What happened on 7 October 2023 was a pivotal event that could have far-reaching implications. Let us examine the outcomes away from the day itself, its meaning, and the way it happened.
The first outcome was the failure of the strategy related to Gaza, Hamas and the question of Palestine in general, of Prime Minister Netanyahu as well as successive Israeli governments.
That strategy essentially forced division. It encouraged one regime in Gaza – under the control of Hamas – and another one in the West Bank – under the control of the Palestinian Authority – as a way to avoid serious political solutions to the conflict via the creation of the State of Palestine.
The second outcome was the failure of a theory that force alone could successfully diminish Palestinian aspirations and end their potential realisation, based on the absolute superiority of an Israeli army that could take action whenever and however Israeli leaders decided.
The third outcome was also the failure of an attempt to avoid the question of Palestine as an issue and compensate for it by establishing relations with some Arab countries.
This principle assumes that “normal relations” will enable Israel to achieve what it wants from the region and that it will absolve it from the difficult choices of dealing with Palestinian affairs and solving the conflict with the Palestinian people.
In addition, there will be almost immediate results of what happened, but also of the successive wars waged by Israel against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip. These results will include the emergence of a new Israeli government – without Benjamin Netanyahu – a new Palestinian leadership and a new Hamas.
These three tactical results are only an addition to the strategic outcomes mentioned above, which I strongly believe are correct and that any sane Israeli would accept as valid even if they disliked those outcomes.