Khaddam Files: Bashar tells Hariri, 'I decide who governs Lebanon'

Al-Assad told Khaddam later that morning that he had "summoned Rafic Hariri and spoke to him bluntly in the presence of my officers. I made it clear that he was not to support any candidate for the Lebanese presidency other than Emile Lahoud. I alone decide who governs Lebanon, and anyone who dares to defy me—I will break his bones".

Khaddam was taken aback and challenged Syria's president. "You are addressing the Prime Minister of Lebanon, a leader who represents the country's Sunni Muslims. Have you considered the repercussions if your words become public? How can you speak to the Lebanese Prime Minister in such a manner, especially in the presence of military officers? What purpose does this serve, for you or for Syria?"

According to Khaddam, al-Assad then softened his stance, adding: "Invite Prime Minister Hariri to meet with you and try to undo the damage." Khaddam spoke to Hariri over the phone. "I will never set foot in Damascus again," he told Khaddam, who nevertheless persuaded him to meet Khaddam at the latter's home in Bloudan.

When Hariri arrived, Khaddam said he was "visibly wounded by the experience" of his encounter with al-Assad. "He said to me, 'I will never forget that meeting with Bashar al-Assad for as long as I live.'" Khaddam intervened. "You are a politician, and you must not take things so personally. The president was emotional when he spoke to you. I met with him on the same day and could tell he regretted his reaction."

Assad backtracks

On 1 August 2004, Khaddam met Bashar al-Assad to discuss Lahoud's presidential term. "I have decided against the extension," al-Assad told Khaddam. "No one in the world supports Lahoud—not the Arab states, not the Lebanese majority. I have already informed him that Syria has no intention of prolonging his presidency."

Wary of al-Assad's mercurial tendencies, Khaddam said: "I hope no one compels you to alter this stance. Neither you nor Syria can afford the consequences." Al-Assad assured Khaddam that he had been "unwavering in my position" with Lahoud.

Three days later, while Khaddam was in France, he took a call from Hariri: Al-Assad had once again changed course. "The Doctor has reversed his decision on the extension," Hariri said, referring to al-Assad by the title often used to address him. "He summoned me to Damascus for a brief meeting."

Hariri said he was told that al-Assad was backing Lahoud's extension and that Hariri had spoken to experienced Lebanese Druze politician Walid Jumblatt, who advised Hariri to accept the extension and then resign. Khaddam concurred with Jumblatt's counsel. "You cannot withstand the fallout of outright defiance… agree to the extension, then leave Lebanon and announce your resignation from abroad."

Hariri conveyed his decision to Syrian intelligence officer Rustum Ghazaleh and left for Sardinia to reunite with his family. A few days later, while Khaddam was still in France, Hariri called again. "If I return to Lebanon, is my life at risk?" he asked. The gravity of the question lingered—one that, in hindsight, foreshadowed a tragic fate. Khaddam sought to reassure him. "You have complied with every demand." 

Pressure at the UN

At the time, European nations were trying to convene a UN Security Council session on Syria's military presence in Lebanon. With the session date set, al-Assad had Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa call his Spanish counterpart, Miguel Ángel Moratinos. According to Khaddam, if the Europeans cancelled the session, Syria would withdraw its backing for Lahoud and push for fresh presidential elections in Lebanon.

"Bashar personally appealed to the Spanish Prime Minister," said Khaddam. "He reaffirmed his commitment to the agreement." In response, the Spanish leader spoke to George W. Bush, Britain's Tony Blair, and Jacques Chirac. After hours of negotiations, they agreed to postpone it—providing Syria honoured its pledge."

The Spanish Foreign Minister called al-Sharaa to convey the news. "We now anticipate that the Syrian side will reach out to Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to annul the parliamentary session dedicated to amending the constitution." The response shocked everyone. Al-Sharaa said: "Lebanon is a sovereign nation. We have no authority over this matter. If you wish to discuss it, you should call Berri yourself."

Khaddam recalls: "The Spanish minister was visibly stunned. The very next day, the UN Security Council proceeded with its scheduled session and passed Resolution 1559, which unequivocally called for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon and an end to its interference in Lebanese affairs. 

"It further urged Lebanon to conduct presidential elections free from foreign influence, reaffirmed the country's sovereignty and independence, and mandated the disbanding of all non-state armed groups. Passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Resolution placed Syria's regime under direct international oversight, marking a turning point in its political entanglements in Lebanon."

Assad's Hariri headache

Khaddam had many questions. Why the about-turn from al-Assad? Why use Spain as an intermediary? Why propose something only to renege on it hours later? He returned from France on 5 September 2004 and met al-Assad the following day. The Syrian president spoke of his recent meetings with US Congressman Darrell Issa, who conveyed his willingness to facilitate improved Syrian-US relations, and with Martin Indyk, former security advisor to Bill Clinton. 

Then al-Assad revealed: "We have received intelligence indicating that the US and France have reached an agreement to expel Syria from Lebanon—and that Rafic Hariri played a pivotal role in orchestrating this plan."

