Is an expanded BRICS a threat to the West?

Chinese enthusiasm

From a Western perspective, China's enthusiasm for BRICS expansion should be the most concerning development.  Xi had long pushed to expand the bloc and overcame the sustained reservations of both Brazil and India to achieve this.

Beijing sees an expanded BRICS as a way to forge what is currently a loose economic grouping into a more solid geopolitical counterweight to the West. Some believe China ultimately would like BRICS to act as a 'G7' for the non-Western world.

The BRICS leaders' declaration at the end of the summit called for, "greater representation of emerging markets and developing countries," in international institutions like the UN Security Council and the IMF, and this echoes Xi's own statements that repeatedly criticized, "US hegemony."

Some commentators, such as CNN's Nectar Gan, have argued that Xi is trying to position BRICS as a focus for the global south's frustrations at Western domination of international institutions. The fact that 60 countries attended the summit in Johannesburg, while nearly two dozen applied to join the bloc, suggests he might be succeeding.

A particular win for China that might alarm some Western states was the inclusion of close allies of the West among the new members. Saudi Arabia has a close relationship with the US, dating back to the 1930s, while the UAE hosts several US military bases. Egypt, likewise, is the second largest recipient of US military aid after Israel, while Ethiopia has also had close ties with Washington in recent years.

But China's relationship with all four nations has advanced in recent years, investing heavily in Ethiopia and Egypt, while enjoying robust trade with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. China's increased influence in the Middle East especially was seen in March 2023 when it helped broker a détente between longstanding rivals Saudi Arabi and Iran – another new BRICS member.

Read more: Why China is mediating in the Middle East

The inclusion of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Cairo, and Addis Ababa within BRICS alongside increased Chinese activism and influence in the Middle East and East Africa will raise alarm bells that these once pro-Western regions are becoming more and more aligned with Washington's rival.

Russia's bid to break isolation

Another concern is what the BRICS expansion means for Russia, which Western states have been trying to internationally isolate since Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Like Xi, Putin has expressed his desire that an expanded BRICS can emerge as a counter to Western dominance, arguing it should become a trading bloc representing the "global majority".

Russia was among the keenest for Iran to be included among the six new members, being another state that shares Moscow's anti-Western worldview and one that has suffered under Western economic sanctions.

Putin may believe that Tehran's inclusion boosts the chances of transforming BRICS into a more explicitly anti-Western organisation. More likely though is Russia's hope that adding more members creates a bigger pool of potential friends for Moscow — which might allow it to survive Western isolation attempts better.

But the picture is complex for Moscow.

Some BRICS members firmly reject Putin's vision of the expanded bloc becoming an anti-Western entity. Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva insisted at the summit that, "We do not want to be a counterpoint to the G7, G20 or the United States."

Lula's administration similarly voted in favour of a UN resolution condemning Russian aggression in Ukraine, even though since then he has refused to join the Western sanctions regime and remained formally neutral.

South Africa has similarly been critical of Russia. South African president, Cyril Ramaphosa, has urged the revival of the Black Sea Grain Initiative that Russia recently ended, limiting Ukraine's wheat exports.

Moreover, Ramaphosa seemed to accommodate his internal opposition's demands to permit the International Criminal Court to arrest Putin should he attend Johannesburg, prompting the Russian leader to remain in Moscow.

Read more: Does the International Criminal Court still matter?

A cohesion problem

The mixed reaction to Russia's war in Ukraine from within the existing five BRICS members underlines Sullivan's point that a divergence of interests might make it difficult for the newly expanded bloc to cohere into a realistic anti-Western bloc even should it want to.

It is interesting that China sees BRICS as a potential rival for the G7 when that bloc struggles for cohesion and relevance. In theory, the G7 states have a lot in common. All are democracies and comprise seven of the nine largest economies in the world.

Culturally six are 'Western' plus Japan. But even within this seemingly like-minded group, there are frequent divisions over policy and direction. As a consequence, its annual summits usually produce declarations that are high on unifying rhetoric, but light on substance.

At the latest meeting in Hiroshima, for example, there were disagreements over the extent of opposition to China, leading to a relatively tame agreement to 'de-risk' investment in Beijing. But this was far less than Washington, who had led the policy push, had hoped for.

