How Israel’s spies know what Hezbollah will do before it doeshttps://en.majalla.com/node/322559/politics/how-israel%E2%80%99s-spies-know-what-hezbollah-will-do-it-does
How Israel’s spies know what Hezbollah will do before it does
Israeli intelligence services have done a thorough job of 'knowing their enemy' north of the border, in a system honed over time and against an enemy who provided opportunities
Al Majalla
How Israel’s spies know what Hezbollah will do before it does
Israel’s thorough penetration of Hezbollah is now no longer in question, given the events of recent weeks, but as so often with intelligence operations, the question of ‘how’ this was accomplished is left lingering.
For part of the answer, rewind to 2012, when Hezbollah’s leadership decided to commit men and weapons to Syria. This was to help save Iranian ally President Bashar Al-Assad in Damascus, whose regime was then imperilled by rebels.
Syria quickly became fertile ground for Israeli intelligence agencies to study and, later, to infiltrate Hezbollah. This began with their collection of vast amounts of information.
Watching and learning
Hezbollah members were stationed in specific areas. These were closely monitored with visual and audio surveillance, with high-resolution images captured, while communications and digital activity were intercepted and read.
Members’ activities, habits, and routines were noted, while their action in combat and even their participation at social events such as weddings and funerals were all recorded. Soon, Israel had a vast database.
Over time, Israeli operatives built up a detailed picture of Hezbollah’s members and affiliates, from the most senior leaders to the newest fighters, with phone numbers, voice patterns, and family details, tracking their movements and social media activity.
This helped the Israelis construct a map of Hezbollah’s networks, both at home and abroad. If a SIM card was replaced, the user could still be found via the phone’s serial number. If both the phone and number were changed, the voiceprint was still there.
Hezbollah members' activities, habits, routines, action in combat, and even participation at social events were all recorded, givingIsrael a vast database
Vast amounts of data that Israel gathered on Hezbollah were then processed, yielding not databases but 'information bases.' When further analysed—including by AI algorithms—for hidden relationships and patterns, this created 'knowledge bases.'
One of Israeli intelligence's main objectives in Syria was to engineer situations in which different factions operating in the country turned on one another. This involved planting conspiracies and sowing discord in psychological operations.
The main armed groups within Syria included the regime (i.e. the military and security forces), Hezbollah, Sunni extremist groups, and militias opposed to both. Israel recruited agents in all of them.
Hezbollah sought to expand by recruiting affiliates and mercenaries, without proper security vetting. This gave Israel opportunities. Operating in foreign and unregulated environments, the group struggled to maintain internal surveillance and discipline.
Making data useable
Intelligence relies on information gathering from both human and electronic sources, then efficiently verifying, analysing, and interpreting that information. Developing quick mechanisms for processing this information lets intelligence agencies prevent threats.
The intelligence supports strategic decisions and planning by offering a deep understanding of the enemy's logic and intentions. This then lets the agencies facilitate offensive operations, targeting critical assets and centres of gravity, whether through covert activity or direct military action.
Israel's ability to strike and eliminate so much of Hezbollah's leadership—including the security-obsessed Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, who was in hiding—and its systematic destruction of the group's offensive arsenals come from years of studying the group, collecting intelligence, and recruiting agents.
An Israeli Apache attack helicopter fires a missile towards southern Lebanon, amid hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, as seen from northern Israel, October 4, 2024.
This effort began after the 2006 Lebanon War, when Israel recalibrated its intelligence strategy against Hezbollah, which had come to be seen as one of the strongest paramilitary groups in the world and Iran's key ally. It has long been seen as a more significant threat to Israel than Hamas.
The intelligence Israel gathered on Hezbollah during the Syrian conflict has been continuously updated and expanded ever since, with a network of agents established to signpost leaders, weapons, and operations.
Mossad's infiltration even extended to Hezbollah's supply chain, as evidenced when hundreds of pagers exploded simultaneously across Lebanon last month. Israel's advance knowledge of pending device inspections led them to order the detonations.
A hybrid network
Israel's surveillance of Hezbollah has included satellites, drones, and spyware that targets the vulnerabilities of operating systems to infect and 'take over' mobile phones, turning them into listening devices and cameras.
Israeli agencies have used the country's technological prowess in other ways, too, such as by developing supercomputers capable of processing vast amounts of data, but as important as signals intelligence is, human intelligence remains indispensable.
Israel has adopted a hybrid intelligence network, merging the efforts of its intelligence agencies and the armed forces. Although these entities have distinct structures and missions, their roles often overlap during operations.
Mossad handles foreign operations, like the CIA or MI6. Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman) is akin to the US Defence Intelligence Agency, while its internal security service (Shin Bet) focuses on domestic threats, like the FBI or MI5.
Israel has adopted a hybrid intelligence network, merging the efforts of its intelligence agencies and the armed forces
Although Shin Bet gathers intelligence on Hezbollah through affiliated Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, the bulk of research and offensive operations targeting Hezbollah is conducted by Aman and Mossad.
Aman consists of three main units: Unit 8200, Unit 9900, and Unit 504. Best known is Unit 8200, which specialises in electronic warfare and has been likened to the US National Security Agency (NSA).
Its operatives' tasks centre on communications and transmissions, both intercepting and relaying. Unit 8200 teams often embed within combat units to ensure that crucial intelligence is promptly collected and relayed for immediate action.
Unit 9900 collects visual intelligence, including from satellites and aircraft, producing 3D maps to deliver real-time insights to commanders and political decision-makers.
Using technology
AI-powered algorithms enhance its visual intelligence programmes, such as in the recognition of patterns, the identification of locations and individuals, and the detection of anomalies and changes. All this helps deliver an up-to-date intelligence picture.
The highly secretive Unit 504 received public recognition in 2018 for playing a major but unspecified role in neutralising threats in Israel's northern sector, but the nature of its operations—presumably in Lebanon and Syria—remain undisclosed.
Unit 8200 mapped Hezbollah's entire leadership structure, detailing roles, responsibilities, identities, actions, and movements
From cyberspace, Unit 8200 mapped Hezbollah's entire leadership structure, detailing roles, responsibilities, identities, actions, and movements, while Mossad worked with other foreign intelligence agencies (some of whom have agents in Iran) to execute the assassination of Hezbollah leaders.
This combined intelligence, whether military or otherwise, is then handed over to Israel's air force for strike planning, including by 119 Squadron. This kind of knowledge helped Israel kill Nasrallah while he was in a heavily fortified underground bunker in Beirut.
The intelligence included the depth of the bunker and its precise location. This allowed pilots to calculate the exact angles, altitude, and ordnance needed.
After an operation, intelligence operatives follow up to assess the strike's effectiveness. The efficiency of the methods is what allows Israel to make such swift and sure announcements confirming the death of Hezbollah or Hamas leaders.
From data gathering to infiltration to surveillance to analysis and assessment, Israel's intelligence services are proving that they have got it very right when it comes to Hezbollah. They will know, however, that on 7 October 2023, they got it very wrong when it came to Hamas. Sometimes, systems only go so far.
