The illusion of 'Lebanising' Hezbollah

Throughout its history, Hezbollah has never been a Lebanese party in any meaningful sense, even though many of its supporters are Lebanese

The illusion of 'Lebanising' Hezbollah

Lebanon is burdened by problems accumulated over decades: political and economic crises, sectarian divisions, and corruption that has hollowed out the state from within and deprived citizens and depositors of their savings. Addressing these problems is an urgent priority for the Lebanese. Yet any remedy requires a state capable of carrying out very basic responsibilities: exercising exclusive authority over its entire territory.

When the Lebanese rose up on 17 October 2019, views differed even among the protesters themselves. Some argued that the question of Hezbollah’s weapons should be set aside so that the struggle could focus on corruption and the ruling class. Others maintained that none of Lebanon’s crises could be resolved before the militias were disarmed, foremost among them Hezbollah. Subsequent events proved the latter view right.

Today, the same debate has resurfaced in a different form. After the war of 2024 and the war of 2026, which shows no sign of ending, the same questions have resurfaced: reconstruction, the return of more than one million displaced southerners, Israeli withdrawal from the territory it has occupied, and the search for a way to deal with Hezbollah’s arsenal.

The core problem

A look at recent history is enough to recall the nature of the problem and the disasters it has brought. Israel withdrew from Lebanon on 25 May 2000, and the justification for the weapons of the “resistance” disappeared. Resistance should be a means, not an end. Events, however, took another course. The Syrian and Iranian regimes invoked Israel's occupation of the Shebaa Farms as a pretext for Hezbollah retaining its weapons. For decades, both Beirut and Damascus never formally agreed on whether Shebaa was Lebanese or Syrian territory. Meanwhile, Hezbollah kept its weapons.

Those weapons were later implicated in the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, followed by the killings of political and media figures. Lebanese leaders then gathered around a dialogue table to discuss the future of Hezbollah’s arsenal. While the party’s secretary-general sat with them, promising a quiet summer and a serious discussion of the weapons issue, Hezbollah abducted two Israeli soldiers, and the 2006 war erupted. Hezbollah initiated the confrontation, and Israel responded by devastating Lebanon and its infrastructure.

The weapons of the “resistance” were subsequently turned inward, against the Lebanese themselves, and used to impose Hezbollah’s agenda on the state. Hassan Nasrallah, the party’s secretary-general at the time, declared that the purpose of those weapons was to protect Hezbollah. Israel was no longer the justification. The weapons had become both the means of power and the reason for preserving it.

Lebanon is once again being offered remedies it has already tried over the 26 years since liberation, with little reason to expect a different outcome.

Hezbollah then entered the war in Syria and became involved in Yemen. The Lebanese state and society proved unable to withstand the coercive power conferred by the militia's arsenal, just as the region struggled against Iran and its network of armed proxies.

Hezbollah's domination of Lebanon continued until the "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation carried out on Israel by Hamas. Soon after, Nasrallah decided to drag Lebanon into the conflict and opened what the party called a "supportive" front for Gaza. Once again, he fired the first shot against Israel, as he had in 2006. Among the consequences of that decision were Nasrallah's assassination along with much of Hezbollah's top brass leadership.

Assad then fell in Syria, severing the lifeline through which Hezbollah had received weapons and money across Syrian territory under the protection of the Syrian regime. Hezbollah subsequently signed what amounted to an agreement of capitulation with Israel. In 2026, however, it again fired rockets towards Israel, this time in retaliation for the killing of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, after using the ceasefire to regroup and rebuild its ranks.

Same remedy, same outcome

These chapters matter because Lebanon is once again being offered remedies it has already tried over the 26 years since liberation, with little reason to expect a different outcome.

One proposal is to embrace the people of the south and rebuild their towns and villages. Yet southern Lebanon has been rebuilt more than once since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah and its weapons then helped bring renewed occupation and destruction upon the south by starting more wars in Iran's service. As a result, no one today is likely to finance reconstruction while the group retains its weapons. Even so, the belief that reconstruction in itself would weaken Hezbollah is naive.

The belief that rebuilding the South in itself would weaken Hezbollah is naive.

Another proposal is dialogue. Yet how many rounds of Lebanese dialogue, under Arab and international sponsorship, have already been convened to address this question precisely? Again and again, dialogue became an exercise in pretence, which Hezbollah used to tighten its grip on the state and impose its agenda. Twenty-six years of such attempts have ended in failure. The weapons have remained unresolved, while the coercive power they confer has grown steadily stronger.

Foreign allegiance

The claim that Hezbollah and Lebanese Shiites are one and the same is another form of political blackmail that the party uses. Throughout its history, Hezbollah has never been a Lebanese party in any meaningful sense, even though many of its supporters are Lebanese.

The idea that Hezbollah can somehow be "Lebanised" is an illusion. Its supporters within the Shiite community therefore face a choice: whether to proceed towards self-destruction in the service of Iran's project to export its revolution, a project now drawing its final breaths whether anyone wishes to acknowledge it or not, or to return to their Lebanese identity. 

For their part, the Lebanese should not be forced into softening their position on Hezbollah's weapons simply to reassure the Shiite community. In fact, it is now their responsibility—first towards their own sons and daughters, and then towards Lebanon and the Lebanese—to distance themselves from a party from which the country has known little beyond killing, intimidation and corruption. That choice is theirs to make. 

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