The spectrum of foreign policy approaches amongst GOP presidential candidates

Foreign policy outlooks traditionalist vs isolationist

To assess candidates' different postures towards Middle East issues, it's vital to first identify the 'camps' of broader foreign policy approaches that candidates fall into.

It's clear that the Trump administration's transactional approach towards foreign policy and isolationist mentality introduced a new strain of policy preferences amongst Republican constituents — one that is defining this race's debate on foreign policy issues early on.

While it's likely that this race will feature shifting foreign policy positions as candidates conform to constituents' preferences and attempt to consolidate their voter base, there have been some clear signals from candidates thus far which outlook they are adopting for their foreign policy agenda.

While all candidates agree on maintaining a strong military posture for bargaining power, there are vast differences over how the US should engage militarily and diplomatically with its partners and adversaries abroad. There are two primary camps into which candidates fall into: the engage camp and the isolationist camp.

Candidates such as Mike Pence, Nikki Haley, Tim Scott, and Chris Christie have upheld a robust US posture abroad. This approach champions US strength through engagement, a heavier forward-operating posture in multiple theatres, and simultaneously doubling down on great-power rivals China and Russia.

Notably, these candidates place greater emphasis on constraining Russia in Ukraine as a force-multiplier for competition with other regional rivals in other theatres; they believe that if the US can effectively constrain Russian encroachment in Ukraine, that sends a message and ultimately deters other regional rivals, such as China in the Pacific and Iran in the Middle East.

As a result, these candidates have strongly asserted their support of US military assistance for Ukraine in the face of risking scepticism amongst party members and constituents over the level of assistance and calls for accountability.

For candidates like Tim Scott, support for Ukraine has been justified to hold Russia further off from additional encroachment in Europe and even threats to the American homeland. 

For candidates like Pence, Christie, and Haley, victory in Ukraine has been cast with a narrative of long-term deterrence, describing a win against Russia on behalf of Ukrainian forces as a way for the US to hit two birds with one stone, ultimately inducing China to "walk away" from Taiwan. 

For candidates in the engage camp, there is a belief that the US can simultaneously counter great-power rivals in the European and Pacific theatres, rather than prioritising one over the other.

And while the campaign trail has not (yet) prominently featured Middle East issues, the engage camp includes a hawkish approach towards Iran, grounded in a strategy to constrain Iranian militia activity, continue punitive economic measures to degrade the Iranian economy, confront offensive attacks on US defensive positions in the region, and deter it from targeting US partners in the region like Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Ultimately, these candidates have upheld greater US presence and hawkish engagement with a neoconservative vision of US supremacy abroad, seeking to avoid any perception of weakening or retrenched American power projection.

Then there is the isolationist camp, primarily comprised of former president Donald J. Trump, Ramaswamy, and—to a degree—Ron DeSantis, which casts doubt on an American posture as the 'world's policeman' and active engagement in multiple theatres, in favour of encouraging regional actors to uphold more security responsibilities.

This camp has critiqued continued US military aid to Ukraine, calling for NATO and EU partners to increase their aid and defence contributions instead so the US can concentrate on what they consider the greater priority: countering China.

For some in the isolationist camp, such as DeSantis and Ramaswamy, the Asia-Pacific theatre is the primary priority. China's expanding economic and military capabilities, in addition to the ongoing trade war with the US, cyberattacks on US and partner interests, island-building campaign and expanding posture in the Pacific.

Continual threat to Taiwanese territorial integrity has elevated great-power competition with China to the top of the foreign policy agenda for candidates like DeSantis and Ramasawamy. Both have critiqued increased aid to the Ukrainian armed forces, arguing that Washington has issued 'blank checks' in a proxy fight with a weakening great-power rival, Russia, and has drained the country's arsenal of weaponry and has distracted from a more looming, long-term challenger: China.

DeSantis has referred to Russia's war in Ukraine as a "territorial dispute" and has called to re-prioritise US defensive assets and assistance from Ukraine to Taiwan, asserting that the Asia-Pacific should be perceived as "our generation's 'Europe' for the post-World War Two generation."

