Will Syria's myriad militias unite under one national army?

Some are happy to do so, some may need coaxing, and others have completely ruled it out. Al Majalla gives an overview of the different armed factions and what they want.

Axel Rangel Garcia

Will Syria's myriad militias unite under one national army?

For years, Syria has been controlled by a patchwork of armed groups. Until December 2024, this included the national army. With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, however, the army melted away, and the map now looks very different.

The alliance of anti-Assad factions that came together to remove the former president from power is called the Military Operations Command (MOC). Led by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), today, it controls just over 60% of Syrian territory.

The Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) retain a hold over the north-east, while the Türkiye-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) retains its positions in the north, and smaller groups still operate in the Southern Provinces of Daraa, Sweida, as well as the Tanf region in the south-east.

The HTS-led interim government has called for the consolidation of all armed factions into a unified military force under the Ministry of Defence. Naturally, several do not want to relinquish autonomy, power, or weapons. Yet, for now, many are at least engaging in a process.

At a conference in Damascus on 29 January, most factions were represented. The two big exceptions were the Kurdish-led SDF and the Druze-led groups based in Sweida. The event confirmed the appointment of HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa as Syria’s interim president. He knows that bringing the militias to heel will not be easy. Here, Al Majalla looks at Syria’s main armed factions.


The Syrian National Army (SNA)

Established in 2017 with Turkish support, the SNA comprises multiple factions opposed to the Assad regime. Its primary goal was to unify all Syrian opposition factions under a single command, hence its name. SNA fighters have fought both Islamic State (IS) jihadists and the SDF forces in Afrin, Ras al-Ayn, and Tal Abyad.

Although accurate figures are hard to ascertain, the SNA is believed to count around 29,000 fighters. It operates under the organisational framework of the Ministry of Defence, led by Brig. Gen. Hassan Hamada is structured into three main corps.

Axel Rangel Garcia

The First Corps, led by Brig. Gen. Moataz Raslan has around 9,000 fighters across northern Aleppo, Afrin, Ras al-Ayn, Tal Abyad, Jarablus, and al-Bab. The Second Corps, led by Fahim Issa, has around 14,000 fighters deployed in al-Rai, Afrin, al-Bab, and Ras al-Ayn. The Third Corps, led by Azzam al-Gharib, has around 6,000 fighters in Azaz, al-Bab, and Marea in northern Aleppo province.

The National Liberation Front (NLF)

Established in May 2018 through the merger of 11 opposition groups in northwestern Syria, the NLF is nominally affiliated with the SNA. With around 25,000 fighters stationed in Idlib province and western Aleppo countryside, it is led by Col. Fadlallah al-Haji from Faylaq al-Sham, while Maj. Mohammad Mansour from Jaysh al-Nasr is chief of staff. Like the SNA, it seems ready to integrate into a national army.

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)

HTS was formed in January 2017 through the merger of several factions, including Fatah al-Sham, the Nour al-Din Zinki Movement (which later withdrew), Ansar al-Din Front, and Liwa al-Haqq. HTS and its allies established control over north-western Syria, creating a civilian administration known as the Salvation Government.

During the ceasefire period from 2020-24, HTS expanded its military capabilities by forming 18 combat brigades. In alliance with factions such as the Turkistan Islamic Party, Ajnad al-Kavkaz, Ansar al-Tawhid, Jaysh al-Izza, Suqour al-Sham, and Ahrar al-Sham, HTS spearheaded the operation that successfully removed Assad.

HTS and its allies appear to be among the most disciplined of Syria’s factions and the most committed to dissolving into the Ministry of Defence. Several HTS commanders have already been given roles in the interim government.

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)

The SDF was established in late 2015 in the city of Qamishli, located in Al-Hasakah Province, a border region in northern Syria with a Kurdish-majority population. This area has served as its base for the past decade.

From its inception, the SDF has been directly supported by the United States as they worked together to defeat IS. In March 2017, the US Department of Defence estimated that the SDF was 40% Kurdish and 60% Arab. Other sources put the Arab fighting figures as lower. It is widely acknowledged that the SDF leadership is predominantly Kurdish.

The HTS-led interim government has called for all armed factions to have a unified army. Naturally, several do not want to relinquish autonomy, power, or weapons.

Several forces comprise the SDF. The largest is the People's Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish militia that forms the SDF's backbone. Established in 2014 as the military wing of the leftist Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), it gets US military support. Some SDF units are tribal. Others are gender-based, including the Women's Protection Units (YPJ). 

The Al-Sanadid Forces have 2,000 fighters from the Shammar tribe, deployed in the Hasakah region and led by Nour Hamidi al-Jarba, while Thuwwar al-Raqqa has around 1,500 fighters from Raqqa Province, primarily from the Walda tribe. It is led by Ahmad al-Othman bin Alloush, known as Abu Issa al-Raqqa. Deir Ezzor Military Council has around 15,000 fighters drawn from the al-Akidat and al-Baggāra tribes. It is led by Iyad Turki al-Khabil.

Divisions within the SDF

Arab factions within the SDF share little in common with the Kurdish forces beyond geography and US backing. Politically, their visions for Syria's future are vastly different. The YPG refuses to integrate into the Ministry of Defence unless it is granted autonomy within the Syrian Army—a demand that has been rejected.

