Israel opens Schrödinger’s box as Gaza ceasefire takes holdhttps://en.majalla.com/node/323943/politics/israel-opens-schr%C3%B6dinger%E2%80%99s-box-gaza-ceasefire-takes-hold
Israel opens Schrödinger’s box as Gaza ceasefire takes hold
For months, Netanyahu has touted that he would not relent until he secures “total victory” over Hamas. But with the group still standing after the truce, it has essentially won.
Jack GUEZ / AFP
Anti-government protesters call for the release of Israeli hostages held captive since the October 7, 2023, attacks by Palestinian militants in the Gaza Strip outside the Israeli Defence Ministry in Tel Aviv on January 18, 2025.
Israel opens Schrödinger’s box as Gaza ceasefire takes hold
In the 15 months since the beginning of the war, Israelis have felt uncertain as to a number of critical issues: Whether hostages they hoped to see come back to Israel would ever return, whether they would do so alive or dead, whether Israel has secured the “total victory” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promised, whether his government would survive the end of the war and whether he could, in fact, truly abide by a deal that entails a permanent end to the war. During 15 months, each of those quintessential questions felt like the proverbial Schrödinger cat. The ceasefire in Gaza means Israelis are finally able to open the box, and they are understandably both terrified and hopeful at what they will find.
The most pressing question regards the status of the hostages. In 15 months of negotiations, Hamas has constantly refused to give a status update on whether and who of the hostages are alive. The assessment in Israel is that a majority of the 33 hostages who will be released in the first phase of the ceasefire are alive, but this still could mean a dozen of them will return only to be buried.
Of the hundred hostages, Israel has confirmed that a significant number are dead, with others presumed dead, and of the remaining 65 hostages to be released in the next phases, most are presumed dead. As a result, the release of the hostages will be a painful moment for families of hostages who have been waiting for their loved ones to come back for 15 months, praying that they would make it out alive.
To end or not to end the war
The second critical question that has agitated Israel’s political leadership in the days before the signing of the agreement is whether the ceasefire will turn permanent or not. Netanyahu’s far-right allies, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir, have insisted that the war should not stop. Smotrich demanded that Netanyahu provide guarantees that Israel will resume fighting after phase 1, while Ben Gvir issued a public statement indicating he would leave the Netanyahu-led coalition should the deal be allowed to transition to a permanent ceasefire. Netanyahu himself claimed he would not agree to a deal that ended the war and would continue to fight until “total victory”.
This is critical and points to the possibility that the deal may collapse after the first phase. According to the parameters of the deal, the agreement is separated into three distinct phases: During the first phase of the ceasefire, Israel and Hamas will negotiate the parameters of an agreement for a “sustainable calm” (a permanent ceasefire). The agreement will be implemented during phase 2. As a result, the transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 will be critical, and so will the negotiations on the parameters of this permanent ceasefire.
Time will tell if the prospect of peace—long comatose—is one among the thousands of casualties of the Gaza war
Israel is likely to push significant demands as part of those negotiations, potentially demanding that Hamas be fully disarmed and that its remaining top leaders be exiled. If Hamas agrees, Netanyahu will be able to claim that he effectively forced the group to "surrender" and that he did, indeed, achieve "total victory". Of course, this is very unlikely.
Hamas is unlikely to yield to the pressure and agree to disarm after months of fighting. The group may be willing to abandon civilian control of the Gaza Strip: Even before October 7, Hamas had hinted that it would be willing to let the Palestinian Authority return to Gaza and take charge of providing basic needs for millions of Palestinians. Now that the task is even more daunting, given the scope of destruction left by the war, Hamas is even more likely to let others deal with the civilian aftermath. But the main goal will be for Hamas to return to its roots as an "insurgency". In other words, Hamas will not disarm, nor will it abandon Gaza.
This means that there are two options. The first is a long phase of negotiations during which the ceasefire will continue to hold. Per President Biden, phase 1 will continue to hold for as long as the negotiations continue. This means that this phase, and the cessation of hostilities that goes with it, can go beyond the expected 42 days specified by the deal.
This is a situation Israel has sought to avoid: Israel fears Hamas will use this possibility to continue to drag its feet and avoid making any sort of concessions. As a result, it is very possible that the Netanyahu government has sought guarantees from the Biden Administration that it will be able to resume the war if they think Hamas is dragging its feet. Israeli media have claimed that Netanyahu did secure such guarantees from Biden, but the important question is whether those guarantees will be extended by the Trump administration? After all, Trump is credited with forcing Netanyahu to agree to make some compromise.
Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu in the East Room of the White House in Washington, DC, on January 28, 2020.
The incoming US president wants the issue of Gaza off his table and may not be inclined to let Israel resume the war, even if Hamas is seen as being the one obstructing a deal (and even less so if Israel is the party blamed for the lack of progress in talks). Once again, Trump's attitude towards Netanyahu will be key to the future of the Gaza conflict.