Unconvinced, Khaddam said: "That is difficult to believe. Hariri confided in me after his conversation with you that, despite his misgivings about the extension, he would ultimately acquiesce. He had no intention of adopting a stance that would jeopardise Syria's presence in Lebanon." 

Al-Assad was unmoved. "I have instructed (al-Sharaa) to visit several European capitals to clarify our position and seek support from the Spanish foreign minister." Khaddam warned that "Spain cannot act independently of the EU in matters of foreign policy", adding that Spain's ambassador to the UN chaired the Security Council when Resolution 1559 was passed… Sending al-Sharaa on this mission is ill-advised—Europe is already inflamed with resentment toward Syria".

Advised to reconcile

Regarding the ramifications of Resolution 1559, Khaddam said the "most prudent" option was for Lahoud to step down, allowing a new presidential election. "The alternative, which could help contain the fallout, would require Syria to make strategic concessions—chief among them, reconciliation with the Christian leadership and opening a dialogue with Patriarch Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir." 

Khaddam told al-Assad that he "must personally oversee this dialogue," but al-Assad hesitated, asking: "How can I negotiate with the Patriarch? Others can be brought into the discussion." The Patriarch was a leader of Lebanon's Maronite Christians who, in the late 1980s, had helped end the country's civil war (just months later, Sfeir would support the Cedar Revolution that led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon).

Khaddam suggested that al-Assad invite Lebanese leaders like Berri, Hariri, Jumblatt, and Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah to Damascus for reconciliation talks, then "empower them to engage in dialogue with the Christian leadership, to lay the groundwork for the formation of a national unity government".

With disappointment, Khaddam added that he "left the meeting expecting Dr. Bashar to take decisive steps toward reconciliation, but nothing of the sort came to pass". On 21 September 2004, Hariri met Khaddam in (what would be his last visit to) Damascus. 

Hariri revisited the milestones of his cooperation with the Syrian government before voicing his reluctant acceptance of the constitutional amendment—an agreement he had reached despite his deep reservations. Any prospect of collaboration between him and President Emile Lahoud, he insisted, was untenable. 

He also believed that leading the next government would not serve Syria's interests. "As a Muslim and an Arab son of Sidon, I could never take a step that would harm Syria or diminish its influence in Lebanon," he is recorded as saying. Khaddam agreed that Hariri forming the next Lebanese government "is not in your best interest".

False backing

The next day, the Syrian president met Hariri for what would be their final meeting. According to Khaddam, al-Assad sought to reaffirm Syria's commitment to Hariri, praising his cooperation, particularly his acceptance of Lahoud's extended presidency. Hariri reaffirmed his stance on Syria. In response, al-Assad said: "I will not entertain any reports about you from any source—I will put them straight in the trash."

The meeting ended with a promise to meet again before the end of 2004 and Khaddam said Hariri looked relieved as he left, believing—perhaps, for the first time in a long while—that he had reached an understanding with Damascus.

Around this time, Syria's National Progressive Front convened a meeting where Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa delivered a political briefing. Asked if Hariri would form the next Lebanese government, al-Sharaa said: "That is out of the question. Hariri is conspiring against Syria alongside Chirac, who is taking money from him."

According to Khaddam, this statement sent a ripple of surprise through the room—particularly given that al-Assad had met Hariri just days earlier. Concerned by the repercussions, Khaddam asked al-Assad if the president had told al-Sharaa to make the claims. "I never gave such instructions," said an irritated al-Assad. "Who even asked him to speak about Lebanon? What business does he have commenting on it?"

A process frustrated

Sensing the need for damage control, al-Assad asked Khaddam to "call Hariri and deliver this message on my behalf: there is no prime minister for Lebanon other than Rafic Hariri; any suggestion to the contrary is false". Khaddam did so. But Hariri was frustrated. "Your people and Lahoud are obstructing the process" of forming the next Lebanese government, he said.

Syrian intelligence officer Rustum Ghazaleh is reported as having told Hariri that Syria "would not interfere and had no involvement in the formation of the government," despite al-Assad's message. Hariri then said Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri had "advised me to withdraw". Again, Khaddam concurred. "Arrange your departure immediately and submit your resignation from the airport." 

Hariri did so, issuing an official statement apologising for not being able to form a government. He signed off with the words: "I entrust Lebanon and its people to God." Those words now serve as a chilling farewell. "It was as if he sensed his fate was sealed," recalled Khaddam.

When Khaddam asked al-Assad about delays to the formation of the Lebanese government, his response was equally ominous. "I am preparing for a confrontation with the Americans," he said. "I cannot do it with Hariri." At that moment, Khaddam understood. The obstruction was no accident. It was deliberate, meticulously orchestrated by al-Assad himself. And as he later concluded, al-Sharaa had been well aware of this decision all along.

In the third and final instalment tomorrow, Khaddam recounts how Maher al-Assad misled Hariri before he was assassinated.