Hamas is an idea. It's not just an entity with guns. You kill it, presumably, and something else, possibly more radical and violent, will replace it.
Majalla/Agencies
While the IDF wants to degrade Hamas's military capabilities, the ground operation comes with a host of political and tactical risks. Al Majalla explains.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is in the unenviable position of having to translate the Israeli government’s ridiculous goal of “wiping out” or “destroying” Hamas into practical, realistic, and achievable military objectives.
Even the most hawkish Israeli generals understand that annihilating a deep-rooted, political-military movement like Hamas, which enjoys support from a large portion of Palestinians in Gaza, is virtually impossible.
Hamas is an idea. It's not just an entity with guns. You kill it, presumably, and something else, possibly more radical and violent, will replace it.
This isn't the Third Reich or Imperial Japan. If the IDF does disarm Hamas, it will neither control Gaza nor turn that place into a democracy like the West did with Germany and Japan after World War II.
The IDF instead will seek to substantially degrade the military capabilities of Hamas, and ideally disarm it. Reducing and possibly eliminating Hamas’ ability to fire and produce missiles, rockets, and armed drones will be a top priority for the IDF.
Hamas is an idea. It's not just an entity with guns. You kill it, presumably, and something else, possibly more radical and violent, will replace it.
Challenges and risks
But that priority itself carries a host of risks and challenges, some strategic/political, some operational/tactical.
Strategically, the IDF has to balance between going hard against Hamas, which is necessary for the goal of degrading or disarming the group, and protecting the lives of the more than 200 hostages held by Hamas (and ideally freeing them). If the IDF pursues lighter and more surgical operations, it gives Hamas a chance to fight back and thus put the lives of Israeli soldiers at risk. Threading that needle won't be easy at all.
Hamas' massive tunnel infrastructure, built methodically over many years, adds a significant layer of complexity to the IDF's operations. These tunnels are long, deep, tight, and with multiple floors. Hamas fighters can live and find shelter there for an extended period of time. They can fight inside and from those tunnels.
Egyptian soldiers inspect a smuggling tunnel in the divided border town of Rafah, along the border with the Hamas-run Gaza Strip, on November 4, 2014.
They can command and control their operations against the IDF. They can store their strategic weapons, and this is most likely where they are keeping all their hostages.
The tunnels are not a tactical feature of Hamas' warfighting strategy. Instead, they are a core element of it. They provide Hamas with operational and tactical flexibility the group doesn't have above ground. The tunnels make it easier for Hamas to conduct hit-and-run operations, which is most likely what they will do against the IDF.
The IDF is trained for both urban and subterranean warfare. It has not only specialised units for those distinct kinds of warfare but also specialised equipment, some locally produced, some provided by the United States.
But until the IDF sends its units below the surface and engages in close combat, they won't know what awaits. All that specialised subterranean equipment – for breathing, for seeing, for navigating, for shooting, for communicating – could very easily malfunction.
And that's not even factoring in Hamas' potential countermeasures. Just like the IDF has prepared for such a fight, Hamas has prepared, too, and for many years.
Consistent with the delicate balance of Hamas disarmament-hostage safety, as discussed above, the IDF cannot exercise all the options at its disposal to destroy the tunnels.
For example, it cannot flush out, or smoke out, the militants. It cannot flood the tunnels. It cannot use heavy ordnance. It cannot pour cement because of the physical safety risks these methods pose to the hostages.
The tunnels are a core element of Hamas's warfighting strategy. They provide Hamas with operational and tactical flexibility the group doesn't have above ground. The tunnels make it easier for Hamas to conduct hit-and-run operations, which is most likely what they will do against the IDF.
Weak intelligence
That's all assuming the IDF has perfect intelligence on the whereabouts of the hostages, which it likely doesn't. The IDF can't pursue surgical operations if it doesn't have enough accurate intelligence, and given the historic intelligence failure the country is emerging from, confidence in Israeli intelligence capabilities is not very high right now.
The existence of that kind of intelligence will also shape the decision of how the IDF will engage Hamas. Does it first clear the tunnels of militants as much as possible so it can proceed to release the hostages, and then it destroys the tunnels? Or is the script reversed? If destruction precedes clearance, that brings us back to the critical issue of hostage safety.
Last but not least, the possibility of another front opening up, be it from Lebanon or Syria, will incredibly complicate operations for the IDF.
An Israeli soldier adjusts his rifle as he stands on a tank near Israel's border with Lebanon in northern Israel, October 16, 2023.
The Israeli government can say all it wants that it is ready for another front against Hezbollah along its northern border should the Lebanese group enter the fight.
But in reality, a two-or-multiple-front confrontation will greatly strain the capabilities of the IDF and create immense political pressure on the Israeli government.
Hezbollah, much more powerful today than in 2006 when it fought Israel to a standstill for 34 days, may not be able to deter Israel from invading Gaza, but it will do everything it can to influence the manner in which Israeli troops enter Gaza and fight Hamas.
Neither Hezbollah nor Iran wants a war with Israel, but it's hard to imagine them watching their Palestinian partner get pummeled or about to get disarmed by the IDF and do nothing about it.
This isn't necessarily out of love for Hamas. This is because the Iran-led Axis views the Palestinian theatre as core to the struggle against Israel. It has immense religious significance. If Hamas goes, so does a major Palestinian means to stand up to Israel.
Israel has the ability to damage Hamas seriously, but the key questions are: what is the military risk it is willing to accept, and what is the political price it is willing to tolerate?
Entering the tunnels will no doubt be perilous, but causing a high degree of collateral damage while doing so, which is virtually inevitable given the densely populated urban terrain and Hamas' tactics of placing its military facilities under hospitals, schools and residential buildings, will be far worse.
It's cliche to say that there is no military solution to the Hamas problem. But it doesn't make it any less true.
