Russia and Armenia 'friendship' hangs by a thread

No international support

Armenian forces found no support in the international community, given that its stewardship of the territory was never formally recognised, leaving Nagorno-Karabakh seen as part of Azerbaijan.

The region's  Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) – an intergovernmental military alliance, with a mutual defence pact, made up of six former Soviet states – did not intervene.

Russia's President Vladimir Putin, when asked about the CTSO's inaction, said Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan: "The CSTO is an agreement on collective security and allows for mutual military support in case of aggression on one of the member states. Nobody is attacking the territory of the Republic of Armenia."

When Azerbaijan's victory in the war was clear, Armenia turned again to Russia, which prepared a trilateral statement, securing a ceasefire while laying out certain conditions that the Armenians had to fulfil, including the return of territories to Azerbaijan that they still controlled.

Russia then posted a peacekeeping contingent to the region, seemingly reinforcing its role in the security plans of the Armenians.

And Armenia remained loyal to Russia, even sending troops to restore law and order in Kazakhstan in January 2021, as part of its own CSTO commitments.

In May 2021, relations between Armenia and Russia were dealt a severe blow, when Azerbaijan launched a military incursion into lands considered the sovereign territory of Armenia.

Armenia's prime minister appealed to the CSTO for military support but received only a response that the border shared by the two countries had not been clearly demarcated, making it unclear whether this could qualify as military aggression.

At a CSTO summit hosted by Armenia in 2022, Prime Minister Pashinyan did not mince his words: "Since 11 May 2021, Azerbaijan used armed force three times and occupied about 140 square kilometres of the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia. This happened on 11 May 2021, 14 November 2021, and 13 September 2022. What do we expect from the CSTO in this regard?

"The recording of this fact in the form of a clearly formulated political assessment. Refraining from such an assessment, saying there is no border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, means claiming that there is no zone of responsibility of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. If there is no zone of responsibility, then there is no organisation."

Additionally, Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh were not living up to the Armenians' expectations. The Lachin corridor – which connects the Nagorno-Karabakh region with Armenia and was a vital route for civilian travel and the transport of goods – was closed by Azerbaijanis in December 2022, a blockade which remains to this day.

Read more: Seven months of crippling blockade in Nagorno-Karabakh

The Russian peacekeepers, who had been mandated to control that road, seemed unable or unwilling to reopen it.

Loyalty unrecognised and a parting of the ways

Nonetheless, Armenia stood by Russia after Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine. It did not condemn the attack.

In the months that followed, Armenia voted against revoking Russia's membership in the Council of Europe and abstained in votes suspending Russia from the United Nations Human Rights Council and condemning Russia in the UN General Assembly. But as the war in Ukraine dragged on, and with this loyalty unrecognised, the relationship shift deepened.

Russia looks more reliant on Azerbaijan, which is now a key transit market for its oil and gas. Azerbaijan has used this leverage to make bigger gains in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, with what seems to be the Russian government's silent agreement.

In the summer of 2023, Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan hinted at a new distance in relations with Moscow. "We are not Russia's ally in the war with Ukraine. And our feeling from that war, from that conflict, is anxiety because it directly affects all our relationships," he told CNN Prima News in June 2023.

Then,  in September, his wife, Anna Hakobyan, accepted an invitation from Ukraine's First Lady Olena Zelenska to Kyiv for a charity event and the delivery of humanitarian aid from Armenia. Armenia also announced joint military exercises with the United States over 10 days, an Eagle Partner 2023 operation involving 85 US soldiers and 175 Armenians.

In an interview with La Repubblica, Pashinyan said that it had been a strategic mistake to rely solely on a single partner for security needs. He noted that Russia seems to be "leaving the region" by not fulfilling what he perceives as its obligations.

At the same time, he noted the precariousness of Armenia's position:  "Armenia does not take advantage of the benefits of being pro-Russian, because in Russia they do not consider Armenia pro-Russian enough, for example for the reason that Armenia in their opinion does not provide enough assistance to them in the Ukrainian issue."

"On the other hand, Armenia cannot take advantage of the potential benefits of being pro-Western because in the West they consider Armenia not to be sufficiently pro-Western, because, for example, from their perspective, Armenia does not sufficiently oppose Russia in the Ukrainian issue."

And this month, Azerbaijan launched a new offensive against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. So far, around 200 deaths have been confirmed, but a rise in the toll is expected. Russian peacekeepers were stationed in the areas that were attacked, but their actions were limited to evacuating the civilian population.

It remains to be seen whether Russia has lost Armenia and its respect in the region, but there are strong hints that a new geopolitical reorganisation could be on the cards.

Highly dependent

Such a major political shift could be difficult for Armenia, which remains highly dependent on Russia, as it has been since independence came with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Almost 89% of natural gas and 74% of petrol and diesel imports to Armenia come from Russia. The operation and maintenance of Armenia's nuclear power plant is dependent on Russia's state-controlled company Rosatom. Gazprom controls Armenia's gas distribution network, including an alternative gas pipeline that connects Armenia to Iran.

In other sectors, Russia is Armenia's leading destination for foreign trade, with a share of around 35% of the total. Russia is the source of around 94% of Armenia's wheat imports. State and private companies in Russia own several mining operations in Armenia as well as other key infrastructure like the railways.

All this pales in comparison to the key area where Armenia remains heavily dependent on Russia: security. Armenia is a founding member of the CSTO, which has a mutual defence clause. Even after Russia withdrew its troops and equipment from military bases in the neighboring former Soviet states of Georgia in 2008 and Azerbaijan in 2012, it kept 10,000 troops in Armenia.

Their role in keeping the border secure is vital, given the bloody war that Armenians fought with Azerbaijan in the 1990s over Nagorno-Karabakh, and the freezing of relations by Turkey which came  in response. The threat of constant conflict has loomed over the small country for several decades, exploding into full-scale wars in 2016 and 2020, as well as border clashes on many other occasions.

EU spurned for Russia

Ten years ago, Armenia was well advanced in negotiations with the European Union on its Association Agreement, President Serzh Sargsyan made the surprise announcement that the country would instead join the Russia-led Customs Union, which went on to become the Eurasian Economic Union. The about-turn suggested political motivations over Russia's security commitments.

Armenia often referred to this strategic partnership with Russia as the core of its foreign policy, and it once seemed unshakeable, even during the series of so-called "colour revolutions" that swept former Soviet states in the 2000s, including Georgia's  Rose Revolution and Ukraine's Orange Revolution.

Even Armenia's Velvet Revolution of 2018 did not damage relations, although ties were strained for a while. But a meeting between Pashinyan and Putin, just months later, suggested the opposite.

The Russian president said: "I think there is no need to qualify our relations: they are very special. It has been so for centuries, not just since you and I have started working together".

Pashinyan echoed the sentiment: "Of course, we are committed to further strengthening our relations, and not only bilateral relations, but our joint work within the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and in other areas."

Perhaps since then, those ties have been taken for granted in a region and world roiled by the Russian tanks that rollied into Ukraine in late February 2022.