Is the Israeli government dead or alive?
Another "box" due to be opened is that of the government in Israel. The alliance between Netanyahu and the far-right, touted as the pillar behind a "full-right" government (a government without any left or centrist figures), has not been an easy one.
The war has served as the glue that held together parties who have vast disagreement on other key issues, including the possible military conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews. Ben Gvir and Smotrich know their supporters are against a permanent of the deal: Ben Gvir himself boasted that he was behind the failure of previous negotiations in a statement that shocked a majority of Israelis who have long hoped to see the hostages come out of Gaza.
However, the issue for Smotrich and Ben Gvir is that they've now gotten used to their cushy positions as ministers. Ben Gvir enjoys cracking down on dissent within the Israeli police and shaping it to his image. This is quite ironic for someone who spent most of his youth trying to dodge the police. Smotrich is also living the high life of finance minister—a key ministry that came with another position within the defence ministry that effectively gives Smotrich civilian control over the West Bank.
The far-right ideologue thinks the real challenge is in the West Bank: He wants to use his position to expand settlements, annexe part of the West Bank, and make sure a Palestinian State can never be created. To leave the ministry just as Trump comes to power would be perceived as a lost opportunity. Smotrich welcomed Trump's first year as "the year of sovereignty over Judea and Samaria (the biblical name of the West Bank)" and intends to use his position to pressure Netanyahu into agreeing to annexe the West Bank, as he initially sought to do during Trump's first mandate, only to be thwarted by the signing of the Abraham Accords.
Smotrich and Ben Gvir also know that should they leave the government, they may not have another shot for years. If they both decide to resign in protest of the ceasefire, this will likely prompt new elections. The Israeli right and far-right would face an uphill battle, as most of the Israeli public still blame them for the security failure of October 7 and their perceived misconduct in the war. Though he has reclaimed some of his lost popularity after reaching some of the lowest points in his career, Netanyahu is still expected to lose ground to other parties. Smotrich himself faces an even bleaker prospect: His party has been projected to lose ground to the point that he may not even be represented in the next Knesset (the Israeli parliament).
As a result, despite their vociferous comments and decision to vote against the deal, Smotrich and Ben Gvir have not resigned yet. Ben Gvir is trying to convince Smotrich that they should do so, particularly if the deal does indeed turn into a permanent ceasefire. However, there is also a possibility that they will stay on and form a vocal troupe of opponents to the deal within the government but still avoid collapsing Netanyahu's government. The moment of truth may, once again, come as the deal moves from phase 1 to phase 2.
Palestinian children gather at a destroyed vehicle, amid the Israel-Hamas conflict, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, September 30, 2024.
Total victory?
Another proverbial Schrödinger box to be opened in the coming weeks and months is that of Hamas's alleged defeat. For months, Netanyahu has touted that he would not relent until he secures "total victory". The slogan hasn't been convincing for a number of reasons, some of which have to do with a lack of public trust in Netanyahu, but also because the Israeli army has been stuck in an endless loop of raids in Gaza.
Since around the end of the Rafah offensive in mid-2024, the Israeli army has been entering and exiting various parts of northern Gaza to rout out "Hamas remnants". This game of whack-a-mole isn't exactly inspiring confidence in Netanyahu's claim that Hamas will be defeated if only Israel were to continue the war. Reports quoting US intelligence suggest Hamas has also been able to refill its ranks from the slew of aggrieved Palestinians in Gaza.
To be clear, Hamas has suffered a significant military defeat. The group no longer exists as a coherent military force and is carrying out hit-and-run attacks. Even the pace of those attacks has decreased since last year. Recruits may boost Hamas's numbers but won't compensate for the loss of experienced fighters.
But to win, Hamas only has to survive, whereas Israel needs to fully destroy the group to secure a true and lasting victory. This "total victory" that Netanyahu has been promising thus can only exist if Hamas is sidelined as a movement and not just defeated as a military force. To do so, Israel would have to implement a plan that would offer an alternative to Palestinians in Gaza and stabilise the enclave. Many Palestinians are angered not only at Israel but also at Hamas for the catastrophe that was brought upon them. But without an alternative, some of them will simply seek revenge—something only Hamas will offer.
To defeat Hamas, Israel would have to not only allow a stable Palestinian-based government to take shape in Gaza but one that would have to rely on the only Palestinian alternative to Hamas: the Palestinian Authority. It will also have to engage more seriously in peace talks: peace and the prospect of sustainable stability and coexistence (rather than "sustainable calm") are the only alternatives to what Hamas is proposing— endless fighting.
Here, we stumble upon the last Schrödinger box. The months and years ahead will be essential to gauge whether the prospect of peace—long comatose—is one among the the thousands of casualties of the war or managed to somehow make it out wounded but alive.
