When Syria’s former Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam left for Paris in 2005, he took reams of papers, reports, notes, and files with him.
A trusted insider to the al-Assads for decades, the documents give rare insight into the heart of government from Khaddam’s first-hand accounts. He died in March 2020.
Among the more intriguing geopolitical periods of his time in power was the year leading up to the United States’ invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
Those attending these crunch meetings between Iran and Syria included Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Syrian Vice-President Abdul Halim Khaddam, Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa, and Brig. Gen. Mohammed Nassif.
From Tehran, there were Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, and Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s powerful Quds Force.
They met at the 11th hour, with the US invasion of Iraq just days away. They knew that Saddam would not go quietly and wanted the US to get bogged down in Iraq, hoping for a “new Vietnam”.
They also sought to avoid the eventual establishment of a new and sovereign Kurdish state in the north of Iraq, so they agreed to work with Turkey, knowing that Ankara would be wholly opposed to this.
Through Khaddam’s paperwork, Al Majalla can now reveal for the first time the conversations that took place between the region’s leaders ahead of the war.
Interestingly, it shows how Tehran and Damascus tried to align security, political, and military strategies to counter American intervention in Iraq.
War feels unavoidable
As the American campaign against Iraq intensified in early 2003, with its military forces amassing in the region, it found itself unable to get a green light for action from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
The lack of a UN resolution defining and limiting US ambitions led to concern in Damascus about the potential for the Americans’ war to spread, especially considering Syria’s previous support for Saddam.
In this context, a senior delegation of al-Assad, Khaddam, al-Sharaa, and General Nassif visited Iran on 16 March 2003 to align strategies with the Iranians. Minutes of the meeting were included in the Khaddam Files.
“What steps can we take in the short time before the war starts?” al-Assad asked Khatami. “How should we brace for a prolonged conflict, potentially lasting years?
“I’m not suggesting the United States will opt for a peaceful settlement, but if it achieves stability and security, it might next focus on Iran and Syria.”
Khatami agreed these were “relevant and timely questions” and added, “We, in Iran, always contemplate such scenarios.”
Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Kamal Kharrazi had had similar discussions with Tehran’s allies for months, including with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and French President Jacques Chirac.
“Interestingly, both expressed worries about the likely attack on Iraq,” said Khatami. “Yet, their concerns extended further. Both felt that war was unavoidable.”
Limiting war to Iraq
Chirac told Khatami that “we must strive to limit the aggression to Iraq alone”, expressing his “grave concern that an attack on Iraq is merely the initial step”.
Chirac said that despite France's preparation to use its veto power in the UNSC, America was still determined to proceed.
“The French position is that opposing America makes any resultant war, should it occur, an unjust act of aggression, granting us the right to react appropriately in its aftermath.”
Khatami told the Frenchman that while air strikes could inflict significant damage on Iraq and its population, “they’re unlikely to unseat Saddam”.
The Iranian president pondered whether this could “necessitate a nuclear conflict,” adding: “I assume the Iraqi military and the Guard would defend from within urban centres.
He said: “A swift victory could denote a decisive win for America, should the war be brief. Conversely, a protracted conflict might spell defeat for America, potentially swaying public opinion against President George Bush and his policies."
“Thus, the outcome of this war seems uncertain. The degree of Iraqi resistance and endurance remains a question."
“We shouldn’t wish for war, but if it happens, America must not win easily. Regarding our actions if war breaks out, what should we consider?”
Al-Assad said: “Had the adversary been anyone but the Americans, Saddam’s downfall might have been swifter. Yet, the Americans’ folly leads them to predict a short war, unnecessarily limiting themselves.”