How George HW Bush reached out to Hafez al-Assad amid Soviet Union collapse

Al Majalla reveals the US president was the first to reach out and initiate a relationship with Hafez al-Assad that eventually led to Aoun's exile and Geagea's imprisonment

Al Majalla reveals the details of secret presidential discussions between Washington and Damascus during a time of flux in the Middle East as the region was remade.
Eduardo Ramon
Al Majalla reveals the details of secret presidential discussions between Washington and Damascus during a time of flux in the Middle East as the region was remade.

How George HW Bush reached out to Hafez al-Assad amid Soviet Union collapse

It was a turbulent time in the Middle East in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Dramatic politics, shifting alliances and a range of tensions would reshape much of the region over the decade.

Al Majalla can now reveal, in full detail, some of the top-level political and diplomatic dealmaking between Washington and Damascus over Lebanon, just as war loomed to push Iraq out of Kuwait.

There would be a large-scale military invasion which would transform the international balance of the region and the world. One of the most compelling developments came over Syria’s military presence in Lebanon, where a bitter civil war was raging.

Al Majalla can demonstrate exactly how the confluence of these events was discussed at the highest level and how it would help shape the fate of nations.

It came as Iraq emerged from its long conflict with Iran and before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. At the time, Saddam Hussein was backing Lebanese army commander, Michel Aoun, against Syria’s ally, President Elias Hrawi.

Saddam also wanted to counter the potential threat posed by the US-backed leader of another faction in Lebanon, the Lebanese Forces controlled by Samir Geagea.

A peace deal, the ‘Rebel General’ and the ‘Doctor’

Syria’s President Hafez al-Assad had just agreed to the Taif Accords – which ended Lebanon’s civil war and set up special relations between his country and Lebanon – in a deal brokered by Saudi Arabia and named after where it was signed there in 1989.

Al-Assad was waiting for the opportunity to help eliminate what he saw as a rebellion in Lebanon using his own forces and the regular Lebanese army. He also wanted to prevent any unity between Lebanon’s two Christian factions – that of Aoun, also known as the Rebel General – and that of Geagea, who was also known as Al-Hakim, or the doctor.

In the late1980s, the situation seemed to favour Saddam and his allies. Emerging victorious from his war with Iran, which remained a key ally of al-Assad, he was concerned about losing the Soviet Union's support and the disintegration of states aligned with him in the international arena.

Saddam's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, turned the tables and created a rare opportunity for al-Assad to corner his Ba’athist opponent in Baghdad while simultaneously targeting his primary adversary in Beirut, General Aoun.

Al-Assad exiled Aoun to Paris. He then imprisoned Samir Geagea, the president’s second rival, capitalising on the collapse of the Soviet Union. This would not have been possible without a deal between al-Assad and US President George HW Bush, supported by influential Arab states.

Now, Al Majalla has obtained a series of secret messages exchanged between al-Assad and Bush, along with meeting transcripts and documents, which are published here for the first time.

Al Majalla

These documents reveal the gradual evolution of the US position. It aligned with al-Assad's demands to pursue a peaceful approach to removing Aoun from power and helped with his ousting.

That led to a green light from the US for the Lebanese army – backed by Syria – to launch a decisive military operation against Aoun in October 1990. After he and his forces were attacked, including at the Presidential Palace in Baadaa, with hundreds killed, Aoun fled to live in exile in France, his major supporter.

The documents also expose Washington's continued support for Geagea, even as Damascus persisted in taking measures against him, ultimately resulting in Geagea's imprisonment in April 1994.

Aoun's exile and Geagea's imprisonment were seen as two gifts to al-Assad from Bush.

Just as all this was happening, al-Assad joined the Arab International Coalition to oust Saddam's forces from Kuwait. That decision was made during his meeting with President Bush in Geneva in November 1990 and he also helped shape the agreements of the Madrid Peace Conference between the Arabs and Israelis in October 1991.

While some of these messages have been previously published, Al Majalla now reveals the complete texts. They outline the US-Syrian dynamic, which was to be so influential at this crucial time.


Two governments and Lebanon’s War of Liberation

Amid Lebanon's civil war and the presence of Syrian forces on its territory since 1976, President Amin Gemayel appointed Aoun as the commander of the army in 1984.

