Recent flare-up shows geopolitical drivers of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The corridors of Lachin —between Karabakh and Armenia passing through Azerbaijani territory— and Zengezur —between Azerbaijan and Nahçıvan and Turkey passing through Armenian territory parallel to Iran— are sensitive, problematic issues.

Azerbaijan has presented the recent operation not as a military one against another country but as an anti-terrorist operation within its own territories, and it is indeed so.

The entire international community recognises Karabakh as Azerbaijan territory, as confirmed by at least four UN Security Council resolutions.

Even the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, declared a few months ago that Armenia recognises and accepts Karabakh as belonging to Azerbaijan.

Not all Armenians share his view.

Dashnags —a hardline Armenian political grouping— and other nationalists, as well as Armenians of Karabakh and a good portion of diaspora Armenians, stand firm on their claim to the enclave.

Geopolitics is a key driver of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The region is rich in oil and gas and is at the crossroads of transport routes and pipelines carrying them from east to west.  Iran, Russia and Turkey are major regional actors with high stakes in the area.

Russian position

While Russia is preoccupied with its war in Ukraine, the Caucasus is in its backyard, and what happens there has direct implications for Moscow. Therefore, it cannot completely remove itself from the crisis.

Russia has long been uneasy with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has openly expressed dissatisfaction over Armenia's dependency on Russia for its security.

Read more: Understanding Russia's war on Ukraine starts with understanding Russia's Black Sea politics

Just recently, Pashinyan upset Russia again with a joint military exercise with the United States — Eagle Partner 2023 — with a  declared objective of establishing new tactical-level relationships and enhancing interoperability for peacekeeping operations.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed disappointment in Armenian leadership and said that its choices were not in anyone's interest, including Armenia itself and that an "aggressive" NATO country was trying to enter the South Caucasus.

But that does not mean that Russia sides with Azerbaijan.

Russia has its own interests and is playing both sides against each other. In fact, even though Russian peacekeeping forces were present on the ground, they waited 2-3 days before stepping in and arranging a ceasefire.

Some observers interpret the delay as an expression of Russia's dissatisfaction with Pashinyan's policies and that it stepped in only when it thought that the message was received and understood.

The US and France have traditionally sided with Armenia. This is mainly due to the influence of the Armenian diaspora in these countries.  Both countries have called on the warring parties to refrain from acts which would escalate the crisis, but their comments have been primarily directed at Azerbaijan.

Iranian and Turkish position

Iran has interests which make the crisis in the southern Caucasus a national security issue.

At least 35% of Iran's population is of Azeri Turkic origin. Economic interests, trade and energy corridors, competition from other regional actors, such as Turkey, and Israel's presence in  Azerbaijan are among the main factors which shape Iran's policy.

Even though the Iranian foreign ministry spokesman confirmed Karabakh is Azerbaijan territory and called on both sides to respect the terms of the truce in Karabakh and resolve problems through negotiations, Iran is known to be more on the side of Armenia.

Meanwhile, Turkey has always sided with its kin in Azerbaijan. President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, stated in his speech at the UN General Assembly that Karabakh is Azerbaijani territory and no other status for this region will ever be accepted.

After the Karabakh War in 2020, Turkey and Armenia started a process aiming at good neighbourly relations and full normalisation.

They made considerable progress. In concrete terms, direct flights have restarted, the Turkey-Armenia border, which is closed, has been opened for third-country citizens, and air cargo trade has commenced.

Erdoğan and Pashinyan had last talked on the telephone on 11 September, where it was reported that they had discussed bilateral and regional issues.

Pashinyan, who has kept his seat despite losing the war in Karabakh, is more prone to resolving issues through negotiations.

He is a realist who sees that Armenia is in trouble economically, demographically and in many other ways. He is well aware of the role Turkey can play in overcoming Armenia's difficulties.

The hope is that Azerbaijanis and Armenians will agree to stop fighting, and tension will die out before clashes evolve into a full-scale war.

But even so, there will always be the risk of a next time unless the root cause of the problem is solved.

In that regard, a solution should firmly establish Azerbaijan's unconditional and undisputed sovereignty over Karabakh. Pashinyan, on his part, has called for ensuring the safety of Armenians there.

A solution around these parameters could bring the conflict to an end, provided that broader geopolitics and interests are also factored in, which is the most challenging part.