Are fears of a Russian attack on Sweden warranted?

Farewell to neutrality

Since the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, concerns about a major conflict in Europe have escalated, with speculation that Russian President Vladimir Putin might target the Baltic countries next.

This apprehension led to the fundamental shift of Sweden and Finland — traditionally neutral states — joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Just two months after the Ukrainian conflict began, there was a notable increase in public support for NATO membership in both countries.

Finland and Sweden subsequently submitted their applications and have since enhanced their mutual defence coordination, both bilaterally and with the Nordic Group and the European Union.

Finland successfully navigated objections from Turkey and Hungary to join NATO last year, ending over seven decades of neutrality. However, Sweden still awaits approval from Ankara and Budapest, who have a veto.

Sweden's accession to NATO would ensure the protection of Article 5, which guarantees collective defence. In essence, if one member is attacked, all other members treat this as an attack on them and commit to defending it.

When Sweden does join (which most analysts assume will happen), it will abandon its longstanding neutrality, maintained since the reign of King Carl XIV, who died in 1844.

This policy kept Sweden out of major European conflicts, including the Napoleonic Wars of 1812, both World Wars and the Cold War, so it represents a monumental change.

Eye on Ukraine

Yet in Sweden, there is a widespread consensus that the country faces its most perilous political and security situation since 1945, with Russia demonstrating its readiness to pay any price to control the south-east of Ukraine.

Swedish concerns have intensified amid these evolving field conditions, including Ukraine's unsuccessful counterattack against well-dug Russian positions.

Battlelines seem not to have moved much, meaning it has become a war of attrition. Russia appears to have the upper hand, having bolstered its military industries to compensate for front-line deficiencies.

Read more: Russian resilience tests Western patience for Ukraine war

In addition, Western military support for Ukraine seems to have waned in recent months, proving the assumptions of Russia's President Vladimir Putin correct.

Critical needs, such as air cover to counter Russian aerial superiority and essential rocket and missile ammunition for the Ukrainian army, remain unmet.

This shortfall hinders Ukraine's capacity to sustain its defence against Russia, let alone advance to reclaim territories occupied by Russian forces.

Applying the lessons

As it has with many other European nations, Russian aggression against Ukraine has prompted Sweden to reassess its military preparedness.

Despite possessing advanced military industries, Sweden's armed forces are notably small and would require significant expansion and modernisation to meet such a challenge from the east.

Strategic defence reviews highlight vulnerabilities in areas such as drones and naval capabilities, leaving Sweden potentially unable to repel a Russian offensive.

Additionally, Sweden, along with other Scandinavian countries, urgently needs to develop civilian shelters in anticipation of possible unconventional warfare, including chemical or nuclear attacks.

Political and military leaders are on the same page. Sweden's armed forces, its security service (SAPO), military intelligence, and civil defence forces all acknowledge that Russia's invasion has changed things.

The delay in ratifying Sweden's membership of NATO, caused by Turkey and Hungary, has not helped settle nerves. 

Swedish decision-makers now operate under the premise that, regardless of Russia's success or failure in Ukraine, the Kremlin will continue to pose a threat but that no clear and present danger has yet been detected.

Tanks and soldiers

Russia's ground forces have been significantly weakened by the Ukrainians, who have used Western weapons to inflict heavy losses on their foe.

In December, briefings based on a declassified US intelligence report confirmed that 315,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or injured since February 2022, which represents 87% of the armed personnel that Russia had when the conflict began.

According to the same report, the Russians began the war with 3,100 tanks but have now lost 2,200 of them, having to 'backfill' with old T62 tanks from the 1970s. This has left it with just 1,300 tanks on the battlefield.

The tracking website Oryx, which uses open-source material and photographic evidence to count equipment losses on both sides, listed Russian tank losses at 2,623 as of last week, adding that this was likely to be an under-estimate.

Of these, 1,723 were destroyed, 148 were damaged, 210 were abandoned, and 542 were captured.

The Americans think that Moscow's losses, in terms of both personnel and armoured vehicles, have set Russia's military modernisation back 18 years.

Others estimate that Russia will need at least five years to rebuild its forces to a state capable of posing a significant threat to the Baltic countries. 

Increasing self-reliance

During Sweden's annual defence conference, talk was about enhancing the Swedish army's capabilities and accelerating its rearmament.

The government and parliament say they are focused on achieving the target of spending 2% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) on defence.

This is due to be met by 2025, although some feel it could be delayed until 2028, given pre-existing commitments.

