Despite the whispers, Maher al-Assad is not ‘coming back’ to Syria

This week, Syrians have commemorated the first anniversary of the revolution that finally ended half a century of rule by the Assad dynasty, even as mass graves continue to be discovered, and even as new images of detainees tortured to death in Assad's prisons continue to appear. Syria's wounds are nowhere near healed. That process will not be helped if killers insist on returning to the scene of the crime to carry out further atrocities.

The Reuters report is deep on detail and shows how important Lebanon is to those doing the planning (associates are also listed as being based in the United Arab Emirates). Information from Damascus and Beirut indicates that the operations room overseen by Maj. Gen. Kamal al-Hassan includes a Lebanese figure backed by Israel, someone who commands digital armies and social media platforms. Some think it is telling that such actors are not being pursued in Lebanon, the Lebanese-Syrian border having featured prominently in the March 2025 rebellion plot.

Plotting from Lebanon

Associates of Makhlouf and al-Hassan appear to be operating freely in a country already grappling with internal crises and strained relations with Arab and international partners owing to the failure to disarm Hezbollah. It is puzzling how authorities ostensibly trying to dismantle one militia can allow the formation and operation of new ones on their soil.

As Lebanon tries to move past an era in which Hezbollah controlled associations, finances, illicit networks, and Islamic financing, how is it that figures like Hassan, Makhlouf, and others can so brazenly violate Lebanese law and sabotage every effort to restore state authority? Why has no action been taken against the associations involved in this sectarian and destructive project, but security agencies act within minutes if a political activist posts something on social media?

This Reuters report should set off alarm bells. Israel has no interest in the return of the Assad regime, nor in figures like Makhlouf or Hassan; its objective is to sabotage Syria by deepening internal divisions, as it did in Sweida. Today, it is exploiting this situation to bolster its position in security negotiations with Damascus.

For Damascus to act

Lebanon, however, must now prioritise its own security, control its borders, and manage its relationship with Syria, because it is not just Hassan and Makhlouf who are involved, but other remnants of the regime also operating from within Lebanon. Syrian authorities need to help by pursuing these individuals and others like them. A failure to do so will stymie the process of transitional justice and signal the government's weakness to all Syrians, particularly those in the Alawite community.

True, the Syrian government has other priorities: large sections of the population are on the breadline and face a deepening economic crisis. Unemployment is not limited to one sect and poverty is not confined to one region. Even a cursory glance at the refugee camps will reveal the extent of Syrians' suffering. But Maher al-Assad is not coming back to Syria. Damascus can feel reassured that Moscow no longer backs armed insurrection, given its strategic interests in Syria and its relations with both Arab and Western states.

Be that as it may, any fresh armed venture launched by the Assad regime remnants will not turn back the clock to the Assad era, nor will it divide the country as they hope. It will only kill more innocent people. Syrians, across all communities, have endured more than enough of that. Only justice can guarantee civil peace.