Ramaswamy has also joined in DeSantis' criticism over support for Ukraine, calling it a "no-win war" in comparison to preparing for long-term great-power-competition with China and has promised that, if elected, his first foreign policy decision would be to halt US assistance to Ukraine, travel to Moscow to lift sanctions on Russia and accept Russian territorial control over annexed eastern Ukrainian territories, ultimately to 'end' the conflict and demand that Russia refuse any future military alliance with China in return.

Former President Trump's foreign policy track record is grounded in an isolationist, transactional outlook. The Trump administration prioritised shifting responsibilities for regional security, development, and aid to local actors—regardless of those countries' track records on human rights and democratic principles.

Furthermore, the administration relied heavily upon punitive financial measures, such as the 'maximum pressure campaign' with Iran and the trade war with China, to impose costs amongst US competitors and adversaries, while pulling out of international agreements, international organisations like the World Health Organisation, and multinational trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

Approaches to the Middle East

While the Middle East has not been featured heavily in the 2024 race thus far, it will likely dominate future debates as the US entertains a series of options, opportunities, and constraints in the region.

Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and continued congressional efforts to withdraw US personnel from conflict zones in Iraq and Syria, the question of continued US presence and level of engagement in the Middle East is under question—a matter that will no doubt be explored as the presidential race narrows.

Another topic that will feature prominently in the candidates' approach to Israel—is how they will confront the Israel-Palestine issue, especially in light of the current escalating Israeli war on Gaza, tensions between Israel and Iran, and building upon existing normalisation efforts with historical regional rivals like the UAE.

Finally, there is the question of how the US will approach relations with Gulf countries following recent regional efforts diversifying relations with Syria, China, and Russia.

When it comes to the prospect of continued military presence in Iraq and northeast Syria, under the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), Republican candidates will likely have divergent positions.

While the majority of Republican candidates will seek to appear tough on Iran and its aligned militia network in the Middle East, Iran-backed strikes on US defensive positions and increased isolationism within the party have given way to increased scepticism for US boots on the ground in Iraq and Syria.

This scepticism has played out in recent legislative attempts, such as Florida Representative Matt Gaetz's sponsored war powers resolution to withdraw US forces from northeast Syria within six months—an initiative that ultimately failed, but drew notably made it past introduction into the House and drew notable across-the-aisle support from congressional members such as Rep. Marjorie Taylor-Green, Rep. Paul Gosar, Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Rep. Rashida Tlaib.

The isolationist camps will likely align with Gaetz's proposal and seek to authorise immediate draw-downs in the Middle East in the belief that a forward-operating posture in the region is no longer needed and that these troops are either needed to bolster US presence in the Pacific theatre against China or withdrawn altogether.

Donald Trump, in particular, would likely champion this proposal, given his history of authorising a draw-down of US forces in northern Syria in the wake of a Turkish operation in October 2019 and the transfer of over eight bases and reduction of US military personnel in Iraq following tensions with Iran over the killing of General Qasem Soleimani in the spring and summer of 2020.

And while DeSantis has served in Iraq in the US Navy and has called for greater US support for Kurdish forces as an elected member of the House of Representatives, it is possible that he will change his tune to match growing scepticism for foreign engagement amongst far-right Republican voters.

Conversely, the more traditionalist engage camp will likely support continued US presence in Iraq and Syria not only due to continued imperatives to defeat the Islamic State (IS) but also the additional advantage of using the mission as a 'tripwire' to deter the advancement of Iran and sponsored militias in the region.

It's also possible that candidates within this camp — Mike Pence, Nikki Haley, Chris Christie, and Tim Scott—could seek to modify the mission of Operation Inherent Resolve as well, incorporating deterrence of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps to the operations' existing mandate to counter IS. 

As for candidates' approach to Israel, there is, too, an emerging divergence that reflects a new direction within the far-right faction of the Republican Party, bucking the party's record of leaning pro-Israel. The majority of candidates from all camps have reiterated support for Israel, with some, such as Ron DeSantis, visiting Jerusalem this past April and meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to signal their commitment to continued US aid.

