The United States’ Caesar Act was introduced in December 2019 during President Donald Trump’s first term of office. It sanctioned the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad for ordering the torture and killing of tens of thousands of Syrians.
The Act was named after the codename for Lt. Farid al Madhan, who finally revealed his identity earlier this month. A forensic photographer from the military police in Damascus, his job was to photograph those killed in detention before they were buried in mass graves. He left Syria in 2014 with 50,000 images that he handed to the Americans as evidence.
The Act came into effect in 2020. Two months after a rebel alliance led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) kicked al-Assad and his regime from power, it remains in force. Trump has the power to suspend it, and those trying to rebuild the country are urging him to do so, citing the sanctions as a major obstacle to Syria’s economic recovery.
Five years ago, Matt Zweig worked for the House Foreign Affairs Committee as the Senior Sanctions Advisor in the Office of the Special Representative for Syria Engagement from July 2019 to December 2020. As such, he had a big role to play in drafting the Caesar Act, the sanctions of which target the provision of goods, services, technology, information, or technical support in the production of gas, oil and its derivatives, while also aiming to deter foreign investors from signing contracts for reconstruction.
Speaking to Al Majalla, Zweig revealed details of how the law was written, whether he feels that now is the right time to lift the US sanctions, and if so, how that could be done, prefacing it all with the warning that “it is incredibly complicated”.
Drawing up the Act
Zweig said he was told to “come up with something that increases the sanctions against both the Assad regime and their enablers,” adding: “I had a portfolio for sanctions covering illicit finance... The aim was to alter the behaviour of the Assad regime, its supporters and enablers, and eventually guide the political process towards establishing a new governing entity.”
The Caesar Act was but the latest incarnation of statutory sanctions targeting the Syrian regime. “The underlying rationale for (sanctioning al-Assad) was his regime’s support of insurgents and terrorists in Iraq that were targeting US personnel,” said Zweig. “That provided the underpinning of the legislative basis for the statutory sanctions that were imposed on the Assad regime.”
The Caesar Act was drafted in the lead-up to the siege of Aleppo, during the worst of the fighting, and garnered bipartisan support when it was introduced by Eliot Engel (a New York Democrat and the committee's senior member) and Ed Royce (a Californian Republican who chaired the committee).
He worked with colleagues who had drawn up sanctions of North Korea, Iran, drug cartels, and terrorists, noting how that bipartisan support, from both Democrats and Republicans, helped get things done. "The objective was clear: to isolate the regime, and to target its facilitators and enablers. But the other part was to support the political process that had been generally agreed upon."
The Act's purpose
Sanctions were imposed on individuals, businesses, financial networks, war-fighting industries (like construction and engineering), and foreign governments. Among the cited concerns was that Syrian airspace was being used (by Syrian and Russian jets) to target civilians.
The Act said those living under siege should have access to medical care and freedom of travel, that political prisoners should be released, schools and hospitals should not be targeted, and the regime should take verifiable steps to comply with conventions and treaties prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons.
It also demanded the safe return of displaced Syrians, those guilty of war crimes to be held to account, and steps to be taken towards a political process that would usher in a more inclusive and representative government.
"It was for regime behaviour change," said Zweig. "Basically, the regime would have to cease behaving like the regime and that was the key. I don't think any of us saw this in terms of regime change."
Although most Arab states shunned al-Assad's Syria in the years after 2011, some sought a normalisation of relations from 2018 onwards. The Caesar Act essentially limited how far these Arab states' normalisation efforts could go.
"It was both political and functional," said Zweig. "There was political consensus behind the sanctions. In the last Congress, there was the Assad Anti-Normalisation Act, a major piece of legislation that enhanced sanctions. That was bipartisan, too. So normalisation would be politically perilous for other countries to engage in."
