New details emerge on Kamal Jumblatt's assassination

Classified documents from the 1970s obtained by Al Majalla show what led to the killing of the Lebanese Druze politician and how Syria came to occupy Lebanon

Al Majalla

New details emerge on Kamal Jumblatt's assassination

The story of the Syrian army’s entry into Lebanon remains a subject of controversy, even two decades after it withdrew in 2005. It is significant because it marked the beginning of what later became known as the era of “tutelage” over Lebanon.

Former President Hafez al-Assad initially deployed Syrian troops under the guise of the Palestinian Liberation Army, before officially committing them in early June 1976. Their crossing of the border coincided with the arrival of Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin in Damascus. The United States approved, as conveyed in a message to al-Assad via Jordan’s King Hussein. It also had tacit acceptance from Israel, which sought to diminish the influence of Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which was later expelled from Lebanon, relocating to Tunisia.

These insights are drawn from classified documents obtained by Al Majalla in the wake of the Assad regime’s collapse on 8 December 2024. They cast new light on the assassination of Druze leader and PLO ally Kamal Jumblatt in March 1977, nearly a year after his tempestuous seven-hour meeting with Hafez al-Assad in Damascus.

Jumblatt was a main opposition leader in Lebanon’s civil war, which had begun in 1975. By 1976, the opposition—aided by the PLO—controlled around 80% of Lebanon and was on the verge of military victory. His March 1976 meeting with al-Assad is significant because it was at this meeting that their divergent positions became clear.

The Assad-Jumblatt relationship remains one of the most enduring enigmas of the Lebanese civil war. Until now, it has been understood mostly through the oral accounts of those who worked with them, rather than through official documentation. The Assad regime had long pursued a policy of secrecy and denial in response to Arab accusations that Jumblatt was assassinated by Syrian intelligence.

Reuters
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt in Damascus, Syria, December 22, 2024.

This issue is still raw. Following the fall of the Assad regime last year, President Ahmed Al-Sharaa began his term by receiving Walid Jumblatt, the son of Kamal Bey and heir to the leadership of both the Druze community and Lebanon’s Progressive Socialist Party. In March, shortly after this meeting, authorities announced the arrest of Ibrahim Huwaija, the Syrian officer accused of orchestrating Kamal Jumblatt’s killing.

A region in turmoil

The seven-hour meeting between al-Assad and Jumblatt must be seen in context. The 1970s were marked by conflicts and shifts across the Arab world in the aftermath of the 1967 defeat to Israel and the events of Black September in 1970, which led to armed Palestinian groups being kicked out of Jordan, landing in Lebanon. Two months after Black September (a period of fighting between the PLO and Jordanian forces), al-Assad took power in Syria in November 1970.

He signed a disengagement agreement with Israel in May 1974, just months after the October War of the previous year, securing the future of his political regime under an American umbrella provided by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Then the Lebanese civil war broke out.

In response, al-Assad strengthened his ties with various Lebanese political factions as a way of tightening his grip on Lebanon, which he considered to be Syria’s “soft underbelly.” Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt was a powerful figure in Lebanese politics. He had led the Progressive Socialist Party since 1949 and headed the Lebanese National Movement, which had, since 1969, united nationalist, leftist, and communist groups.

Al-Assad wanted international legitimacy for Syria’s intervention in Lebanon, drawing on its strategic alliance with the Soviet Union and functional relationship with the United States, while keeping Israel informed. In the early 1970s, Syria-US talks centred on restoring diplomatic ties following a period of rupture, and on the broader implications of Egypt-Israel negotiations that eventually led to the Camp David Accords.

The Assad regime had long pursued a policy of secrecy and denial in response to Arab accusations that Jumblatt was assassinated by Syrian intelligence

In late November 1975, the UN Security Council passed a resolution extending the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights. US Assistant Secretary of State Alfred Atherton visited Damascus and met Syrian Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam on 17 January 1975. "I would like to hear your assessment of the situation in Lebanon," Atherton said. "Some reports have suggested you may be preparing to re-enter Lebanon. In this regard, I must say the Syrian government is playing a useful diplomatic role in Lebanon."