Mounting pressures may force the SDF to change its stance. Arab resentment is rising, the Turkish threat is increasing, internal SDF divisions are becoming more heightened, and with the arrival of Donald Trump comes the potential for a US withdrawal of support, both military and otherwise. 

There are divisions within the SDF because there are divisions within the Kurdish community. Many Syrian Kurds reject the influence of 'the Qandil wing', a reference to the PKK leadership based in the Qandil Mountains. 

Daraa in southern Syria

In 2018, an agreement between Russia, the US, and Jordan led to the end of the opposition rebellion in southern Syria, particularly in Daraa. Yet opposition factions there retained their weapons and forces. The most significant was the Eighth Brigade led by Ahmad al-Awda, part of the Russian-controlled Fifth Corps.

It is currently deployed in Busra al-Sham, al-Harak, and Khirbet Ghazaleh, as well as in parts of eastern Daraa Province bordering Sweida. It is estimated to have around 800 fighters. Al-Awda has not said that he will merge into the Ministry of Defence or surrender his weapons, and his position remains unclear. 

Axel Rangel Garcia

In western Daraa, the Central Committees—formerly part of Ahrar al-Sham and led by Abu Hayan Heit—exert control over a wide area, from Nawa to Tafas, Yaduda, Mzayrib, and Heit. In Tafas, Jaysh al-Mu'taz, led by Abu Murshid Bardan, operates alongside smaller affiliated factions. 

In Daraa al-Balad, the factions are smaller in number, but they possess heavy weaponry, strong cohesion, and effective coordination, making southern Syria one of the country's most unstable regions, especially considering the new ground presence of Israeli troops near the Golan Heights. 

Most factions do not seek direct confrontation with the new authorities in Damascus, so the reluctance of the Eighth Brigade to integrate into the Ministry of Defence may simply be a negotiating strategy to get better terms. Despite these tensions, all Daraa factions attended the conference in Damascus on 29 January.

Sweida in southern Syria

The most prominent factions in the Druze-dominated southern area of Sweida include Rijal al-Karama (Men of Dignity), led by Sheikh Buhassan Yahya al-Hajjar; the Sheikh al-Karama Forces, led by Laith al-Balous; Ahrar al-Jabal (Mountain Free Fighters), led by Sheikh Suleiman Abdul Baqi; and the Anti-Terrorist Forces (previously affiliated with Malik Abu Khair's Brigade Party, though their separation from it remains uncertain). 

The Mountain Brigade, previously led by Merhij al-Jaramani, remains without a newly appointed commander following his assassination. The Al-Aliya Forces, based in Salkhad and the western countryside of Sweida, are affiliated. The number of fighters under their command is unknown, but their operations extend into Damascus suburbs, including Jaramana and Sahnaya, to defend the Druze community against potential attacks from IS or pro-Assad fighters.

All these groups raise the flag of the Syrian revolution, support its goals, and follow the spiritual authority of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. He has publicly rejected any integration into the Ministry of Defence until a new constitution guarantees Druze rights and ensures the formation of a civilian, non-sectarian state with fully national and non-partisan Syrian armed forces.

While some faction leaders, such as Suleiman Abdul Baqi, have visited Damascus and met with the new leadership, Sheikh al-Hijri has publicly rejected any integration into the Ministry of Defence until a new constitution is drafted, guaranteeing the rights of Sweida's communities and ensuring the formation of a civilian, non-sectarian state. 

Most factions attended the conference on 29 January. The SDF and Druze-led groups based in Sweida did not.

Free Syria Army (FSA)

In 2015, the New Syrian Army, later known as Jaysh Maghawir al-Thawra, was established with US and Jordanian support and training. Its primary objectives were to combat IS, the Syrian regime, and monitor Iranian movements in Syria, using the US military base at al-Tanf, near the Jordanian and Iraqi borders.

In 2022, Maghawir al-Thawra rebranded itself as the Free Syria Army, appointing Farid Qassem as its commander. It is estimated to have around 2,500 fighters, primarily drawn from local tribal communities who get training from US forces. In 2024, Salem al-Antari replaced Qassem as the group's leader.

The FSA has met the new administration and Defence Minister Murhaf Abu Qusra, reaching an agreement on the faction's integration with the Ministry.

Looking ahead

The new HTS-led administration in Damascus will face significant challenges subsuming Syria's numerous armed groups into a unified national defence system with a cohesive combat doctrine. 

The transition from a fragmented factional landscape—shaped by competing loyalties and narratives—to a structured national army will be particularly difficult. Incorporating the SDF is likely to be the most sizeable undertaking, while the process may prove somewhat easier with the southern factions, the SNA and the NLF, which appears more straightforward (especially given that the SNA's Turkish backers have encouraged them to coordinate with Damascus).

Some seem happy to integrate providing they get guarantees that would preserve certain national or religious identities—a demand that the new administration has thus far rejected. The Druze demand to wait for a constitution, for instance, could mean waiting up to four years, according to al-Sharaa. 

Political and geographic realities, as well as concerns over long-term security, will likely compel all parties to make concessions to complete the military unification process. How quickly and seamlessly that happens remains to be seen.

font change