New front? Israel and Iraq's IRI look to be on a collision course

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq appears more capable of inflicting damage on Israel than ever before. But as the ongoing escalation in Lebanon shows, Israel is determined to route out all threats.

New front? Israel and Iraq's IRI look to be on a collision course

While global attention is fixed on Israel's escalating attacks on Hezbollah in Lebanon, another potential regional conflict is quietly simmering in the background. The trigger for this brewing tension came on 20 September, when an air strike, believed to be carried out by Israel, killed a commander of Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah faction in Syria. Unlike the more frequent targeted killings of Hezbollah and Iranian commanders, Israel’s deliberate assassination of an Iraqi commander is a rare, if not unprecedented, move.

In turn, this event prompted a sharp escalation in retaliatory strikes by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) against Israel. Not only have the attacks increased in intensity, but the alliance has also achieved a higher success rate in infiltrating Israeli-held territory and hitting their targets. These developments— particularly the growing threat posed by the IRI to Israel—have set both sides on an escalatory path, potentially leading to increased violence in Iraq and Syria, where the alliance is active.

Before exploring the consequences of this escalation, it’s crucial to understand why Israel targeted the Kataib Hezbollah commander with a drone strike on his vehicle near Damascus airport in the early hours of 20 September. The IRI has claimed responsibility for approximately 167 attacks on Israeli targets between November 2023 and September 25, 2024, making it difficult to pinpoint the exact reason. However, two recent developments may offer some insight.

Key developments

The first is a trend observed in September 2024, where the IRI saw a marked increase in the success rate of its attacks infiltrating Israeli-held territory. Until August 2024, only 18% of the group’s claimed attacks were intercepted by the Israeli army, while many of the remaining claims lacked concrete evidence, leading to speculation that they were exaggerated for media impact.

In September, there was a marked increase in the success rate of IRI attacks infiltrating Israeli-held territory

The alliance's sudden improvement in success rates may indicate that Israel's assassination of the Iraqi commander was meant as a warning against further infiltration. This move mirrors Israel's August attack on Hodeidah in Yemen, which followed a Houthi strike on Tel Aviv, though the scale of the two incidents differs significantly.

The second development is the recent surge in Israeli attacks against Hezbollah. As Hezbollah faces growing pressure in Lebanon, with the risk of a full-scale conflict on the horizon, Israel may have carried out the assassination of the Iraqi commander to deter Iraqi factions from stepping in to support their Lebanese ally. Iraqi commanders aligned with the IRI have repeatedly expressed their willingness to fight alongside Hezbollah if necessary. Notably, just days before the assassination, Kataib Hezbollah issued a statement declaring its readiness to support Hezbollah "until the end," offering fighters and resources.

Undeterred

However, rather than acting as a deterrent, the killing of the Kataib Hezbollah commander seems to have had the opposite effect, suggesting that further escalation is likely. In addition to a higher success rate in infiltrating Israeli territory, the IRI has improved its ability to hit its targets. On 25 September, two of the five attacks launched by the alliance struck targets within Israel: a building in the Arava Valley and the port of Eilat.

This raises the possibility that they have either made significant strides in improving their capabilities or are receiving assistance from a more skilled operator, such as Iran, Hezbollah, or the Houthis. Alternatively, they may have possessed these skills and technology all along but chose not to use them effectively until now.

Rather than acting as a deterrent, Israel's killing of the Kataib Hezbollah commander seems to have had the opposite effect, suggesting that further escalation is likely

Either way, the IRI now appears more capable of inflicting damage on Israel than ever before. But as the ongoing escalation in Lebanon shows, Israel is no longer willing to accept such a heightened level of risk. The absence of an immediate Israeli retaliation does not imply tolerance—it may simply reflect other priorities, such as the current focus on Hezbollah or a strategic decision to avoid opening a third front along its border with Syria.

However, these calculations could shift quickly if the threat posed by the IRI becomes too significant to ignore or if one of their attacks causes enough damage to necessitate a swift Israeli response, as seen with the Houthis' strike on Tel Aviv.

Recipe for disaster

Such a scenario is not far-fetched. These tit-for-tat skirmishes tend to take on a life of their own, fuelling further escalation— especially when none of the parties involved are willing to appear as though they are backing down. Coupled with the high potential for miscalculations, this dynamic creates a recipe for disaster, where the original intentions of the involved parties become less relevant than the momentum of the conflict itself.

When the flames of war spread, Iraqis and Syrians, much like the Palestinians before them, will find themselves caught in the crossfire in a conflict they neither ignited nor control, bearing the ultimate cost for decisions made far beyond their borders.

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