When Syria’s former Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam left for Paris in 2005, he took reams of papers, reports, notes, and files with him.
A trusted insider to the al-Assads for decades, the documents give rare insight into the heart of government from Khaddam’s first-hand accounts. He died in March 2020.
Among the more intriguing geopolitical periods of his time in power was the year leading up to the United States' invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
In the months before, the Americans had been working closely with the Kurds in Iraq’s north. The Kurds were certainly no friends of Saddam Hussein and wanted him gone as much as Washington did.
Two of the key Kurdish leaders were Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Masoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). They coordinated with both Damascus and Tehran.
Among other things, the ‘Khaddam Cache’ reveals Iran’s stance and the difference between what it conveyed to Damascus and the Iraqi opposition.
For the first time, Al Majalla reveals the conversations that would have such a lasting impact on the Middle East, the effects of which are still felt today.
Post-CIA debrief
In Germany, Talabani and Barzani agreed to follow up their visit to the CIA by briefing two allies: Syria and Iran. Specifically, they conveyed the message that the US was determined to topple Saddam.
Barham Salih, a leader in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), visited Damascus on 8 June 2002 to brief Khaddam on the visit’s outcomes and Talabani’s discussions in Iran.
Salih told Khaddam that his meetings with the Americans were “long, detailed, and focused”, as President Bush had “asked the security agencies to prepare detailed plans and options” for regime change. He said the Americans had ruled out a military coup.
“Therefore, they must look to us, the Democratic Party, and other parties like the Supreme Council – namely Baqir Al-Hakim – and pay attention to the Shiite of Iraq. This constitutes a message of reassurance to the Iranians.”
Khaddam asked, “How do they seek to reassure Iran when they consider it part of the Axis of Evil?” Salih described this as “more of a pressure tactic than a calculated step to confront Iran”.
The PUK man, who was in Damascus on behalf of Jalal Talabani, the head of the PUK, said: “Iran is in a complex position, as the Jewish lobby works to fuel the campaign against it.
“Personally, I think (Israeli Prime Minister Ariel) Sharon and the Jewish right in the United States want to keep the situation in Iraq as it is and focus on Iran at this stage.”
Two kinds of war
Salih told Khaddam that Talabani “met with the heads of intelligence agencies in both Germany and France, telling them: ‘Should the Americans decide to strike Iraq, there is nothing we can do but give our blessing.’
“He made an important statement: there is a need to prevent Turkish intervention because it will exacerbate the situation in the region. We welcomed this opinion.”
Other options presented to Bush included “a military operation like Afghanistan, with troops on the ground assisting the opposition, working to foment rebellion in the army... or a comprehensive invasion, staying in Iraq for about five years”.
Salih said the most likely option was a “limited intervention due to regional and domestic American requirements”.
Khaddam said a US military victory and regime change were perfectly achievable. “War is not the most dangerous issue. Rather, the danger lies in what comes after the war. Will the US wage war in Iraq under the cover of the United Nations?”
Later in the evening, Khaddam asked Salih what the Americans expect from the two main Kurdish leaders: Talabani and Barzani.