Aoun clashed with the Lebanese Forces during his tenure. When his term ended in September 1988, Gemayel dismissed the government of Prime Minister Salim Hoss and formed a military government led by Aoun, due to deadlock over electing a new president.

Consequently, Lebanon found itself with two governments, split along religious lines – one for Christians, in East Beirut, and another for Muslims, in West Beirut.

In mid-March, Aoun declared what became known as the War of Liberation to expel Syrian forces from Lebanon. He harshly criticised Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and renewed some coordination with the Lebanese Forces and Geagea.

Aoun declared what became known as the War of Liberation to expel Syrian forces from Lebanon. He harshly criticised Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and renewed some coordination with the Lebanese Forces and Geagea.

In October 1989, the Taif Accords over Lebanon were adopted, sponsored by Syria and Saudi Arabia with US support. This curtailed the executive powers of the Maronite Christian presidency, transferring them to the Sunni prime minister. The conflict between Aoun and Geagea persisted.

As the Taif Accords were being implemented, Lebanon's President René Moawad was assassinated — a murder that was never brought to account. His elected successor was Elias Hrawi.

From this moment, Aoun became an obstacle to implementing the next phase of the Accords, and he was considered a "rebel against legitimacy", until he was defeated in October 1990, after the Kuwait invasion and before the Gulf War.

And so, we arrive at the deal forged with Damascus over the Rebel General and the Doctor. Al Majalla now publishes in detail the documents that show how it was struck, how Syria got the green light to take decisive military action against Aoun and what distinguishes him from how Geagea was treated.

We also shed light on some of the differences within the West, or more specifically, between Washington and Paris.

Washington and Paris propose resolution of 'Aoun problem' peacefully

On 18 October 1989, Bush sent a message to al-Assad through his friend Vernon Walters to initiate a dialogue between the two countries: "Dear Mr. President... I believe the time has come for us to communicate more directly. Allow me, Your Excellency, to expand on the idea of relations between Syria and the United States."

Getty
US President George Bush (L) poses with his Syrian counterpart Hafez Al-Assad prior to their private meeting focused on Gulf situation on November 23, 1990 in Geneva.

"There have been times of bitterness and mutual accusations. I hope that both parties have learned from the past and can work together more effectively."

At a time when al-Assad was concerned about the fate of his ally, the Soviet Union, Bush stated: "The rapidly changing world we live in demands that we address the present while looking ahead as leaders. I believe there is a tangible path toward a better Syrian-American relationship. I am willing to take that path if you will."

"One step from your end, and I will personally make contact... I realise, Mr. President, that there are some very deep disagreements between us, but with patience and goodwill, we can narrow, and even overcome, these differences. Sincerely, George Bush."

The rapidly changing world we live in demands that we address the present while looking ahead as leaders. I believe there is a tangible path toward a better Syrian-American relationship. I am willing to take that path if you will.

George HW Bush to Hafez al-Assad

Paris' stance regarding Aoun was clearer.

The French envoy François Scheer visited Damascus on 28 November and delivered a message from President François Mitterrand to al-Assad, stating that Aoun was an "obstacle" in Lebanon and the French government supported "continuing to pursue peaceful means to persuade Aoun to abandon his positions."

The Taif Accords were signed on 30 September and ratified on 22 October 1989. In November 1989, Syria's Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Shara'a informed the US Ambassador to Damascus, Edward Djerejian, that Aoun was a "rebel and it is within the state's right to deal with him on this basis."

He added: "Obstructing the state's efforts to address his rebellion would mean the continuation of the crisis and the bleeding."

The US ambassador responded: "Resorting to force would harm President Hrawi as the head of the national consensus. It would also harm him if he moved to the Baabda Palace after bloodshed had happened, as it would diminish his ability to implement the Taif Accords.

"Therefore, my government wants to use all political means to solve the Aoun problem." … "I have instructions to strongly reiterate my government's call to Syria to refrain from using military force in Lebanon."

On his part, Al-Sharaa called Aoun "a rebel and not part of the national consensus." He added: "He is an officer in the army who has acted against legitimacy, whereas the consensus was established by the Lebanese Parliament."

