Trump’s Three Ts—tariffs, tech and Taiwan—set to define US-China relations

As the world braces for the return of a president who sees Beijing as Washington’s main rival, Trump's second act may look different this time around

Dominic Bugatto

Trump’s Three Ts—tariffs, tech and Taiwan—set to define US-China relations

Ahead of Donald Trump's return to the White House, world leaders are bracing for a profound change in the foreign policy of the world's most powerful nation.

Trump's Second Act is likely to be more complex than its straightforward “America First” slogan suggests. It will also starkly differ from outgoing President Joe Biden's policies.

When Vice President Kamala Harris was asked who America's greatest adversary was, she did not hesitate. “Iran”, she replied. And while Trump is no friend of Tehran, his answer would probably be very different. And the way he sees the balance of global rivalries will be definitive for the next phase of international geopolitics. Where it will lead—and precisely how it will look—will likely be different this time.

Back then, China was Trump's primary focus. He saw it as the number one threat to America. As such, he levied tariffs on Chinese imports. The new trade barriers disrupted two-decades of symbiosis between the world’s two biggest economies that had become known in some international diplomatic circles as “Chimerica”.

Dominic Bugatto

Expect more anti-China moves from Trump this time around, who wants America to emerge as the decisive winner in its strategic competition with Beijing. While it remains unclear what additional steps he will take, past moves can give some indication.

Trumpism can be broadly defined as a mix of free market capitalism, trade protectionism and foreign policy realism. All three can be traced back to the doctrines and beliefs of America’s founding fathers. When applied to the China context, it involves what has become known as the Three T's: tariffs, technology, and Taiwan.

Tariffs

“The most beautiful word in the dictionary is ‘tariff,’” Trump famously said during his election campaign. And he will certainly be using them in his second term.

Steep tariffs on goods made in China—60% according to Trump’s campaign message—will be deployed to coerce US and foreign companies manufacturing in China to move their supply chains to the US. The aim goes beyond simply generating revenue; it is part of Trump's overarching economic agenda to strengthen America at home.

At a tariff rate of 60%, products manufactured in China will find it difficult to compete with those made in other emerging economies. For example, if iPhones—mainly manufactured in China—were subject to a 60% price increase when sold in the US, it would shake up the US consumer market. As a result, Apple’s global market share could be eclipsed by that of its South Korean competitor, Samsung. Meanwhile, Chinese companies with a substantial market share in the US will also be forced to move their supply chains offshore.

This would mark a far more aggressive trade approach than Biden’s, which only selectively punished Chinese companies that were believed to be national security risks with market restrictions. Biden's policy did not target US companies operating in China or overseas. Instead of using a stick approach, it used a carrot by enacting some of the largest fiscal subsidies since the Great Depression to lure global companies to manufacture in the US. The most notable recipients of the Biden subsidies were TSMC and Samsung. For his part, Trump will likely opt for a more punitive approach.

Steep tariffs will directly harm Chinese exports to the US, its largest single-country trading partner. Over time, this could hollow out its domestic manufacturing capacity. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) net flow into China has already turned negative in the third quarter of 2022.

China could respond in several ways. It could devalue its currency in a bid to support its exporters. Less dramatically, it could try to get around tariffs by diverting trade of intermediary goods through third-party markets to continue to supply the US. It may also choose to cultivate larger developing markets as an alternative destination for its exports while also boosting its domestic consumption. None of these options are easy and, if seriously pursued, they could drastically reshape China's economy.

Additionally, a 60% tariff could potentially slash China’s economic growth forecast by 2.4%. That would place its growth rate at 2.5%, placing it on par with the US and slower than most developing economies in the upper tier of the classification. If it struggles to offset the impact of the high tariffs, it could possibly end China’s long period of expansion, known as its “economic miracle".

A 60% tariff could potentially slash China's economic growth forecast by 2.4%, placing it on par with the US

Technology

Any economic or trade war between the US and China would be felt most in the technology sector, which powers so much of the infrastructure on which the 21st century depends.

The production of semiconductor chips underpins the tech sector itself and the new-frontier technologies it is developing. Biden's microchip war on China has been sweeping. It restricts the supply of critical components, equipment, and final chip products to China. It also prohibits the movement of human tech talent from the US to China.