America's thoughts

Tensions in Lebanon escalated in early 1976, particularly in the spring, after the failure to form a national unity government and fears among certain Lebanese factions of a Syrian military intervention. According to classified Syrian documents, Jordan's King Hussein called al-Assad at 4am on 30 March 1976 to convey a message: "The United States views a Syrian military intervention in Lebanon with grave concern."

The following day, King Hussein sent another message to al-Assad from Washington, stating that he had discussed the Lebanese crisis with US President Gerald Ford and Kissinger and told them that, in his view, "there was no alternative to saving Lebanon other than a direct and overt Syrian intervention". The Americans, he noted, warned that a public military move could provoke an Israeli response, but expressed support for covert Syrian intervention and for Syria "assuming control of the situation in Lebanon".

The king further relayed an American message that "if the situation were to deteriorate further, the US might consider accepting an overt Syrian intervention," and that "in case they agree to its entry, Syria should clearly define its objectives, specify the scope and timing of its operations, and commit to a full withdrawal afterwards". Another document quotes Kissinger, saying: "There is no truth to what has been relayed to al-Assad, that America opposes the Syrian initiative in Lebanon." Kissinger added that the US ambassador in Beirut would warn Kamal Jumblatt of serious consequences if he continued to resist a ceasefire.

On the morning of 1 April 1976, the US ambassador delivered a message to Assad's 'Special Office.' Its contents are revealed here for the first time. It stated: "King Hussein informed us this morning that President Assad was told we are encouraging Jumblatt to continue fighting in Lebanon. The Secretary (Kissinger) wishes President Assad to know directly that this is a vicious and brazen lie aimed at sowing discord between the United States and Syria, and between the leaders of our two countries."

It continued: "As both President Ford and the Secretary stated unequivocally to the King this morning, something Ambassador Murphy will reiterate, we are clearly working to achieve a ceasefire, in line with the Syrian proposal of 22 January. Al-Assad should know that Ambassador Brown has strict and clear instructions and will be firm with Jumblatt regarding America's intent to take every step to stop the fighting. Jumblatt and his aides will bear the consequences… We are confident President Assad will not be misled by such Jumblatt manoeuvres."

AFP
US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in Damascus, January 30, 1974.

Discussing next steps

On 5 April 1976, another Kissinger message was delivered to Assad by Murphy. "If a new president is elected in Lebanon, ensuring the resignation of President Suleiman Frangieh, a government can be formed even if the fighting continues," it read. Kissinger proposed a programme to rebuild Lebanon, including its armed forces, with the United Nations possibly deploying international or Arab forces, and urged joint efforts to persuade Maronite leaders to adopt a political, economic, and social reform plan "to alleviate Muslim grievances". He said: "The United States will discuss any major step with Damascus and reach an agreement on it," adding that American action was "not counter to the Syrian move, but parallel and complementary to it."

On 14 April 1976, Ambassador Murphy met Syrian Foreign Ministry Advisor Adeeb al-Daoudi, saying Washington was "comfortable with a Syrian intervention in Lebanon" but warning that Israel may intervene. Al-Daoudi interpreted it as a threat and an intrusion into Syrian decision-making, saying: "We do not accept such a warning."

Meanwhile, President Assad met Foreign Minister Abdul Halim Khaddam, Chief of Staff Hikmat al-Shihabi, and others to review their options in Lebanon. They could either withdraw and leave the Lebanese factions to bear responsibility, enter Lebanon with full military force to impose a resolution, or explore the creation of a Lebanese military force operating under Syrian direction.

Al-Assad leaned towards full military entry, "given the insistence of the Palestinian leadership and Lebanese parties on continuing the fighting and their refusal to lift the siege on Zahle and the Christian villages in the north". Syrian forces moved towards the Lebanese border and crossed it on the night of 31 May 1976. It was opposed by Arab communist parties, which influenced Moscow's position.

Soviet consternation

Khaddam travelled to Moscow on 5 July 1976 to explain Syria's stance to his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Gromyko. According to transcripts obtained by Al Majalla, a deep rift emerged between the two. The Soviets supported Arafat and were firmly opposed to any Syrian intervention under what they saw as an American umbrella, but Khaddam told Gromyko that Syrian military intervention was "to restore balance between the two sides in favour of the resistance," adding: "It is a major gamble, but a necessary one to confront a conspiracy which, if it succeeds in Lebanon, will inevitably spill into Syria."

