Zangezur Corridor: Could a road in Armenia start a war?

A proposed trade route connecting Turkey and the Mediterranean with Azerbaijan through Armenia would be controlled by Russia and bypass Iran. No wonder Tehran is furious.

Shutterstock

Map showing the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, in Azerbaijan.

Zangezur Corridor: Could a road in Armenia start a war?

Nazareth Seferian

last update on 04 Oct 2024

In the restive South Caucasus, where grievances do well to simmer, a proposed new road can be much more than just another transport route. Such is the case in the Zangezur Corridor, a stretch of land in one of the world’s most contentious areas.

Located on the slopes of a mountain range, Zanzegur is a historical and geographical region of Eastern Armenia that Persians, Azeris, Armenians, Turks, Mongols, and Russians have fought over. Persia ceded it to the Tsars in 1813, but a century later, after Russia’s 1917 Revolution, disputes arose between the two newly created republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan as to ownership. This set an enduring trend.

Once considered part of Azerbaijan, the Soviet Union reassigned Zanzegur (also known as Syunik) to Armenia in 1920, cutting the land link between Azerbaijan and its exclave, Nakhchivan. An autonomous republic, Nakhchivan is an archetypal flashpoint. Today, it is bordered by Armenia to the east and north, Iran to the south, and Turkey to the west. In a place like this, a proposed road link can easily cause more than bristling.

The 40km road in question would link Azerbaijan to its landlocked but separated exclave Nakhchivan without passing through Armenian checkpoints, therefore creating an important new trade route connecting Asia, Europe and the Middle East. This would be to the benefit of Russia and Turkey, but to the detriment of Iran. With disagreements over the road also rooted in a previous territorial clash, it could yet prove to be a route into deeper conflict.

Shutterstock — A road along the Zangezur Mountains near Noravank Monastery in Armenia.

Azeri-Armenian animosity

Azerbaijan’s relations with Armenia are frosty at best. They have come to blows several times over the nearby disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory mainly populated by ethnic Armenians. The most recent military action was in 2020, which ended with Azerbaijan defeating Armenia.

Nagorno-Karabakh had effectively been out of Baku’s control since a bloody post-independence conflict, which was, in effect, frozen by the international response to it in 1994. In September 2020, Azerbaijan launched an offensive to retake control of the territory it has long claimed as its own.

The largely one-sided war lasted 44 days and ended in defeat for the Armenians. A trilateral statement was signed in November of that year by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. It consisted of nine points, which were mainly concessions made by Armenia to Azerbaijan.

The all-important final point stated that "all economic and transport links in the region shall be unblocked" and that Armenia "shall guarantee the safety of transport communication between the western regions of Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan". This was explicitly "with a view to... the unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles and cargo in both directions," with Russian border guards exercising control over transport communication.

The 40km road through the Zanzegur Corridor would link Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhchivan without passing through Armenian checkpoints

Russia wades in

When Russia's President Vladimir Putin visited Azerbaijan in August of this year, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was asked about relations between the two uneasy neighbours. "Russia stands for concluding the peace treaty and unblocking communications as quickly as possible," he said.

"Unfortunately, it is the Armenian leadership that has been failing to abide by the provisions dealing with communications through the Syunik Province of Armenia, despite these bearing (Armenian Prime Minister) Nikol Pashinyan's signature." He added: "We find it hard to understand what this position means." By 'communications through part of Armenia', he meant the Zangezur Corridor.

Previously, the only connection between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan has been by air, or via road passing through Iran. Having achieved a crushing victory over Armenia nearby in 2020, Baku felt it was a good time to change that.

Connecting Turkic states

Any road running from Nakhichevan directly through to Azerbaijan that was not subject to Armenian control would be truly strategic because it would provide direct transport links between all Turkic countries—from Turkey in the west to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in the east. According to the agreement, it would run near the border with Iran, where the distance between Nakhichevan and Azerbaijan is the shortest. Armenia would be prevented from exerting any control over it—whether for customs or security.

Critics say the wording of this agreement is vague, however, because it mentions only "all economic and transport links in the region" without naming a specific road. This lack of clarity has contributed to the current dispute.

