Russian President Vladimir’s decision not to attend the upcoming BRICS summit in South Africa for fear of being arrested by the International Criminal Court (ICC) raises questions about the effectiveness of the Hague-based organisation.
Since its creation in 2002, the ICC has had a mixed experience. On the one hand, it has partly fulfilled its mandate to hold global leaders to account for international crimes, indicting dozens of individuals. But at the same time, the ICC has experienced considerable pushback.
Many states have refused to join, including the United States. Several governments, especially from Africa, have complained of the ICC’s Eurocentrism, given the disproportionate number of Africans targeted. Others have complained that the court is simply ineffective as a deterrent, with leaders such as Putin insufficiently deterred by the spectre of ICC prosecution.
Yet, at the same time, Putin has opted not to visit South Africa, a state party to the ICC and, therefore, expected to aid the court arrest of the Russian president. His absence was not guaranteed, and he initially seemed keen to attend.
South Africa’s president Cyril Ramaphosa was caught in a bind, noting that, “Russia has made it clear that arresting its sitting president would be a declaration of war.” Yet in the end, Moscow’s pressure didn’t succeed.
Domestic pressure on Rampahosa, including the opposition party suing his government to demand that Putin be arrested, prompted Pretoria and Moscow to reach a compromise whereby Putin would attend via video link.
The episode suggested that an ICC indictment still holds some weight. For all the criticism, is there still a need for an International Criminal Court? Or are its critics right that it remains too closely aligned with Western foreign policy to ever be viewed as anything more than a ‘Eurocentric’ tool?