In January, the British government created a new ‘Soft Power Council’ to boost the UK’s international influence. The group, which included leading cultural figures, was designed to work alongside other British institutions, such as the royal family, to help promote Britain’s international prestige, its ‘soft power.’ Yet barely a few months into its existence, The Guardian reports that leading figures from the council have warned that London’s economic policies are risking its soft power goals.
While the UK is pouring money into its ‘hard power’ assets via an increased defence budget, key soft power entities like the BBC World Service, British Council and universities are being underfunded, and Britain is far from unique. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many Western leaders have concluded that we’re back in a ‘hard power’ world, and defence and military assets need to be prioritised over soft power tools. So, are entities like Britain’s Soft Power Council simply wishful thinking, or can soft power still have geostrategic value in an increasingly hard power world?
Joseph Nye’s ‘Soft Power’
The term ‘Soft Power’ was coined by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye in 1990. He argued that ‘Soft Power’ was “getting others to want the outcomes that you want.” According to Nye, traditional, ‘hard’ power in international relations was coercive, whereby more powerful states would use material incentives to coerce weaker states to do as they wanted. This meant using military or economic tools as either sticks or carrots: threats, violence, and sanctions to enemies, and alliances, arms, and investment to allies. Ultimately, though, all these relationships were transactional: states complied or resisted based on what they might materially gain or lose by doing so.
But Nye believed that states could be co-opted rather than coerced. If the more powerful state’s ideology, culture and way of life were attractive to less powerful states, the latter’s government and people might be enticed to follow, regardless of material outcome. Nye examined the appeal of ‘The American Dream’ in persuading countries to align with the US during the Cold War, or, similarly, the attractiveness of Communism in drawing many countries in the Global South into the Soviet orbit.
Nye’s ideas were understandable in the post-Cold War world he wrote about: the era of Francis Fukuyama’s "End of History," characterised by the supposed triumph of Western liberal capitalist democracy alongside unmatched US power. Of course, the world looks very different 35 years later, with the return of multi-polarity and the end of US global hegemony. With international relations once again dominated by hard power—indeed, many argue it always has been—some might question whether soft power remains relevant.
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The West’s focus on Hard Power
Western governments appear to be leading the renewed focus on hard power. European governments have been rocked by the dual shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Donald Trump’s questionable commitment to European security, prompting many to rapidly increase their defence budgets.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), European defence expenditure (including Russia) rose by 17% to $693mn last year, the highest levels since the end of the Cold War. Britain has increased its defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, with the intention of increasing it to 3%, while Germany has indicated that it might grow its defence budget to 5% of GDP. NATO leader Mark Rutte has stated he wants all members to be spending 3.5% of GDP on defence by the mid-2030s.
Even though the US under Trump appears less interested in defending Europe militarily, it is still prioritising hard over soft power. Trump’s emphasis on economics as a tool of diplomacy is still what Nye would call coercive power: using the threat of sanctions or the prospect of a trade deal as a tool to get what he wants. Moreover, Trump’s apparent disregard for the reputational damage the US suffers because of his crackdowns on migrants and protestors at home, or his humiliation of allies like Zelenskyy and Ramaphosa in the White House, suggests he is not concerned by ‘co-optive’ power.