The corridor would create an important new trade route connecting Asia, Europe and the Middle East. This would benefit Russia and Turkey but not Iran.

Nearly four years after its defeat, Armenia still stands in the way of this much-touted road through the Zangezur Corridor. In doing so, it is backed by Iran. While Russia wants to make the road a reality, Tehran says that any attempts to do so would be "crossing a red line." Last month, Russia's ambassador to Iran was summoned to make that point in person.

Three regional powers

Assigning Russian border guards to control the region's newly opened roads was initially seen as the Kremlin's way of maintaining its hold over Armenia and Azerbaijan. To date, Russia has approached Armenia with care over the land connection. However, the geopolitical calculus changed in 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine and suffered a slew of international sanctions. That has made its need for land-based trade routes through friendly states both more important and more urgent.

The Zangezur Corridor would add to another, bigger plan to connect Russia to the Indian Ocean, called the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). There is also the potential to connect to China's Middle Corridor route, which runs from Southeast Asia and China to Europe via Kazakhstan, Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and possibly Turkey. These extend Russia's sanction-evading routes for imports from friendly states and, likewise, for its exports to those states, which are often "repackaged" and then delivered to Europe.

Ankara's eyes light up

Turkey would enjoy clear benefits from a road through the Zangezur Corridor, because it would effectively control the access of this route to the Mediterranean, while at the same time using it to connecting Turkey to Central Asia and China.

Some think this would be an economic boost to Ankara, catapulting Turkey into a trade leadership role in the region. Yet only 3% of Turkish exports currently go to Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states. Russia receives 2.3% of its exports, while some European countries like Spain and France are also low, at 4.5% and 4.4% respectively.

Turkey would effectively control the access of this new route to the Mediterranean, while using it to connecting to Central Asia and China

There are different reasons. For instance, Turkey's route to Russia goes through Georgia and this road often closes in the winter as it passes through mountains. Reducing transport costs and times could significantly boost trade. Opening the Zangezur Corridor could even help balance economic development within Turkey itself, given that the country's eastern regions produce only 20% of its gross domestic product (GDP), despite being home to almost half the country's population.

Tehran's mood darkens

Iran is staunchly opposed to the creation of a new corridor in Armenia's south and sees any extraterritorial roads near its frontier with Armenia as an attempt to redefine borders. It also fears that this could cut it off from an important ally and neighbour. Armenia and Iran recently agreed to increase their trade turnover to $3bn, and Armenia is also a popular tourist destination for Iranians.

Furthermore, a Zangezur Corridor road with Russian control could weaken Iran's position on the INSTC and its connection to the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), where Armenia is a member. Iran's current trade with the EEU is around $6bn. That is expected to grow to $20bn in 5-7 years after the implementation of a free trade agreement in 2024.

Iran has the option of a cargo route to Russia through Azerbaijan, which is not a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, but Tehran is suspicious of the Azeris, who have warm relations with Israel.

Armenia's alternative

Armenia has firmly rejected the road plans. Instead, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan advocates an alternative project, which he calls the 'Crossroads of Peace,' which he explained in a speech in October 2023.

"The key essence… is the development of communications between Armenia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran by means of renovating, building, and operating roads, railways, airways, pipelines, cables, and electricity lines," he said. "All infrastructures… operate under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the countries through which they pass."

Economically, using existing roads would mean a longer route than any 40km Zangezur Corridor and would presumably result in transit tariffs as well. Politically, the difference between Pashinyan's plan and the Zangezur Corridor is clear: The 'Crossroads of Peace' would have no federal Russian border guards controlling the roads, and transportation would be subject to the usual customs and security checks.

Interestingly, Iran and the United States are on the same page: both are pushing for the Armenian Crossroads of Peace plan to be the solution. For Baku, there are more pressing matters. In November, it hosts the high-profile UN Climate Change Conference, or COP29. That, plus the US presidential elections in the same month, means that Azerbaijan is playing a waiting game. It is hoping that Russian pressure will force Armenia to submit and give up control at its southern border.

If it does not, President Aliyev has left all options on the table. "The creation of the Zangezur Corridor fully meets our national, historical and future interests," he told Azeri TV several years ago. "We will be implementing it, whether Armenia wants it or not."

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