Gaza's "day after" poised to bring more strife than stability

The "Day After Team"

Just days ago, Israel finally made the jump.

The decision came amidst renewed US pressure, including a visit by Vice President Kamala Harris's National Security Adviser Phil Gordon, and as the "high-intensity" phase of the Gaza war may soon come to an end.

A "Day After" team has been named, headed by a duo made up of National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi, Minister Ron Dermer, and other members of Israel's security apparatus.

However, none of these figures truly have any power to decide anything. In other words, while this may represent a real effort to think ahead, it could just as easily become a forgotten committee whose conclusions will be bound for the trash bin.

The task is daunting, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been dragging his feet for a reason: Any post-war scenario would have to involve some concessions to Palestinians.

These concessions are certain to undermine Bibi's far-right coalition. As a result, Netanyahu has been doing what he does best: Kicking the can down the road and focusing on narrow security interests.

So far, PM Benjamin Netanyahu has given one precondition for any "day after" scenario. In a speech in early November, he warned that in the future, Israel would retain "overall security responsibility" in Gaza and would do so for an "indefinite period". This has been misinterpreted as a sign that Israel would re-occupy and stay indefinitely in Gaza.

But what Netanyahu has in mind is slightly different. The Israeli PM was actually referring to a concept derived from the Oslo Accords.

In an effort to alleviate Israeli concerns, the accords gave Israel "responsibility for the overall security of Israelis" in all of the West Bank. Based upon this concept, Israel has been operating regularly across the West Bank, carrying out raids in all areas of the West Bank.

To be clear, this was not the spirit of the accords but has become a fait accompli. What Netanyahu wants is to reserve the ability for Israel to enter and operate Gaza through similar raids.

This explains why the current Israeli government is putting little effort into the other "half" of the day after planning in Gaza. The Israeli government is focusing solely on "security responsibility", but as Defence Minister Gantz said, Israel does not want to take charge of "civilian responsibility" in Gaza.

Civilian responsibility would include reconstruction and providing basic services for the more than 2 million Palestinians living in the enclave. Israel wants none of this responsibility.

This isn't new.

Multiple Netanyahu-led governments have narrowed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a mere "security nuisance": A problem that can be managed rather than solved.

The fact that this is still how Netanyahu treats the conflict even after 7 October should worry us all. But it is in line with Netanyahu's own track record of never offering any political solution to the conflict.

Yet this time, the Israeli government cannot ignore the issue — international pressure is too high.

Israel's leading partner, the US, understands that the "civilian half" of the Gaza equation is just as important (if not more) than the narrow security interests Netanyahu is trying to advance. One side of the equation won't be solved without the other.

Transitional phase

As a result, Washington's team is discussing plans for a transitional phase it hopes will lead to a more stable governing power in Gaza. This transitional phase, which could last around two years, would see a new governing entity being formed. One of the key US demands is to have a Palestinian component at the core of this governing entity.

This won't make its task easy — any government that comes on the back of an Israeli operation will be viewed as illegitimate by a majority of Palestinians — but without a Palestinian component, the chances of success are even lower.

Yet Washington quickly ran into a major problem: There are not many Palestinian entities capable of governing Gaza — if any.

Washington has pushed the Palestinian Authority (PA) to the forefront, not as necessarily as the ideal choice, but as one by default.

After all, the Palestinian Authority does still have a presence in Gaza, through dozens of thousands of civil servants and pensioners who are still theoretically on its payroll — though not part of the Hamas government. It is the last Palestinian power to govern Gaza before Hamas.

Washington is aware of the PA's limitations  — and they are stark. The Palestinian Authority is barely capable of controlling its own territory in the West Bank. President Mahmoud Abbas is extremely unpopular, and most Palestinians see the PA as a corrupt extension of Israel's occupation.

Having the PA make a comeback in Gaza in the wake of an Israeli ground incursion would aggravate those existing fragilities by stretching thin its resources and men while also further delegitimising it.

Bringing the PA back in Gaza might not only fail to stabilise the Palestinian enclave but also lead to the collapse of the PA in the West Bank.

A "revitalised" PA

Out of the realisation that the PA, in its current form, simply cannot take charge of Gaza, Washington has been advancing a new idea: "A revitalised Palestinian Authority". This concept has been regularly mentioned in briefs by US officials, though it is not clear that they, themselves, know what they're talking about.

Nonetheless, the idea of a "new PA" is being explored, and this — to an extent — isn't bad news.

