Egypt’s possible command of Gaza force is fraught with risk

Cairo understands that what sounds like a reputation-enhancing regional role is in fact a poisoned chalice

AFP

Members of the Egyptian Special Forces during their deployment at the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip in Rafah, October 20, 2023.

Egypt’s possible command of Gaza force is fraught with risk

Amr Emam

last update on 23 Oct 2025

It seems likely that Egypt will be given command of the international stabilisation force being envisaged for the Gaza Strip as part of Phase II of US President Donald Trump’s peace plan. For Cairo, this is less an honour than a bitter medicine.

The force is likely to include troops from other states, not least from Islamic and Arab nations, to address a series of security, economic and geopolitical concerns. Backed by the US, Europe, and with a proposed UN Security Council mandate, the 5,000-strong force will aid post-war reconstruction efforts following the Israel-Hamas ceasefire reached earlier this month.

Its responsibility will include overseeing security when (and if) the Israeli army withdraws. It also includes disarming Gaza-based militant groups like Hamas, and securing a transitional Palestinian government, the formation of which is still being contested (Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has ruled out Palestinian Authority involvement in post-war Gaza).

In Jerusalem on 21 October, the Egyptian intelligence chief met US Vice President JD Vance and US Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff (together with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner) to discuss the fast-approaching 'day after’.

Nathan Howard / Reuters — US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff speaks to the media, next to US Vice President JD Vance and Jared Kushner in southern Israel on October 21, 2025.

Egypt is well aware off the difficulties of the role ahead, which carries security, political, economic, and social risks. Gaza’s volatile history and pending security vacuum, together with Egypt’s domestic vulnerabilities and strained regional dynamics, only add to an already-noxious mix.

Egyptian troops, who will make up most of this international stabilisation force, could easily be drawn into indefinite operations against Gaza-based militants, including the remnants of Hamas or emerging factions and gangs. Sky News, Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, and other media outlets have already reported that Israeli forces are supplying some anti-Hamas armed groups in Gaza.

Symptoms of the post-war turmoil are already appearing, with Hamas settling scores with Gaza residents and families believed to have spied for Israel during the war. In Rafah on 19 October, Hamas fought running battles with one such group believed to be led by Yasser Abu Shabab. The head of a former looting gang, he reportedly gets cash, guns, and cars from Israel, supplied via crossings.

In this context, Gaza’s security vacuum is only likely to widen—especially if Hamas does fully disarm—as it is bound to do according to the ceasefire agreement. If not, it could adopt a Hezbollah-like model, remaining as an armed force in the shadows without directly ruling Gaza.

Egyptian troops could easily get drawn into indefinite operations against Gaza-based militants

An inextricable quagmire

In this way, it is easy to see how the temporary stabilisation force could get dragged into a long and costly quagmire. The force faces risks if it has to square up to an armed Hamas, end score-settling among armed Palestinian groups, or gets caught in the crosshairs of further Israeli intervention.

Gaza abuts Sinai—a large peninsula in north-eastern Egypt—and this amplifies the dangers, because instability in the Strip could easily cross the border, with renewed terrorist activity as a result. Such a scenario is not without precedent; Islamic State (IS) was active in Sinai before Egyptian forces eradicated it in 2021. Some military analysts fear that IS sleeper cells remain present.

Fears of a renewal of violence in Sinai have fuelled Egyptian deployments there over the past two years, to prevent any spillover from Israel's war in Gaza across the shared 12km border. This caused tension with Tel Aviv, which accused Egypt of violating the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty that limits troop numbers in this area.

Egyptians have been strongly supportive of Gaza's Palestinians in recent years but are tentative when it comes to Egypt's future role in any force seen as enforcing Hamas disarmament for Western powers. Many see this as a form of 'collaboration' with Israel and the United States, meaning it could spark protests or unrest. That might not end well, given that Cairo shows little tolerance when it comes to protests about causes it thinks are being used by the Muslim Brotherhood to stir up anti-government sentiment.

There are wider concerns about the international stabilisation force and Egypt's role in it. The force's goals, though yet to be fully detailed, may be virtually impossible to achieve, all but guaranteeing its failure in Gaza. Is Egypt, therefore, being lined up as a scapegoat? If it is, this could damage its reputation both regionally and globally, potentially leading to financial repercussions.

Economic losses resulting from the Gaza war have already been felt in tourism and reduced transit fees from the Suez Canal—one of the country's largest sources of foreign currency (after exports, foreign direct investment, remittances from Egyptians working in other countries, and tourism).

Reuters — A huge container ship passes through the New Suez Canal, Ismailia, Egypt, July 25, 2015.

Lingering questions

It is not clear who will fund the Gaza stabilisation force, but regional and international donors are likely to contribute. Even if Egypt only funds the maintenance of its own troops in Gaza, this will add to a strained military budget already paying for additional Sinai operations. The impact will be felt in areas like debt servicing, infrastructure, education, and health.

Trump's new blueprint for ending the war in Gaza appears to bury his earlier plan to take over the war-devastated territory and move two million Palestinians into Egypt and Jordan, but displacement fears are still alive in Cairo (and possibly Amman). Some think Egypt will be asked to absorb some Gazans in Sinai temporarily until Gaza is once again habitable after reconstruction. This would overwhelm Egypt's resources and exacerbate its economic issues. In short, if the floodgates open, the Gaza crisis will fall neatly into Egypt's lap.

While command of the Gaza stabilisation force sounds grand and honourable, it is in fact fraught with risks that outweigh any potential gains in a high-stakes regional and international environment. Yet Egypt also knows that a secure and habitable Gaza is in its national security interests. There are no good choices here; only some that are slightly less bad than others.

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