Did US pragmatism in Niger underpin France's decision to end its military presence?

French miscalculations

The pattern shows the extent of France's miscalculations over the changing political times in a region over which it once dominated. Its errors reached fresh heights when it failed to see the regime change coming in Niger.

The origins of the coup come from poor management of the West's war on terror in the Sahel. There has been both overconfidence and a lack of attention to social and political intricacies in French diplomacy in and around the region and its nations.

France's policy toward Africa is run directly from the Élysée Palace, the centre of presidential power. It is the highest office in the land and the constitution gives it decision-making authority over foreign policy and defence.

Communication from the apex of the French state out to its diplomats, military and security apparatus has been lacking. And one of its consequences is that the Élysée must now deal with the current setback and the strategic overhaul it requires.

President Emmanuel Macron tried to blame the coup on incitements against France by rival global powers with ambitions for a new colonialism in the region, singling out Russia. But the facts on the ground are more complex.

France has failed to adapt to the rise of Africa and the continent's ambitions to assert itself on the world stage, as a young, vibrant and resource-rich powerbase keen to exert its own international influence on a regional and global basis.

French resentment

Anti-French sentiment there has grown as African nations have gained confidence and sought to move further away from colonialism. This new perspective has not just arrived because there are new rivals to Paris in Moscow and elsewhere.

There are deeper reasons for disappointment with the policy from Paris. Criticisms have focused on aid provision and the link between economic policy and the West African Franc, the currency used by eight Ecowas states. But the final straw came from a campaign against jihadists – Operation Barkhane – which ran from 2014 to 2022.

The duration itself was a problem. Its eight-year lifespan meant the French military presence that it brought to bases around the region fuelled anger, even as it also achieved tactical success against targets. But the implementation came across as a new form of colonialism.

It also felt like a purely military response, adding to the impression of heavy-handedness. France failed to deal with the social and developmental causes of jihadism viewing it only as a rebellion carried out by armed Islamic groups.

This was flawed. It missed the details specific to the countries within the region, including the places where separatists or other rebel groups were involved.

A divided West

Then came the Niger coup.

Initial hopes for a united response from the West did not last. In the days following the army's action, it became clear that the US was avoiding discussions of a military response, unlike France.

Washington was concerned about the fate of Niger's elected government, not least with the country a key player in the West's efforts against Sahel jihadists. But worries over the 1,100 US troops in the region getting drawn into a wider and longer campaign won out, amid memories of what happened in Libya in 2011.

The French military in West Africa depends on logistical support from the US Command Centre, or AFRICOM, run out of Stuttgart in Germany. Any lack of backing from Washington for French operations in Africa limits the options Paris can consider.

Amid a stark contrast between the allies in their diplomatic response to the coup, any unified action looks unlikely.

France strongly condemned the coup and even called for a military response from ECOWAS and for President Mohamed Bazoum to be returned to power.

Americans opt for pragmatism

But the US leaned towards dealing with Niger's new Military Council and avoided using the word 'coup' because doing so would mean the end of US security presence in the country.

French sources say Washington has a strong connection with coup leader General Abdourahamane Tchiani and also trusts the newly appointed army chief of staff, General Moussa Salou Barmou, who trained in the US.

Secretary of State Anthony Blinken sounded a conciliatory tone and his assistant, Victoria Nuland, met the new leaders on a visit there. Washington also appointed a new ambassador, Kathleen FitzGibbon, who is now in Niamey.

For now, it seems the White House is prioritising its counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel and Sahara and is wary of Russia's growing influence there.

Washington's preference for pragmatism comes amid divisions over Niger among other European nations. Germany's position is nearer that of France, while Italy is more aligned with the US.

It comes as US financial support for Niger has risen, reaching almost $500mn between 2012 and 2021. It has paid for military drones to be based in the northern Agadez region.

This investment, and its strategic nature, are revealing, as is the US willingness to engage with the coup's leaders. It wants to limit Moscow's influence in West Africa, to avert a confrontation there between the West and Russia, not least as the Ukrainian conflict continues to cause global geopolitical stress.

The US and Europe worked together to share spheres of influence in Africa throughout the Cold War. Their alliance, rooted in the West's ideological struggle against Communism, now tracks their economic interests, which have declined.  

It is striking that for France, Africa represents a maximum of 5% of France's foreign trade. That makes the extent of Paris's presence there look all the more outdated.

But the renewed competition over the continent from China and Russia means the idea that Africans can take the lead in running their own global role remains distant.