-IS role leaves it vulnerable

Unmisktable shift

US officials were careful not to publicly assign blame. But their statements made something else clear: The existing system for securing IS detainees is no longer viewed as reliable. Behind the diplomatic language, confidence in the SDF's ability to manage the problem has eroded.

That shift became unmistakable in recent messaging from senior US officials. Remarks by the president's special envoy, Tom Barrack, signalled a move away from the SDF and toward Damascus as Washington's primary partner in preventing an IS resurgence. Stability, centralised authority, and unified control over detention facilities were no longer framed as abstract political goals. They were described as operational necessities.

President Donald Trump underscored the change in his own blunt style. Referring to the Shaddadi breakout, he claimed credit for stopping an IS prison escape by working with Syria's new leadership, boasting that escaped European fighters were quickly recaptured and returned to custody. The political takeaway was unmistakable. In Trump's telling, coordination with Damascus, not reliance on the SDF, resolved the crisis.

For the SDF, this represents a strategic blow. Control of IS detainees had long been its strongest bargaining chip with Washington. That chip is now being reframed as a liability. Rather than demonstrating the SDF's indispensability, recent events are being cited as evidence that divided authority creates openings for IS to exploit.

Read more: The SDF: from chosen US security partner to liability

Laying the groundwork

Damascus, for its part, has been laying the groundwork for this moment. The Syrian government joined the international anti-IS coalition, publicly offered to assume responsibility for prisons and camps, and portrayed the SDF's handling of detainees as politically-motivated rather than security-driven. More recently, it has gone further, arguing that IS suspects should be tried in local courts rather than warehoused indefinitely. While controversial among many Western governments, the proposal reflects an effort to shift from indefinite containment to resolution.

In recent days, Syrian government forces have acted on that posture. Damascus cooperated with US forces to recapture around 80 prisoners who escaped from the Shaddadi facility. Syrian security units were deployed to secure the al-Hol camp a day after the SDF announced its withdrawal. Government forces also assumed control of al-Aqtan prison in Raqqa province under a deal brokered by the United States.

Beyond these handovers, Washington is reportedly in the process of transferring up to 7,000 IS detainees from SDF-run prisons in Hasakeh to Iraq. US officials say the transfers prioritise the group's "most dangerous" fighters, many of them foreign nationals, including Europeans, and are intended to reduce the risk of further escapes.

While the future of northeastern Syria is still being negotiated, the direction of US policy is no longer in doubt. A chapter of America's war against the Islamic State has closed, ending the era in which the SDF served as Washington's indispensable partner. What follows is not merely a loss of leverage, but a reckoning with a political reality in which the SDF no longer occupies a role that ensures its survival.