In December, the Swedish Defence Committee presented a preliminary version of the defence plan for 2025-2030. It includes an early rearmament of the Swedish army, with a final report due in April.

Experts and analysts point to a lack of urgency, saying the rearmament process is not advancing as rapidly as political leaders promise.

Bydén this month admitted that the pace of preparations was lagging behind the objectives set by lawmakers.

He said that if parliament does not agree to increased funding, the goal of establishing four new military brigades could be postponed by a decade.

Many feel that to modernise and re-equip the army; the government may have to delay other economic and social reforms or consider borrowing.

Despite a security agreement with the US signed in early December, there is a strong push within Sweden for self-reliance in security and defence.

Fuelling this has been the delayed NATO ratification, the looming threat from Russia, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and the increasing tensions over Arctic resources and control of the Baltic Sea.

Additionally, the potential return of Donald Trump to the White House is a concern, given that his past statements about European security and NATO suggest that he would be reluctant to help in the event of an attack.

Swedes increasingly want to focus on national and regional security solutions, such as with the European Union, rather than putting all their eggs in the NATO basket.

Russian reasurrances

In response to heightened warnings, Russia's embassy in Stockholm has dismissed allegations that Russia is planning to wage war against Sweden.

Such reassurances are unlikely to reassure, given that four days before the Ukraine invasion, Putin said Russia's military drills on the border were "purely defensive" and "not a threat to any other country".

On 10 January, the Russian embassy derided "hysterical" politicians in a statement disseminated via their social media channels.

It advised that those stirring up military sentiment and pushing the idea of an "imaginary Russian threat" should find an alternative method to get the adrenaline they seek.

"Sweden should focus on internal improvements, such as enhancing medical care, education, tackling inflation and unemployment, fostering societal unity, and bolstering national security," said the Russians.

They added that this would not be "as a countermeasure against Moscow, but for the benefit of ordinary Swedish citizens".

Rattling sabres

Yet concerns about Russian intentions regarding the Baltic states only intensified after Putin said on 18 December that he wanted to re-establish a special military zone in the St Petersburg region.

Putin noted that while Russia had maintained friendly and economically robust relations with Finland, the recent formation of the St Petersburg Military District and the redeployment of military units there might alter the dynamics.

Despite these developments, it remains unlikely that Russia will opt for military confrontation with its Scandinavian neighbours.

Finland's NATO membership and Sweden's anticipated accession are significant indirect military repercussions from Russia's invasion of Ukraine and have escalated the rhetorical tension.

This was exemplified in a late December statement by Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia's permanent representative in Vienna.

He expressed bewilderment at Finland's decision to join NATO, which had placed it precariously between Russia and the alliance.

"They had lived calmly and in peace and suddenly ended up between Russia and NATO," Ulyanov told RIA. "Since they are our neighbours, if, God forbid, there is some escalation, they will be the first to suffer."

The Russian reaction

Russia's response to the Scandinavian states' NATO membership will hinge on several key factors, not least how Finland and Sweden choose to interact with Moscow.

Some NATO members, like the Baltic states and Poland, display hostility towards Russia, whereas others, like Hungary and Norway, maintain a space for dialogue and coordination. Before 2022, Germany also had good relations with Russia.

Read more: Russia masks deep internal fractures with threats to let Wagner invade Poland

Russia's reaction could also depend on how much NATO's infrastructure expands. If military bases or interceptor missiles are stationed near Russia's north-eastern border, it could alter the thinking in the Kremlin.

Despite these considerations, most analysts think that Russia is unlikely to initiate a war against a NATO country in the next six years unless absolutely necessary.

Such a situation could arise if there is a blockade of the Kaliningrad enclave, leaving Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in the firing line.

In the medium- to long-term, the contest for the Arctic's energy and rare mineral resources, as well as its transit corridors, could be a flashpoint between Russia (and its allies, including China) and NATO, led by the US.

Finally, it is important to note that Sweden and Finland's decision to join NATO will not have been a pre-2022 Russian security expectation, so it will have surprised the Kremlin.

A December 2021 agreement on measures to ensure the security of Russia and NATO member states even included a clause about reverting NATO's infrastructure to its pre-1997 state.

This does not imply that Russia will engage in war, but regardless of the outcome in Ukraine, this issue is of existential importance to Russia.

Putin believes that, with Ukraine, Russia can re-establish itself as an empire. Without Ukraine, it remains merely a regional superpower.