The last red line: Iran consulate strike shows the gloves are off

When Syrians first took to the streets demanding political reforms in the spring of 2011, it was Zahedi who was swiftly dispatched to Damascus to coordinate the IRGC's mission to assist the Syrian intelligence crackdown that soon followed.

Zahedi's actions in Syria, his role as Iran's link to Hezbollah, and his status as receiver and disseminator of Iranian weapons across the region saw him sanctioned by the US, the UK, the EU, Canada, and Australia.

Raising the stakes

The Damascus strike followed weeks of escalating tension between Israel and the two allies, Iran and Syria. Specifically, Israel has targeted Iranians on Syrian territory.

Between 2013 and October 2023, Israel conducted several hundred strikes against Iran-linked targets in Syria, but almost all were targeting weapons shipments and Iranian proxy militants.

Over those ten years, Israel's military and security community repeatedly made clear that a policy of 'mowing the grass' or 'playing whack-a-mole' was sufficient to cripple Iran's capabilities in Syria, and to an extent, in Lebanon too.

Yet since its security was so badly shattered on 7 October 2023, Israel has embraced a far more aggressive and strategic approach to striking Iranian interests on Syrian soil.

This would seem to suggest the former line of action is far from sufficient and that, in times of increased tension, a more assertive posture is required.

As such, Israel has launched more than 55 strikes in Syria in the past six months. More than 30 of these have come since 1 January 2024.

In this recent wave of strikes, Israel has clearly expanded its target list to include IRGC operatives and leaders, while the geographical spread of strikes has also grown markedly.

Israel's strikes on multiple targets in Aleppo on 29 March that left more than 40 dead and 100 injured were described at the time as the most aggressive seen since 1973.

However, with Iran's consulate now struck, and the IRGC's dedicated leaders dead, there are no red lines left uncrossed as far as actions in Syria are concerned.

This makes some form of Iranian response virtually guaranteed. With the region already a tinderbox, the risk associated with miscalculation is sky-high.

Iranian response

Iran has a clear and consistent track record in previous years of using proxies to attack US troops as retaliation for particularly aggressive Israeli strikes against its interests.

Since early February, an IRGC-imposed freeze on attacks by its proxies on US forces in Syria and Iraq has remained in place, offering some calm after more than 180 attacks in less than four months.

Lifting the freeze on attacks by Iran's favoured militias in Syria and possibly Iraq would seem to be a likely response in the coming days.

In recent months, Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and suicide drones have all been launched at US troops, international shipping, and Israel itself, but they have all been fired or launched by Iran's proxies in Yemen, Iraq and Syria.

While Iran did launch ballistic missiles at a target in Erbil in January 2024, so far, no attack has been launched from Iranian territory at Israel.

Iranian state media now describes the 1 April strike on the Damascus consulate as a declaration of war. 

Some form of reciprocal missile launch from Iran against Israel could be seen, in a form that would allow for its interception and therefore the avoidance of an uncontrollable spiral of escalation.

While tensions between Hezbollah and Israel have ratcheted up significantly in recent weeks, it remains unlikely that the Lebanese border will be where Iran responds.

The balance of terror that exists on both sides is the only thing that has avoided all-out war in recent months.

This is despite more than 800 Hezbollah attacks and 1,500 Israeli strikes since October.

Hezbollah, and by extension Iran, appear to have too much at stake in Lebanon to risk a direct response on the so-called northern front.

While the precise nature of what comes next remains unclear, tensions look set to rise significantly.

Having established a complex and highly capable network of militant proxies across the region, Iran is well-positioned to respond on several different fronts.

Where and how it chooses to will provide an important insight into its risk calculus, after six months of multi-front hostilities.