The sorry state of the Palestinian Authority is the result of decades of neglect of the conflict, rampant corruption and clientelism, as well as Israel's own effort (under Netanyahu in particular) to marginalise the Palestinian Authority. It is also one of many factors that have led to the current deadlock in efforts to solve the conflict.

As part of those discussions, some diplomats are quietly considering whether a leadership change at the helm of the Palestinian Authority would be necessary.

Replacing President Mahmoud Abbas with a more popular figure could give it new perspectives and stronger legitimacy. But doing so would also open the pandora box: It would aggravate an existing power struggle that has pitted various potential successors of Abbas behind the scenes. Though nothing is certain, Washington may instead feel that more gradual steps are needed to "revitalise" the PA.

Washington isn't the only actor sensing an opportunity to foster change on the Palestinian scene. Abbas's opponents are also looking to make a come-back. One of the names that has been quietly whispered recently is that of Mohammed Dahlan.

Prominent figures surface

Dahlan, who was the head Gaza security chief before Hamas's take-over, is viewed as one of Abbas's archenemies and has been in exile in the UAE. Often described as an opportunist involved in shady deals, Dahlan still maintains the trust of powerful figures within the Gulf. He is also viewed as a pragmatic figure whom Israel could accept.

The usually discreet Dahlan has given two interviews to major Western outlets — a sure sign he understands the opportunity presented to him. 

While he is not a popular figure among Palestinians, he has managed to maintain solid relations in Gaza and even mend ties with Hamas.

As part of an agreement with Hamas, Gaza-born "Dahlanist" figures have quietly been able to come back to the Palestinian enclave.  Those figures could serve to form one of the layers of a transitional authority.

Still, Dahlan knows he won't return to Gaza in the coming years without some more manoeuvring and the support of other Palestinian actors. He has quietly been in touch with other Palestinian factions.

A few weeks ago, a rare meeting in Qatar saw one of Dahlan's trusted confidants, the Rafah-born Samir Mashrawi, sitting with several rival Palestinian figures. One of those figures is Nasser al-Qudwa, Yasser Arafat's nephew and another opponent of Mahmoud Abbas.

Al-Qudwa (who recently gave an exclusive interview to Al Majalla) made waves by running a competing Fatah list during the aborted Palestinian elections of 2021. These elections never took place, but Al-Qudwa managed to secure the backing of the most popular Palestinian leader still alive: Marwan Barghouti.

Barghouti — a Fatah leader sitting in Israeli prison over his participation in attacks against Israelis during the Second Intifada — has consistently been slated to win any free and fair elections. Notably, rumours have circulated that Hamas could be seeking to have him released as part of a future deal with Israel.

The other two Palestinian leaders in the room were none other than Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of Hamas, and Khaled Meshaal, its former leader. The meeting may point to behind-the-scenes efforts to bridge the gap between various rival Palestinian factions.

The fact that these factions are still in talks with Hamas and that both the PA and Dahlan have said Hamas should have a role in Gaza's future will surely help the cause of Benjamin Netanyahu, who seeks to prevent a return of the PA to Gaza.

Bibi's "Day After" plan

The Israeli PM is also thinking about the "day after" — but for himself rather than Gaza. He has a plan. All of these initiatives have one thing in common: They all require that Israel recommit to the two-state solution and return to peace negotiations.

All of Israel's interlocutors — be it in the West or in the region — have made it clear that the current deadlock in the peace process can no longer continue.

In Netanyahu's view, this is his opportunity to bounce back. Bibi is deliberately positioning himself as the only Israeli leader capable of thwarting the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Decades after trashing the Oslo Accords, Netanyahu is once again campaigning against the establishment of a Palestinian state. Gone are the days when Bibi paid lip service to the two-state solution (while acting against it).

Netanyahu has clearly stated there will never be a Palestinian state under his rule. He proudly touted his record of preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state and warned he would never let Israel "return to the mistake that was the Oslo Accords".

This is no coincidence. Netanyahu understands that, on the day after the war, pressure will be high to return to the table of negotiation with Palestinians.

He also understands that after 7 October, Israelis are even more concerned about the possibility of a future Palestinian state. Segments of the Israeli public see the past decades in Gaza as a cautionary tale.

In their view, Israel withdrew from the Palestinian enclave only to see Hamas rise and eventually carry out the worst terror attacks the country ever faced.

This is, of course, a simplistic view of recent Gaza history. But Netanyahu has always had a knack for exploiting Israeli fears when at a crossroads. And he knows simplistic views often make for powerful political arguments.