Read more: How microchips are reshaping geopolitics

Trump's exact position on the microchip war has yet to emerge. However, during his first term in office, he restricted access to the most advanced chips by Huawei, ZTE, and China's largest chip maker, SMIC. Nonetheless, China still sees an opening for its tech industry with Trump, who sees himsef himself as a deal-maker and tends to approach matters in a pragmatic and transactional way, rather than purely on princple and ideology. Biden's uncompromising restrictions—borne from an ideological stance—were designed to suppress China's tech sector. But there are hopes in Beijing that Trump could lift the restrictions as part of a wider deal between Washington and Beijing, which would come alongside significant concessions from China to allay his concerns.

Shi Bufa / Getty
An employee works on the production line of quartz crystal resonators at the intelligent workshop of Zhejiang Huilong Chip Technology Co., Ltd. on November 26, 2024 in Jinhua, Zhejiang Province of China.

China also sees an opportunity to recruit top US-trained talent in the industry. As of 2022, roughly 45% of the graduates from US universities in advanced science, technology, engineering, and maths—the so-called STEM subjects—were non-US citizens. China understands that it is easier to restrict the flow of microchips than it is to prevent the movement of people. So, if it can attract the talent, it will only be a matter of time before it secures its own microchip supply. To this end, Chinese companies are offering salaries up to three times higher than elsewhere to attract the best employees. Many candidates are of Chinese heritage and have faced increased political scrutiny in the US.

Beijing also sees another opportunity in Trump's return: the breakdown of the Western solidarity over containing China's tech industry and the potentially positive knock-on effects from which it could benefit.

The incoming president is targeting traditional allies just as much as his perceived archrival. Trump has already announced he will impose a 25% conditional tariff on imports from Canada. He proposed to impose a universal import tariff of between 10% and 20% on the EU. Such tariffs could mean that European and Asian chip companies come to rely more on the Chinese market. It may incentivise them to find creative ways to work with China despite political pressure from the US.

To be sure, Trump's presidency is expected to be challenging for China's tech industry. It will have to heavily invest in the semiconductor supply chain and become more self-reliant.

Trump wants Taiwan to pay more for its defence and doesn't like that nearly 80% of the world's microchips are made there

Taiwan

Before he took office for the first time in 2017, Trump accepted an early congratulatory call from Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen. It marked the first direct contact between a US president-elect or president with the leader of Taiwan since 1979.

In 2024, Taiwan's more pro-independence president, Dr. Lai Qing-Te, received a much colder reception. After Trump's electoral victory, Lai passed through the US territory during his week-long trip to the South Pacific, but rather than New York, which Tsai had visited, Lai was only granted a stopover in Hawaii and Guam—far away from the continental US—where he was not met with any high-ranking American official. This cool reception suggests Trump doesn't want to provoke China.

And consistent with his foreign policy doctrine, Trump wants Taiwan to pay more for its defence and doesn't like that nearly 80% of the world's most-sophisticated microchips are made there. The two countries could very well clash over this issue, where Trump will be keen to put America's national interest first. He could very well slap Taiwan chipmakers with tariffs to move the supply chain over to the US. He could also condition American military protection on moving chip-making facilities to the US.

Without Taiwan's silicon, America's tech industry couldn't stand. However, once the US can produce the chips locally and on the same scale scale, it will no longer feel compelled to defend Taiwan—something that unnerves Taipei. Beijing does not accept Taiwan

AFP
A Taiwanese US-made M60A3 tank firing its main gun during the annual Han Kuang military exercises on Taiwan's Penghu Islands, on July 24, 2024.

Shifting US-Taiwan relations away from ideological grandstanding to more commercial footing will also cool tempers and lessen the likelihood of a military confrontation over Taiwan.

And while China doesn't want Taiwan to breakaway from the mainland and become independent, it doesn't necessarily oppose Taipei's economic engagement with the US. Taiwan could soon realise that striking a balance between Beijing and Washington is in its best interest. 

As Trump takes office, both he and President Xi Jinping will be pushing their respective national agendas.

In the new multipolar world order, countries can enact policies that align better with their own national interests rather than feeling forced to swallow the diktats of global hegemons. This will be the new guide for political statecraft. 

States will be better positions to exercise sovereignty over their own territories. This principle is known in international law circles as "Westphalianism", and it has a long history. Its return means that as 2025 begins, it brings with it a prevailing international current that first shaped global geopolitics in the 17th century.

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