However, support for Israel amongst far-right, evangelical voter bases has fragmented in recent years, with some candidates even proposing cuts to assistance to Israel. A tense exchange over the social media platform 'X' illustrated this emerging gap, when candidates Nikki Haley and Ramaswamy entered a debate over continued US aid to Israel.

Ramaswamy proposed that the US eventually reduce its security assistance to Israel, on the basis of pushing for more normalisation progress amongst regional neighbours that he believes would improve local security and help reduce dependence on US military aid—a proposal that Haley criticised for threatening the US and Israel's "special bond" and that continued aid was "morally right."

The debate illustrated how growing party scepticism over US assistance could extend itself into the US-Israel relationship, a potential spoiler to the Obama administration's Memorandum of Understanding that secured over $3.8bn in annual aid for Israel until 2028.

However, the recent Hamas attack on Israel and the resulting war declaration will likely temper far-right proposals to reduce US assistance during the lead-up to the 2024 elections.

Instead, there will likely be a notable increase in solidarity with Israel amongst Republican candidates, even proposals for increased US military and security assistance, and ultimately little focus on an attempted settlement with Palestine, ultimately sidelining the two-state solution.

Finally, a key question of US policy in the Middle East will be how Washington approaches regional powers and simultaneous normalisation processes.

If violence between Hamas and Israel intensifies in Gaza and risks overspilling with Hezbollah and other Iran-aligned proxy networks in the Middle East, it's possible that Republican candidates —particularly within the engage camp — will perceive this as an opportunity to demonstrate US leadership in the region and double-down against Iran.

With JCPOA nuclear deal negotiations with Iran still unlikely to revive, Republican candidates will likely pursue the maximum pressure campaign the Trump administration launched against Iran, extend this approach to Iran-backed militia networks and sponsored non-state actors like Hezbollah, and oppose any regional normalisation process with Tehran.

As a result, it's likely that both Republican engage and isolationist camps will oppose continued Saudi efforts to pursue rapprochement with Iran, by way of US great-power rival, China, and instead launch pressure to pursue normalisation with Israel.

This approach will likely also extend into the normalisation process between Syria and regional neighbours that began in the wake of the February 2023 earthquake in southern Turkey and northern Syria.

Republican candidates will likely seek to maintain the US' ongoing sanctions regime and punitive financial measures to diplomatically and economically isolate the al-Assad regime, placing pressure on regional partners like Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE to resist rapprochement.

Conclusion

The 2024 presidential race is just only kicking off in the United States, with a long road ahead for candidates to further narrow their policy platforms to conform with the Republican Party's shifting voter base.

Until now, only a few candidates have outlined a specific foreign policy approach and list of objectives, with many candidates lacking prior positions in foreign policy or a congressional voting record.

Furthermore, the few forums for candidates to convey these positions, have mainly focused on two foreign policy developments: positioning on assisting Ukraine and Taiwan against great-power rivals Russia and China.

Despite prevailing questions about the permanence of US military presence in Iraq and Syria, sustained diplomatic approaches over normalisation, and commitment to human rights and human security in the Middle East as a whole, the region has not been prominently featured in the 2024 presidential race thus far.

Still, what few signals candidates have made have illustrated a growing gap between two camps amongst candidates: isolationists and engagers.

With polling numbers amongst Republican voters skewing more and more in favour of isolationists like Trump and DeSantis, while engagers poll only in the single digits (with the exception of Nikki Haley), it's likely that we will see some candidates attempt to adopt more retrenched foreign policy proposals towards the Middle East, proposing policies such as burden-sharing amongst regional players, a partial or even full military withdrawal from Iraq and Syria, and a more transactional approach with Arab Gulf partners like the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

While the 'engager' camp in this 2024 race technically outnumbers candidates in the isolationist camp, the poll numbers will likely tilt in favour of a more constrained, distant US policy towards the Middle East and the international community at large.