Politics

Now that the guns have fallen silent, what next for Iran?

Tehran will return to nuclear negotiations with far fewer cards. Even if it seeks a token gesture on enrichment, that could be rejected. Remaining options include capitulation or even civil war.

ATTA KENARE / AFP

Iranians chant slogans and wave national flags as they celebrate a ceasefire between Iran and Israel at Enghlab Square in the capital Tehran on June 24, 2025.

Now that the guns have fallen silent, what next for Iran?

Wahid Abdel Maguid

last update on 26 Jun 2025

Iran demonstrated remarkable agility in absorbing the shock of the initial, unexpected Israeli strike, swiftly replacing more than 20 high-ranking military and security commanders killed in the attack, and retaliating with domestically-produced ballistic missiles and drones.

Despite its speed of response, however, there was a pronounced and evident disparity in overall military capabilities, which clearly favoured Israel. This imbalance not only shaped the outcome of the conflict but, increasingly, could also shape the structural integrity of the Iranian regime. With the guns having fallen silent for now, but with Iran left vulnerable, what lies ahead for the country and its system of governance?

The most favourable option is for Iran to resume nuclear negotiations. It was reportedly drafting a proposal when Israel began bombing. This is believed to include a ban on uranium enrichment within Iran, the establishment of a regional enrichment consortium involving other states, restrictions on Iran’s missile development programme, and limitations on its financial and logistical support for regional allies and proxies.

Concessions sought

Should negotiations resume, Iran would likely seek an agreement permitting uranium enrichment at very low levels (as little as 1%), a symbolic concession intended to uphold national dignity while preserving a minimal yet scalable nuclear infrastructure that could be expanded in the future if necessary. Under current conditions, however, this scenario does not appear likely, not least because US President Donald Trump has explicitly ruled it out.

The second scenario, supported by Israel and some other Western powers, envisions the Iranian regime’s capitulation and acceptance of a complete cessation of its nuclear programme on imposed terms. Such a white-flag moment would be reminiscent of Emperor Hirohito’s World War II surrender on 15 August 1945, when he addressed the Japanese people and the world by radio, just days after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Some observers believe that Trump may have wanted something similar from Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (Trump remarked on 18 June that, although the whereabouts of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei were known to Washington, his assassination was not currently under consideration). Yet this scenario also appears highly unlikely.

ATTA KENARE / AFP — An Iranian man holds a portrait of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as people celebrate a ceasefire between Iran and Israel at Enghlab Square in the capital Tehran on June 24, 2025.

Unlikely to collapse

Iran in 2025 is not Japan in 1945, the latter having suffered overwhelming devastation, with no capacity to continue resisting. The Iranian regime, by contrast, retains significant resilience—even after direct US military intervention—thanks to its deeply entrenched, ideologically-driven infrastructure.

It commands a semi-militarised popular base mobilised by powerful institutions such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij militia, and a network of grassroots organisations operating across nearly every province. The regime's ideological rigidity further reinforces its internal cohesion—unlike the Japanese leadership in 1945, which had already been sapped of ideological resolve.

The psychological impact of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings was immense and irreparable. This had effectively marked 'a point of no return' for Japan's rulers, delivering a strategic shock from which they could not recover. By contrast, the Iran-Israel war had been largely anticipated, including by Iranians. Following the shock of the initial Israeli strikes, no further shocks appear to have materialised.

Slow erosion

There is a third scenario. This envisions the gradual destabilisation—and eventual collapse—of the Iranian regime, an outcome actively pursued by Israel. While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior officials have repeatedly stated that regime change is not an explicit war aim, they also acknowledged that it could be a consequential outcome.

Realising this outcome would require close coordination between Israel and Iranian opposition groups in exile, capitalising on any disarray within the regime. If Iran's central and regional security apparatus has suffered significant damage, its ability to maintain control, especially over peripheral regions, could be severely compromised.

A third scenario envisions the gradual destabilisation—and eventual collapse—of the Iranian regime, an outcome actively pursued by Israel

Iran's geographic vulnerability further exacerbates this risk. It shares 6,000km of land borders with seven neighbours (Afghanistan and Pakistan to the east, Iraq and Türkiye to the west, and Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkmenistan to the north) and it has a 2,700km maritime border.

Weakened but alive

If Iran's central government were to lose its grip, militarised factions of opposition groups could begin to mobilise, particularly those with intimate knowledge of Iran's geography and social dynamics. Chief among these is the People's Mujahedin of Iran (MEK). Founded in 1965 in opposition to the Shah, it predates the current regime.

However, such a trajectory is unlikely to result in a slow, orderly collapse. More plausibly, it would trigger a protracted civil war. While it cannot be entirely ruled out, such a scenario remains improbable, particularly in the absence of sustained, coordinated groundwork laid months or even years prior to the current conflict.

Ultimately, the prospect of the regime's overthrow as a direct consequence of 'the 12-Day War' with Israel and the United States appears less plausible than its survival in a considerably weakened state, more so perhaps than at any point since the early 2000s, when Iran's nuclear ambitions and regional influence began to take shape.

Some will be relieved. The sudden and unstructured collapse of the regime, with no viable and prepared alternative to assume power, would almost certainly plunge the country into chaos. Regardless of what Mr Netanyahu would prefer, that would serve neither the interests of the region nor of global powers. From his most recent comments about "talking" to the Iranians, it appears that Mr Trump may have grasped that.

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