The Trumpification of American policy

No matter who wins in November, Donald Trump has redefined both parties’ agendas

Republican presidential nominee, former U.S. President Donald Trump delivers remarks during a campaign rally at the Cobb Energy Performing Arts Centre on October 15, 2024 in Atlanta, Georgia.
Kevin Dietsch / AFP
Republican presidential nominee, former U.S. President Donald Trump delivers remarks during a campaign rally at the Cobb Energy Performing Arts Centre on October 15, 2024 in Atlanta, Georgia.

The Trumpification of American policy

The choice facing America in less than a month will not be made by voters weighing rival sets of policies. Kamala Harris’s plans lack detail; Donald Trump’s are sometimes untethered from reality—and in any case, divisions over culture motivate voters more than tax policy. Yet the choice matters hugely in policy terms, for America and the rest of the world. This aspect of the election has been under-covered relative to fantasies about what Haitian migrants in Ohio have for lunch. Our current issue, which contains eight concise policy briefs on the areas where we think the election will make the most difference, is intended as an antidote to that.

Our list is selective: we have left out subjects where the contrast between the two candidates is stark but which have no direct bearing on public policy. These include the candidates’ characters, what the election would mean for institutions and even for American democracy. Nor have we included abortion, where the candidates’ different views are unlikely to translate into markedly different policies thanks to a Congress that neither party is likely to dominate. Strip those things out, important as they are, focus on policies that are in the president’s gift instead, and the result is surprising. Whoever gets to 270 electoral college votes on 5 November, Mr Trump’s ideas will win. He, not Ms Harris, has set the terms of this contest. American policy has become thoroughly Trumpified.

Whoever wins on 5 November, Trump's ideas will still win. He has set the terms of this contest. US policy has become thoroughly Trumpified.

Domestic policy

Take Ms Harris's domestic platform. Her immigration policy is to endorse the most conservative bipartisan reform proposal this century. Its provisions include shutting down asylum applications when the flow of irregular migrants is high. Her trade policy involves keeping, in modified form, most of the tariffs Mr Trump imposed in his first term. On tax, Ms Harris would keep most of the cuts Mr Trump signed in 2017 (raising rates only for those who earn over $400,000). On energy, she has become a convert to fracking and has been part of an administration that has seen America pump more oil and gas than ever before. Because America is so partisan, and Mr Trump is such a polarising figure, Ms Harris has been able to borrow parts of Mr Trump's first-term agenda without most people noticing.

This policy-poaching makes political sense. Mr Trump moved onto Democrats' turf first, love-bombing trade unions and scrapping Republican plans to trim public spending on pensions and health care. Because the election will be fought in six or seven swing states, all of which were a couple of percentage points more Republican than the national average in 2020, Ms Harris's quiet adoption of Trumpier positions could help her win. Yet the result is that a candidate who lost the last election, whose party was trounced in the 2018 midterms—a candidate who has never won the popular vote and probably never will—has remade American policy in his image.

Foreign policy

The same is true in foreign policy. The two candidates have different approaches: one is built on values and alliances; the other on asking what the world can do for America. If Mr Trump wins, nervous speculation over America's commitment to NATO will come back; with Ms Harris, it is not in doubt. Yet, there is a surprising overlap. Mr Trump adopted a more confrontational approach to China than any recent president, even if his policies were, in practice, less scary than they sounded. The administration Ms Harris has been part of has been less verbally antagonistic but tougher in practice, banning technology exports to China and placing huge tariffs on imports of Chinese electric vehicles. On the Middle East, Ms Harris has not let Mr Trump outflank her on the right, despite pressure from within her own party to cut arms supplies to Israel. Nor does she seem in a hurry to revive the deal with Iran that Mr Trump tore up; this week, she called the Islamist regime America's greatest adversary. Here, too, Mr Trump has set the terms.

Because Trump is such a polarising figure, Harris has been able to borrow parts of his first-term agenda without most people noticing

Support for Ukraine is where the gap seems widest. Ms Harris has been part of an administration that has led the Western effort to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia's unprovoked invasion. She would continue to supply Ukraine with arms and cash as long as Congress let her do so. Mr Trump's policy is extraordinarily vague: he says only that the war would not have broken out on his watch and that he would end it swiftly. He does not say how, and his refusal to say which side he would like to win adds to fears that he would urge Ukraine to settle on Russia's terms. Such a catastrophic betrayal is not certain, however. Even Mr Trump may worry that letting Russian tanks roll over more of Ukraine would make him look weak.

A choice and an echo

The second thing that is clear from our policy briefs is that while Ms Harris has moved towards the Donald Trump of the first term, Mr Trump has become more extreme, even compared with his prior self. On trade, he said earlier this year, he favoured a 10% universal tariff on imports and has now upped that to 20%. He wants a tariff of 60% on all Chinese imports. On tax, he now wants to cut everything in sight, making all the 2017 cuts permanent and reducing corporate taxes further. The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget reckons that his plans would add twice the amount to the national debt that Ms Harris's would (and hers are hardly restrained). On immigration, 2024 Trump is more extreme than 2016 Trump. He always needs a new big promise, and this time it is not merely a wall but mass deportation. Some of his policies are extreme by omission: he has no discernible plan for reducing CO2 emissions or for helping the country adapt to climate change.

And for all Mr Trump's claims that President Joe Biden has "destroyed" America's economy, it is currently the envy of the world. Yet it is striking how little faith either candidate places in the things that made it great, such as openness to trade, talent and competition. Clearly, Ms Harris would not seek to shut America off as vigorously as Mr Trump would. But whoever wins in November, the Trumpification of American policy seems likely to continue.

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