Some alternative forms of governance to Iran's theocracy

The Supreme Leader, also known as the Wali al-Faqih (Guardian of the Jurist), holds the highest position of authority in Iran's constitutional and political framework. This role, rooted in Twelver Shiite jurisprudence, was revived and institutionalised by Khomeini after the 1979 revolution.

The concept of Wali al-Faqih allows the Supreme Leader to act as the deputy of the Hidden Imam, blending religious and political authority into one office. The role-holder must possess significant religious and Sharia expertise and is appointed following a general referendum.

The Iranian executive

According to the latest constitutional amendments, the Supreme Leader serves for life unless deemed incapable of fulfilling his duties. He wields extensive constitutional powers, setting the general policies of the republic (after consulting relevant councils), ordering referenda, declaring war or peace, ordering mobilisation, and commanding the armed forces.

He also has the power to resolve disputes between military branches, regulate their relations, address unresolved national issues through competent councils, approve presidential elections, dismiss the President, grant pardons, and commute sentences. He can appoint and dismiss key officials such as the jurists of the Guardian Council, the head of the judiciary, media chiefs, and senior commanders. This consolidation of both religious and political authority makes the Supreme Leader a central figure in Iran's governance.

The President holds the highest executive authority in Iran after the Supreme Leader. He implements the constitution, appoints ministers, and oversees the executive branch, except in areas specifically under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Leader. Presidential candidates are among the country's leading religious and political figures. After meeting constitutional requirements, they are directly elected by the people for a four-year term, with the possibility of re-election for only one consecutive term.

Judiciary and legislature

The Judiciary is led by an official appointed directly by the Supreme Leader. This official's primary responsibilities include the appointment and dismissal of judges, in accordance with constitutional provisions and guidelines.

The Legislative Authority is composed of two chambers. The first is the Islamic Consultative Assembly (or lower house). This consists of members elected by the public and has the power to legislate and propose the impeachment of the President. The second is the Assembly of Leadership Experts (the upper chamber). This consists of 88 members who have attained the degree of religious jurisprudence in the Twelver Shiite tradition. They elect or remove the Supreme Leader in accordance with constitutional requirements.

The Guardian Council functions similarly to the French Constitutional Council, exercising prior control over the constitutionality of laws. The Islamic Consultative Assembly cannot enact legislation without the Guardian Council's approval. It comprises 12 members, half of whom are appointed by the Supreme Leader and half by the head of the judiciary. It also oversees the approval or rejection of presidential candidates.

The Expediency Council acts as an advisory body to resolve disputes between the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Guardian Council, as well as to provide counsel to the Supreme Leader, who appoints all 31 of its members.

The Supreme National Security Council is composed of senior military, political, and judicial leaders and is chaired by the President. Its decisions become binding once ratified by the Supreme Leader, who also appoints most of its members.

The council is tasked with determining the country's defence and national security policies, coordinating political, intelligence, social, cultural, and economic activities related to these policies, and mobilising the nation's material and intellectual resources to address both internal and external threats.

Options in a vacuum

If Iran's state institutions collapse, a temporary leadership council may be established to manage the country. Its members would comprise parliamentarians, military leaders, and judges, operating under a provisional constitutional framework to ensure continuity of government until a new constitution is drafted or elections are held.

The primary objective of this council would be to maintain government continuity. Failure to agree on leadership during this transition risks constitutional instability amid competing claims of legitimacy. This could spark chaos and potentially even civil war.

In such a scenario, the armed forces or Revolutionary Guard may seize power, operating outside the constitutional framework under emergency laws or martial law. This would likely result in the restriction of individual and civil rights, with a focus on maintaining internal security.

A constitutional vacuum in Iran could also potentially lead to the establishment of a democratic republic built on modern civil foundations and guided by a new constitution. This new system, whether presidential or parliamentary, would incorporate universally recognised constitutional principles, such as separation of powers, the rule of law, equality, and protection of public rights and freedoms.

A new constitution might also adopt a federal structure, granting greater autonomy to Iran's diverse regions, particularly those that have been marginalised. This would recognise the country's complex ethnic and sectarian diversity.

In terms of religion and politics, the constitution could take on a civil or secular character (instead of being theocratic), ranging from complete secularisation, with Islamic law removed from legislation, to a partial compromise, in which Islam is still the official state religion and a source of legislation, but the rights of religious minorities are also upheld. This latter scenario could help produce a balance, honouring Iran's rich religious and cultural heritage while promoting equality for all citizens.

Return of the monarchy 

In any constitutional vacuum in Iran, another possibility is the restoration of the monarchy—the Shah's regime—alongside constitutional reforms resembling the British model of a constitutional monarchy.

The 1906 constitution could be reactivated (with its 1963 amendments) or a new constitution could be introduced that blends the traditions of a constitutional and democratic monarchy, as in Europe, where executive powers are vested in an elected government, and the monarch acts as symbolic head of state.

Under this framework, the king's powers would remain limited, while the elected government would assume executive authority, and the parliament would be responsible for legislating and overseeing the government's actions. This constitutional setup could even incorporate a federal system with a secular, civilian character.

The return of the monarchy would likely see Reza Pahlavi II, the son of the former Shah of Iran, as the crown prince. Reza Pahlavi II, who today lives in Virginia, was the last crown prince before the 1979 revolution. His return would depend largely on the level of popular acceptance. Age may be a factor, with older generations might be more inclined to support the monarchy. Last year, he visited Israel, meeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and a Jewish settler family that had been attacked in the occupied West Bank.

A popular referendum could be held to gauge public approval. While some may view the return of the monarchy as unlikely, history provides examples of such restorations. In France, for instance, the Bourbon monarchy was restored after the French Revolution and the fall of Napoleon.

Similarly, in Spain, King Juan Carlos returned to power in 1975 after the death of Franco, with widespread public support following years of suffering under the Republican era from 1936-75. It just goes to show that anything is possible.