Iraq's IRI ramps up attacks on Israel: Reasons and repercussions

Breakdown of attacks

Open-source data reveals that the IRI claimed a minimum of 124 attacks on Israel from November 2023 to June 2024. These claims have shown a documented increase notably in the second quarter of the year, reaching a significant peak in May with approximately 40 claimed attacks on different targets.

The announcements underscore the use of suicide drones and cruise missiles targeting military installations and critical infrastructure across Israel. According to the IRI reports, over half of the attacks were focused on targets in southern Israel, followed closely by the north with a marginal difference (approximately 40%), while less than 10% of the attacks targeted central parts of Israel.

However, the validity of many of these claims is questionable, as they have neither been confirmed by the Israeli army nor triggered Israel's Tzeva Adom (Red Colour) alert system. Furthermore, open-source data, including reports from Israeli news outlets and social media, have not corroborated many of these claims.

This trend began to shift in April when some of these attacks started to be reported by Israeli sources. In April, Israel reported an attack on the naval base in Eilat originating from the east. In May, the Israeli army noted an increase in such incidents, intercepting nine suspicious aerial targets en route to Israel from the east on May 8, 14, 15, 23, 24, 28, and 30. In June, the Israeli army intercepted five suspicious aerial targets on June 3, 11, 15, 16, and 23. Additionally, a drone reportedly fell in the maritime area near Eilat on June 26. The Israeli army typically describes IRI attacks as originating "from the east."

Joint action

In June, the IRI intensified its attacks on Israel by partnering with the Houthis, demonstrating increased cooperation within the "axis of resistance" to turn their slogan of a unified front against Israel into a reality. Their first claimed joint attack took place on 6 June, targeting three ships either in or en route to the port of Haifa. These joint operations continued throughout June, culminating in five claims for a total of nine attacks. All of these attacks targeted Haifa, except for one incident in Ashdod.

Additionally, the Houthis announced their collaboration with the IRI to launch attacks against Israel from the Golan Heights, although no further details were provided. Notably, the Israeli military did not respond to these joint claims but confirmed shooting down a drone approaching from the east on 23 June. Beyond this incident, there were no further indications or confirmations of these attacks aside from the groups' claims of responsibility.

Israel downplaying attacks

Despite the apparent escalation in the number of actual attacks by IRI against Israel over the past two months, Israel has continued to ignore the purported attacks. Even when Tel Aviv confirms an attack, the Israeli army continues to avoid identifying the groups responsible, which contrasts its policy towards Hezbollah's attacks.

Israel's lack of acknowledgement or response to the IRI might be attributed to the limited impact of these attacks, which is restricted to occasional light damage without casualties or injuries. Israel, already grappling with conflicts on two fronts—in Gaza and along the border with Hezbollah—seems to believe that ignoring the IRI's symbolic activities is the best option to avoid opening a third front in Syria or Iraq.

However, this measured stance has prompted Israeli voices to warn that—despite the militia's failure to date to mount a significant attack on Israel—the threat they pose must not be discounted. They argue that the IRI's claims of attacks on Israel indicate a clear intention to target the country. While previous attempts may have fallen short or were intercepted, the group's basic capability and intent are evident. Neglecting these actions, they contend, risks normalising them, which could pose more significant challenges even after the Gaza conflict concludes.

Since its inception, the IRI has maintained its commitment to carry out actions against Israel until the Gaza conflict reaches a resolution. With no foreseeable end to the Gaza conflict, the likelihood of a surge in IRI attacks on Israel remains high, particularly if Israel initiates a comprehensive offensive against Hezbollah. The IRI has made clear its unwavering pledge to stand by Hezbollah in any necessary capacity, including active involvement in frontline combat. Furthermore, the IRI has issued threats to target US interests in Iraq and the wider region, posing further risks to regional stability.

Amidst the rising tensions, the need for nuanced diplomatic engagement to ensure strategic de-escalation becomes ever more vital to avert a descent into widespread conflict and instability.

In the absence of such proactive steps, Iraqis, Syrians, and Lebanese, akin to the Palestinians in the current context, face the grim prospect of being caught in the crossfire. As the spectre of war looms large, they risk becoming collateral damage in a conflict not of their making, bearing the brunt of decisions made far beyond their own borders.