Israel's war on Gaza: Possible scenarios for the day after

Rules of engagement

The resolution did not call for a pause in hostilities or a truce. It showed the different approach of the US – not only in addressing the escalating crisis in Gaza and the broader Palestinian issue – but also in terms of what could be called the US rules of engagement in the Middle East, which emerged as follows:

• Israel's right to self-defence was re-asserted

• The resolution demands Iran stop exporting arms to "militias and terrorist groups threatening peace and security across the region."

• It urges all countries to stop "the violence in Gaza from spilling over or expanding to other areas in the region by demanding Hezbollah and other armed groups to cease all attacks immediately."

• It demands Iran to stop exporting arms to groups threatening peace and security across the region, including Hamas.

• It calls for the protection of civilians, including those who are trying to get to safety. It emphasises that states must comply with international law when responding to "terrorist attacks."

• It urges the continuous, sufficient, and unhindered aid delivery to the Gaza Strip.

Since then, on 25 October, the United States and Russia put forward rival plans at the UN to help Palestinian civilians in Gaza: a humanitarian pause or a ceasefire.

Both countries seek UN Security Council resolutions to address food, water, medical supplies and electricity shortages in Gaza. But the US has called for pauses to allow aid to enter Gaza, while Russia wants a humanitarian ceasefire.

Diplomatic initiatives have coincided with an announcement from the Pentagon that the US will send state-of-the-art air defences – including Patriot and THAAD systems, which protect against missile attacks – to the Middle East.

This deployment comes in response to recent attacks on US forces in the region.

Furthermore, additional military units, with undisclosed troop numbers, will be deployed along with the aircraft carriers Gerald Ford and Dwight D. Eisenhower.

In parallel, there have been Israeli air strikes on Damascus and Aleppo airports in Syria, stopping them from operating for the second within a week. These strikes by Israeli aircraft might be a part of a US strategy to disrupt arms shipments to militias in the region.

The increased US presence in the field aligns with the stance revealed by President Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken during visits to the region. It also backs up the intent mentioned in the UN resolution, especially on containing the conflict, and demands for Hezbollah and other armed groups to stop their attacks and arms exports from Iran.

It amounts to a redefinition of security in the Middle East. The sole point of disagreement between the US and its regional partners lies in the method of removing Hamas fighters from Gaza without subjecting the population to further casualties and destruction.

What next?

There is no doubt that the war has swept away the unstable coexistence between Gaza and Israel that was in place since Hamas took over governance 17 years ago.

The old cycles of bloody escalations of violence followed by periods of relative peace – when economic overlap opened the way for Gaza's residents to work in Israel or do business with it – will never return. Hamas' Al-Aqsa Flood operation has changed all that.

It is still too early to predict the nature of the new reality. As Israel's former deputy national security advisor, Chuck Freilich, said: "We haven't seen this before. This is not just another round with Hamas."

The 7 October attack killed 1,400 Israelis on the country's own soil, including over 300 soldiers. The shockwaves that have followed have swept away established assumptions and raised the prospect of great change that was previously inconceivable.

Potential outcomes include Israel's temporary re-occupation of Gaza, the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza and the deployment of international peacekeeping forces. It is also conceivable that a disarmed Hamas may be left to manage the aftermath.

But it remains too early for all of these scenarios to be discussed.

"Crushing Hamas"

Israel's stated objective for the looming battle is to eliminate Hamas – designated as a terrorist group by the United States and others – once and for all. "We will crush and destroy it," Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pledged to Israelis in a televised address.

But what will "crushing Hamas" actually mean in practice?

Hamas represents an ideology similar to Islamic State (IS); therefore, it will be challenging to eradicate it, or those kinds of beliefs and ideas, at least entirely. Even if Israel does kill every Hamas leader in Gaza and collapses all of the group's tunnels, destroying the organisation may not be possible.

Hamas has leaders and activists outside Gaza who move around across various regional countries and in the West Bank. Hamas supporters can be found in multiple other locations as well as Gaza.

Nonetheless, there is widespread and passionate support among the Israeli public for the destructive attacks on Gaza and the aim to wipe out Hamas.

But previous conflicts show that the mood can shift – and international support can wane – especially if the expected ground war drags on and produces horrifying body counts.