We reject this filthy sectarian war and won't allow one faction to crush the other, just as we will not allow the Palestinian resistance to be crushed

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad on the Lebanese civil war

Syria's initial military intervention had actually come six months earlier, on 20 January 1976, under the guise of the Palestine Liberation Army, which in reality consisted of Syrian special forces, according to Khaddam's papers. In his discussions with al-Assad, Jumblatt claimed that Syrian forces first entered Lebanon even earlier, in 1975.

The intervention by elements of the 'Liberation Army' and other units called Al-Sa'iqa took place in the north, near the cities of Tripoli and Zgharta, the hometown of President Suleiman Frangieh. On 21 January, Frangieh contacted al-Assad to protest. "A mistake has been made that we cannot allow to continue," al-Assad replied. "We reject this filthy sectarian war. We will not permit one faction to crush the other, just as we will not allow the national movement and the Palestinian resistance to be crushed. There is no solution but to stop the fighting and begin implementing the agreements."

That same day, al-Assad sent Khaddam to Beirut. An agreement was reached with Frangieh and others to halt hostilities the next morning. A tripartite Syrian-Palestinian-Lebanese high committee was formed, tasked with restoring order in Lebanon. The ceasefire took effect as planned, the committee convened and drafted a working plan, and within a week, all visible armed presence in Beirut had been removed.

Jumblatt and Assad

Life in the capital returned to relative normality until March. During this period, two members of Jumblatt's party met Khaddam in Beirut and informed him that Arafat was trying to obstruct the ceasefire and its terms. Arafat was summoned to Damascus for a meeting with al-Assad. During their encounter, he alluded to the growing perception that Syria aimed to "undermine the Palestinian resistance" and to kill him.

Before arriving in Damascus, Arafat requested that Jumblatt also be invited. Jumblatt accepted the invitation and held a marathon seven-hour meeting with al-Assad, during which the Syrian president tried unsuccessfully to persuade him to end the fighting. When al-Assad asked what Jumblatt wanted, Khaddam claimed that Jumblatt said: "I want weapons to kill part of the Christians and displace the rest, so they remain a minority we can rule, as they ruled us for 140 years." Al-Assad responded: "Are you crazy? How can I give you weapons to kill citizens simply because of their religious affiliation? That is absolutely unacceptable to us." He added that the conflict only served Israel's interests and would push Christians "into its embrace".

AFP
An undated file picture from the early 1970s shows from L to R: late Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salam, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, late Christian right-wing leader Pierre Gemayel and Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt.

On 27 May 1976, delegations from several Lebanese Christian villages near the Syrian border that were under siege by Palestinian forces arrived in Damascus seeking help. They said that if al-Assad refused, they would seek help from abroad, or even from Israel. Khaddam queried the choice of Israel, but one said: "In 1970, a hundred Palestinian fedayeen sought refuge in Israel to escape (Jordan's) King Hussein. If the fedayeen themselves once did that, why shouldn't we?" In response, al-Assad dispatched Syrian soldiers to lift the siege on the Christian villages.

Syria digs in

During their meeting on 5 July 1976, Gromyko grilled Khaddam. "You said that Syria cannot agree to dismantle the resistance, since Syria's position is fundamentally anti-Israel and opposed to US policy in the region. How do you reconcile this with the operations your forces are carrying out in Lebanon? How can your weapons be used against these forces? You have participated in the siege of some Palestinian camps, which has prevented us from delivering medical and food supplies. We are astonished by this, especially given that Syria is our friend. It is shocking, at least from a humanitarian perspective. How do you reconcile your statements with your actions?"

On 1 October 1977, The New York Times reported that al-Assad had rejected a direct plea on 11 September from Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to withdraw Syrian forces from Lebanon, citing a close aide of al-Assad, who said the Soviets and Syrians had "differing views" on Lebanon. "We have our own positions, and we will not compromise on them," al-Assad reportedly responded. "I hope our Soviet friends understand our perspective. But I don't believe they fully grasp the reasons behind our presence in Lebanon."