Read more: G7: Valuable forum or outdated irrelevance?

An expanded BRICS will face even greater obstacles to finding unified positions. If all six states do join, of the 11 members, four are democracies, while the remaining seven are a mixture of monarchies, one-party states, strongman dictatorships and theocracies.

As well as different systems of government, the members vary in current geopolitical alignment. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt are historically Western allies, while Brazil, South Africa, India, Argentina, and Ethiopia are also friendly to the West. In contrast, China, Russia, and Iran are openly hostile.

While the G7 has a geographical concentration, with all bar Japan located around the North Atlantic, BRICS will have three African states, three in the Middle East, two in South America and three in Eurasia, which will bring with it a vast range of differing geopolitical priorities.

On top of these general obstacles, specific rivalries and disputes could compromise cohesiveness. India and China have a long history of antagonism. While relations are currently amicable, India is wary of China's efforts to use BRICS as a vehicle for Beijing's interests and sees itself as a rival leader of the bloc.

Similarly, despite the recent 2023 détente, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt all share a historic rivalry with fellow new member Iran.

Egypt also remains in dispute with another new member, Ethiopia, over Addis Ababa's plans for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which could cause a major reduction in the flow of Nile water that Cairo's economy depends on.

Given the BRICS group requires unanimity among its members for any actions to be taken, these general and specific divisions could take years to iron out, if ever,  given that new issues might arise.

Independent not anti-western

The US government is therefore probably correct that the newly expanded BRICS bloc is unlikely to challenge the West directly as Russia — and perhaps China — might wish. However, this doesn't mean Western leaders shouldn't be concerned.

The expansion of BRICS should be seen not as the disrupter of the Western-dominated global order, but as a symptom of the fact that this order has already passed.

Read more: Ghassan Salamé: The birth pangs of a new world order

The entry of states that have historically aligned with the West is a key indicator of this. In the past, perhaps as recently as BRICS' foundation in 2009, pro-Western allies like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt did not seek to join the bloc.

At that time, the West — especially the US — was still perceived as being the dominant force in the world and there was no reason for Washington's allies to look elsewhere.

But times have changed. Western states' allies and enemies all now recognise that the US (and the Western bloc) is not the power it once was.

In the Middle East, for example, where the US in the 1990s and 2000s was the clear regional hegemon, it has stepped back under the successive presidencies of Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. While the US is still present, and looks likely to remain, it is no longer attempting to project power everywhere.

Read more: Biden's security strategy reflects waning US interest in the Middle East

As such, regional leaders in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Cairo, and elsewhere, are increasingly pursuing their own interests independent of Washington.

This does not mean they are repudiating their friendship with Washington and the West, but rather they are advancing their own policies which, at times, means diverging from the West's line. This has led to closer relations with China and Russia, and it is a natural move to seek to expand their influence by joining BRICS, should they ultimately decide to do so.

However, even if Beijing and Moscow may like to interpret this as the beginning of an anti-Western alliance, it is highly unlikely that these Middle Eastern governments do, with the obvious exception of Iran.

The same is true of Ethiopia and Argentina, as well as South Africa, India, and Brazil. BRICS membership is not seen as incompatible with retaining close ties to the West but is also seen as a way of asserting independence from it.

Multipolar world

Arguably the true disrupter of the global order has already happened, in Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Not so much the invasion itself, but the global reaction to it.

While Western states rallied together and placed sanctions on Moscow, their requests for the global south to join them fell on deaf ears. Non-Western states took a position of neutrality and defied Washington's requests.

In many ways, the expansion of BRICS is an extension of that trend. States that the West once took for granted have now turned around and said they will only align with the US and its allies when it's clearly in their interests.

This is a symptom of the multipolar world order that has been developing for the last decade but is now clear for all to see. BRICS is unlikely to become a powerful actor and almost certainly won't become the anti-Western counterweight China and Russia hope it might.

However, its expansion does indicate how powerful regional 'middle powers' are benefitting from the multipolar world order. Many are no longer feeling compelled to toe the Western line as they once did and are striking out on their own.