Read more: Catastrophe in Gaza and Western complicity

Israel's three stages for war

Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant has said Israel is presently in the initial phase of what are expected to be three stages of conflict: Air strikes, already underway, followed by ground operations to destroy Hamas and then the setting up of a new security framework in the region. 

During a session of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, Gallant went into more detail on these phases:

"We are in the first phase, in which a military campaign is taking place with air strikes and later with a ground manoeuvre to destroy operatives and damage infrastructure in order to defeat and destroy Hamas.

"In the second stage, the fight will continue but at a lower intensity as troops work to 'eliminate pockets of resistance.'

"The third step will be the creation of a new security regime in the Gaza Strip, the removal of Israel's responsibility for day-to-day life in the Gaza Strip, and the creation of a new security reality for the citizens of Israel and the residents of the area surrounding Gaza."

A scenario in which the political wing of Hamas continues to govern the Gaza Strip is highly unlikely, though not entirely impossible, according to Yossi Melman, a long-standing intelligence columnist for the Israeli newspaper Haaretz.

Officials see this as a possibility mainly because it would support a strategic priority of Netanyahu's: continuing the split of the Palestinian people between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, which governs the West Bank. Melman stated: "This has been a dream scenario for Israel: a disarmed Hamas that remains in power."

The Times of Israel reported in late October that "Recent days have seen growing pressure on the government to devise a clear strategy for how it plans to avoid getting bogged down in a lengthy reoccupation of the Strip and leaving Gaza while ensuring Hamas no longer manages it."

It added: "US President Joe Biden's administration has also privately pressed Israel to flesh out its exit strategy. Netanyahu and his inner circle indicated to their American counterparts that Israel had not yet developed such a strategy and was more focused on the immediate goal of removing Hamas from power in Gaza."

Biden's warning and ground invasion plans

In mid-October, Biden warned Israel against prolonged involvement in Gaza, drawing parallels with America's experience in Afghanistan after 2001, when it invaded the country to overthrow the Taliban after the 11 September terrorist attacks.

Biden expressed concern about civilian casualties and emphasised that wartime leadership requires "clear objectives and an honest assessment of whether the chosen path will achieve those objectives."

Operational plans for Israel to invade Gaza appear to be incomplete, despite the army's and Netanyahu's claims that the ground campaign is ready.

Uncertainty remains over the definition of success in the field – and how to achieve it – there are doubts over Israel's ability to stay in Gaza and tolerate the political consequences of any subsequent occupation.

Minister of Intelligence Gila Gamliel says: "We need to see how long it will take to destroy Hamas. And then I believe there will be an international understanding with Israel for the day after. But now we must put all our power into winning this war."

Observers and experts think a sustained occupation is unlikely. Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, says:

"Israel is not willing to sacrifice any more of its soldiers' lives than is necessary, and after what could be a brutal invasion, staying in Gaza to govern will have no appeal. Israel will not occupy Gaza and run the lives of 2 million Palestinians."

Some analysts believe deploying an international or Arab peacekeeping force may be one of the options. In turn, that could open the way for an eventual return of the Palestinian Authority, which was the governing body of Gaza between 1994 and 2006.

This viewpoint relies on the ability of Saudi Arabia to act as a mediator in bringing the Palestinian Authority back to Gaza.

The Kingdom has already been in talks with the US regarding the normalisation of diplomatic relations with Israel. It has signalled that any bilateral deal with Israel needs to include provisions for the Palestinians, probably including measures to bolster the diminished standing of the Palestinian Authority.

Risks on the ground and a better option

The ground invasion poses a substantial challenge for Israel, militarily and for what happens after the initial phase of conflict after an invasion.

Exploring a diplomatic alternative that ensures the permanent end of the cycle of violence and ensures Palestinian rights by establishing the two-state solution appears to be the best option.

The willingness of the Gulf Arab states, Egypt, and other Arab governments to help Israel define an outcome from the current conflict will depend on how the Gaza war ends.

The world was shocked by Hamas' brutality. But there has been Israeli brutality since the founding of the country in 1948. The daily destructive experiences, the civilian casualties, and the humanitarian agony in Gaza is likely to erode international support for Israel and the Arab states' willingness to accept outcomes.

As Freilich, Israel's former deputy national security advisor, said:

"Now we see strong support from the United States and Western countries. But public support will shift – weaken – as the Gaza campaign gets ugly."