Assad turns escalation in Gaza and Lebanon to his advantage

The Syrian president was perfectly happy to benefit from his allies' help during the uprising against his regime from 2011, notably when Hezbollah fighters crossed over from Lebanon and came to his rescue, to ensure his survival.

Yet when the roles are reversed, he refuses to reciprocate their support. Indeed, Assad's purposeful passivity has persisted as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran have all faced direct attacks in recent months.

Seeking Arab friends

Several factors contribute to Assad's adoption of a stubbornly non-interventionist stance. First, Syria remains ravaged by 13 years of civil war.

Its once-might military is but a shadow of its former self, its air defences seem non-existent, and its economy is in ruins. Assad cannot afford to repair infrastructure damaged by Israel so dare not antagonise it.

There is no love lost between Assad and Hamas, since the latter sided with the 2011 uprising. But that is not why Syria did not come to its rescue. It could not have opened a front across the Golan Heights, even if it had wanted to.

Politically, this disengagement strategy benefits the Assad regime by fostering improved relations with Arab states, whose priority since October 2023 has been to de-escalate and prevent a wider regional war.

Arab states have also long sought to wrench Syria from Iran's sphere of influence and align Damascus's foreign policy more closely with their own.

Fully aware of the angles, Assad has framed Syria's recent posture as alignment to that of Arab peers, rather than fear for survival. It seems to be working. Diplomatically, Syria is more involved in the region than it has been since 2010.

Its readmission to the Arab League marked a major moment. There has also been an enhanced Arab diplomatic presence in Damascus since the start of 2024.

Benefits from war next door

Much like the conflict in Gaza, the growing fear of an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon has provided the Syrian regime with an opportunity.

Since October, tit-for-tat attacks between Israel and Hezbollah were an almost daily feature, but the risk of war recently rose after Israel assassinated Hezbollah's top military commander, Fouad Shukr, and Hamas political chief, Ismail Haniyeh.

The anticipated strong retaliation from Iran and Hezbollah, coupled with Israel's intention to respond and America's intention to help, has fuelled concerns that the situation could quickly spiral out of control.

If Beirut's international airport and seaports are disabled early on, as they have been by Israel in the past, those leaving Lebanon will have to do so by land. With Lebanon's Israeli border a warzone, that only leaves Syria as an exit route.

So, after a long period of silence, communications between international missions and the Syrian regime's embassy in Beirut have suddenly reportedly surged, to coordinate potential evacuations.

The calls have come not only from traditionally friendly nations, such as some in Latin America, but also from Western embassies in Lebanon, including those of Norway, Switzerland, and Italy.

UN missions in Lebanon have reportedly taken similar steps to plan for possible evacuations in the event of war.

According to informed sources, the Syrian regime's embassy has conveyed its readiness to cooperate, following directives from Damascus.

However, it remains unclear what Assad has demanded in return. He is known for being calculated and adept at capitalising on situations like this to.

Winning either way

Syria is not typically regarded as a desirable evacuation destination, due to the ongoing conflict there and the fragile security situation in regime-controlled areas.

But in the event of war, evacuation operations from Lebanon would have to go through Damascus Airport or leave from Amman Airport via Syria.

Either way, the Assad regime stands to benefit, not least by claiming the moral high ground for helping others, including those who have wronged it in the past.

Such cooperation will increase its contact with missions that had previously disengaged. For Assad, this can only help Syria's international reintegration.

Some suggest that Damascus may leverage the prospect of evacuations to press diplomatic missions to re-establish a presence in Syria or expand their operations under the guise of logistical necessities.

Even if the current escalation in Lebanon is resolved peacefully, many missions will now want to keep their channels open. Even if war does not arrive today, it may still arrive tomorrow.

While regime has gained from the war on Gaza, with its bolstered regional standing offering some political advantages, this does little to alleviate the far more pressing and monumental economic challenges facing Syria today.

President Assad has been walking a tightrope between Iran on one side and Arab states on the other. He may be adept at maximising advantage out of situations but keep your eyes out in the months ahead.

The reason? He is unlikely to maintain his ability to play all sides… especially if tensions continue to escalate.