As Lebanon readies for new president, Hezbollah clamours for relevance

After suffering a huge blow militarily, Hezbollah is now forced to show political flexibility. By backing Aoun for president, it hopes to secure a win over Israel's preferred candidate, Geagea.

Members of Lebanese security forces stand guard in the perimeter of the Parliament, a day ahead of a parliamentary session to elect a president in Beirut on January 8, 2025.
ANWAR AMRO / AFP
Members of Lebanese security forces stand guard in the perimeter of the Parliament, a day ahead of a parliamentary session to elect a president in Beirut on January 8, 2025.

As Lebanon readies for new president, Hezbollah clamours for relevance

Hezbollah’s leadership, weapons, finances, and communications all took a major hit in the latter half of 2024, targeted by Israel’s intelligence services and armed forces.

There are rumours that it is rebuilding, but details remain vague as to the extent to which it needs to and the extent to which it has done. Meanwhile, in Syria, Hezbollah has lost an ally in Bashar al-Assad. None of this is lost on Lebanon’s politicians.

The discussion is timely because the country’s parliamentary session to elect a president is being held this week. Ahead of it, Hezbollah has been working hard to project the image that it has not only recovered but is now stronger than before.

The group can only show this politically, given that southern Lebanon is still occupied by Israel, which continues to strike sites, demolish homes, destroy fields, and reposition its forces despite a 60-day ceasefire still supposedly in effect.

What Israel wants

Israel’s objectives in southern Lebanon up to the Litani River are still in question. Last week, it targeted sites that it alleged were Hezbollah missile platforms. Whether the Israeli army intends to fully withdraw from the southern villages after 60 days is in doubt. Some reports suggest that a 30-day extension will be sought.

In Israeli media, there have been hints that Tel Aviv will keep its military positions in certain areas of southern Lebanon and establish a 3km buffer zone along the border. It is uncertain if Hezbollah would (or could) respond if Israel delays its withdrawal.

US envoy Amos Hochstein’s visit to Beirut on Monday coincided with the Israeli army’s withdrawal from the town of Naqoura. Optimists will hope this signals Israel’s intent to adhere to the ceasefire’s deadline, but Hochstein’s comments in Beirut left room for doubt when he dodged a definitive commitment to the timeline.

IBRAHIM AMRO / AFP
Lebanon's Prime Minister Najib Mikati (R) meets with US special envoy Amos Hochstein in Beirut on January 6, 2025.

Hezbollah's Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem said the group reserves the right to respond to Israeli violations at a time and a place of its choosing—a familiar refrain heard from Iran and its proxies over recent years.

While Hezbollah accuses Israel of breaching the ceasefire, Israel accuses Hezbollah of stalling its withdrawal from territory south of the Litani River and of refusing to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese army. Israel feels this justifies its continued strikes.

All this places immense pressure on Lebanon's internal politics, as one of Israel's apparent objectives in the south is to compel the Lebanese government and army to put pressure on Hezbollah. The message is clear: unless Hezbollah backs down and adheres to the terms of the ceasefire, war will recommence.

Iran reviews its strategy

While the Lebanese government is understandably eager to avoid another conflict, Hezbollah's stance remains ambiguous. Yet many think the power to coerce Hezbollah does not rest with the Lebanese government or army but with Iran. That has long been given but with Donald Trump due in the White House soon, Tehran may be reconsidering.

If Iran decides to abandon its 'advanced defence' strategy (which hinges on it arming and training regional proxies as its first line of defence), Hezbollah may cooperate with the Lebanese army, both in terms of its withdrawal and weapons.

With Lebanon's presidential election nearing, Hezbollah's determination to avoid any perception of weakness in the wake of war is noticeable

This strategy is rumoured to be the subject of fierce debate in Tehran, particularly between President Masoud Pezeshkian's government on the one hand and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) on the other.

It was interesting, therefore, when Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reiterated last week that "there is no separation between diplomacy and field activities" in reference to the agreement between his ministry and the IRGC that Iran's military and diplomatic efforts will be fully coordinated. Some wonder whether they are.

Analysts suggest that the statement underscores the ongoing debate and might signal a willingness to prioritise diplomacy as Trump takes office, given that the incoming US president is known to value his reputation as a deal-maker. If Iran's strategy changes, this will be felt in Lebanon.

Shifting landscape

Most think any sudden strategic shift in Tehran remains unlikely, at least for now. This means that it is also unlikely that Hezbollah will relinquish its heavy weapons and transform into a purely political entity in the short term. The idea that Hezbollah will start handing over Iranian ballistic missiles to the Lebanese army imminently remains fanciful.

With Lebanon's presidential election nearing, the group's determination to avoid any perception of weakness in the wake of war is noticeable. It publicly lost political allies during Israel's bombardment and has been seeking to reassert its domestic influence ever since.

It has not fully managed to do so. This is evidenced in negotiations. Before the war, Hezbollah would only support its preferred presidential candidate, Suleiman Franjieh. Since the war, however, it has been negotiating with its ally, Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri, about agreeing on a consensus president—an opposition call it once rebuffed. On Wednesday, Franjieh pulled out of the running and endorsed Army Commander Joseph Aoun's candidacy.

AFP
Caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati and army commander General Joseph Aoun visit the southern Lebanese village of Khiam on December 23, 2024, after the withdrawal of Israeli forces under a ceasefire deal with Hezbollah.

This marks a notable shift in the Lebanese presidential race, further highlighted by the entry of Lebanese Christian politician and former militia leader Samir Geagea, whose candidacy reflects a newfound boldness among Hezbollah's opponents to challenge its red lines.

Hezbollah's sharp criticism of Geagea, delivered through its senior official Wafiq Safa, suggests that the party is framing the prevention of Geagea's election (Israel's preferred candidate) as a political victory. This mirrors its narrative during the war, where it touted Israel's failure to advance further into Lebanon as a military success.

Resurfacing divisions

In truth, Hezbollah's goal is not merely to block Geagea's candidacy but to secure the election of a candidate whose interests closely align with its own. Whether it still has enough political clout to do so remains to be seen.

More broadly, amidst the efforts of a weakened Hezbollah to reclaim its space at the top of Lebanese politics and the efforts of its opponents to seize the initiative while it regroups, Lebanon's famous internal divisions risk resurfacing with renewed vigour. That would be a death knell. 

Still smouldering after the war, Lebanon needs to rebuild with a broken economy while entangled in the calculations of foreign actors. Meanwhile, in Lebanon's much bigger neighbour, Syria, everything has changed. Where once the 'advisors' in Damascus were Iranian, now they are Turkish. 

How this affects Lebanon remains to be seen, but what few will want to see is a new internal conflict in the country. Because until Hezbollah hands its weapons over to the army, there are still more than enough guns to go around.

font change

Related Articles