Khaddam told Gromyko that his information was "either inaccurate or one-sided," adding: "Our weapons have not been used in Lebanon against the Palestinians. Our forces entered Beirut on 21 January to defend them. Three and a half years ago, we deployed air defence units to protect Palestinian positions. What was their fate? They were either imprisoned or killed in the very camps they were sent to defend." Khaddam explained that it was Jumblatt's claim that Syrians were besieging Palestinian camps, but that "it is simply not true".

Jumblatt sought to build bridges with Assad, warning that Israel and the US were behind plans for a self-governing Maronite enclave in Lebanon's south

He offered to fly with a Soviet delegation immediately to the Tel al-Zaatar camp. "If we find a single Syrian soldier there, we will accept full responsibility. The nearest Syrian forces are 22km from Beirut. As I've said before, we are against the fighting. Anyone escalating it is either a conspirator or an instrument in the conspiracy. Why did Jumblatt open fire after 55 days of calm? Does he want to turn Lebanon into a progressive revolutionary state? Is that even possible? If he knows it is not yet still pursues it, then he is clearly enacting part of the regional conspiracy. Does Comrade Gromyko believe Syria is incapable of occupying the entirety of Lebanon within ten hours? We are fully capable, militarily, of ending the situation there, and neither Jumblatt's clamour nor Yasser Arafat's outcry will stop us."

Khaddam criticised Jumblatt for favouring foreign forces over Syrian troops and for praising Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who had visited the US a few months earlier in pursuit of peace with Israel. "You know Sadat's position with the United States," Khaddam told Gromyko. "So how do we explain Jumblatt's admiration for him and his American policies in the region? I urge you not to be swayed by those insincere tears."

A political killing

US President Jimmy Carter assumed office in early 1977 and dispatched his Secretary of State to the Middle East in a failed bid to defuse the Lebanese crisis. On 2 March 1977, just days before his assassination, Jumblatt wrote a rare letter to al-Assad.


Al Majalla

Read the letter, sourced from the Syrian archives, here


In it, Jumblatt sought to build bridges with al-Assad, warning that Israel and the United States were behind plans for a self-governing Maronite enclave in Lebanon's south, adding that this would ultimately lead to pressure on Syria's forces to withdraw. On 16 March 1977, Jumblatt was assassinated, gunned down in his car a few hundred metres from a Syrian army checkpoint, exactly a year after his turbulent meeting with al-Assad.

Two weeks later, on 30 March 1977, a Christian delegation travelled to Damascus for a meeting with Khaddam. The group included Edmond Rizk, Georges Saadeh, Karim Pakradouni, and Amine Gemayel, who would later become President of Lebanon in 1982, succeeding his assassinated brother, Bashir. Representing Syria were Chief of Staff Hikmat al-Shihabi, Maj. Gen. Naji Jamil, Col. Mohammed al-Khouli, and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Abdul Karim Oday.

Discussion turned to the political vacuum created by Jumblatt's death. Pakradouni said Lebanon had "lived through the Jumblatt era" and that "Lebanon with Jumblatt was one thing, and without him another". Despite deep political rivalries, all parties acknowledged the profound role Jumblatt had played in Lebanese political life since independence. In the years that followed, Lebanon witnessed a cascade of developments, assassinations, and shifting alliances.

In June 1982, Israel launched a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. With tacit Syrian approval, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) established an armed group, Hezbollah, on Lebanese soil. In August 1982, Arafat and his fighters were expelled from Lebanon, choosing to relocate to Tunisia. Syria's influence reached its zenith after the 1989 Taif Agreement, which ended Lebanon's civil war.

On 13 October 1990, benefiting from its participation in the Gulf War and with American approval, Syrian forces and the Lebanese Army launched an offensive against the areas under the control of "rebel" Gen. Michel Aoun, who was subsequently exiled. It was only in 2005, five years after Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father as Syrian president, that the Syrian army finally withdrew from Lebanon, after a huge backlash against the killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, which many blamed al-Assad for. This brought to a close decades of Syrian tutelage.

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