Al-Assad: Aoun must be removed by "all available means"

As the Malta Summit between US President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in early December approached – just weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the declaration of the end of the Cold War – the US understood the concern about timing from Syria and the Lebanese government. They stated that Bush, "in response to Hrawi's request, will discuss this matter with Gorbachev in Malta."

Damascus encouraged this direction and insisted on the "necessity for the statement issued by Gorbachev and Bush regarding Lebanon to be crystal clear."

He added: "The statement should strongly condemn General Aoun's behaviour and positions and include strong support for the new legitimate authority."

"This is to make Aoun understand that he must submit to the new legitimate authority in Lebanon and step aside," according to the telegram. It further stated: "Issuing such a clear statement from Gorbachev and Bush would greatly help overcome the main obstacle, General Aoun, through peaceful means."

On 1 December 1989, al-Assad sent a message to Bush: "In the context of ongoing coordination and exchange of opinions, it has become clear to everyone that Aoun is the main obstacle on the path of enhancing the new legitimate authority, restoring Lebanon's unity, and implementing the Taif Accords."

"The Lebanese legitimacy and the Tripartite Committee have confirmed that Aoun is the main obstacle and must be removed by all available means."

It has become clear to everyone that Aoun is the main obstacle on the path of enhancing the new legitimate authority, restoring Lebanon's unity, and implementing the Taif Accords. Aoun must be removed by all available means.

Al-Assad to Bush

Bush: Aoun is an obstacle we are working on overcoming

On 1 December 1989, a message from Bush, who was about to meet Gorbachev, reached al-Assad: "Dear Mr. President, I would like to share with you some of my thoughts about the situation in Lebanon as I prepare to head to Malta."

"The Taif Accords brought genuine hope for national reconciliation, peace, and unity in Lebanon. Its opponents will not be able to halt this historical progress through actions like the assassination of René Moawad (in November 1989)."

"I stand with the new President of Lebanon in his efforts to unite his people and initiate the healing process. I have called on all Lebanese to support him. General Aoun remains the obstacle that I am working to overcome."

"I am convinced, Mr. President, that the only way to do so is by preserving President Hrawi's government and strengthening the vitality and consensus it enjoys."

"Resorting to military force will further divide Lebanon and harm the process of national reconciliation in a way that may be irreparable."

"We are trying every means to overcome General Aoun's opposition, but the use of force – especially if employed by Syria – will grant him an undeserved legitimacy and additional power."

"I respect your support for the Taif Accords. Together, we can fulfil its promise of peace and unity for all the people of Lebanon. More bloodshed will not help."

"Finally, let me add that I have conveyed the same points to our colleague, President Hrawi, as I believe he represents Lebanon's best hope to emerge from its darkness. Sincerely, George Bush."

Damascus later received a written message confirming that the leaders had "supported Lebanese legitimacy" without condemning Aoun.

We are trying every means to overcome General Aoun's opposition, but the use of force will further divide Lebanon and harm the process of national reconciliation in a way that may be irreparable.

Bush to al-Assad

Al-Assad to Bush: Escalation is needed, and a decision must be made

On 14 December 1989, al-Assad sent a message to Bush addressing bilateral relations, the peace process, Iran, regional situations, and Lebanon.

The following is the section related to Lebanon in al-Assad's message: "As for Lebanon, I would like to mention what our cooperation has achieved: the success of the National Accord Conference in Taif and the subsequent endorsement of the Accord Document, the holding of presidential elections twice, and the establishment of legitimate constitutional institutions despite the difficult and intricate circumstances that are not alien to you."

"You know that Syria exerted significant pressure on the Lebanese Muslims, who constitute 70% of Lebanon's population, to accept power-sharing in governance and a Maronite president. Our argument was based on the premise that such concessions would help restore national unity and achieve peace."

"However, the continuation of the present situation, which is a divisive one, may make it difficult to persuade the Muslims, once again, to accept the Taif Document, as the concessions they made would not lead to the restoration of national unity, security, and peace."

"Evident signs have begun to emerge of a growing trend among the Muslims rejecting the Taif Document because it did not grant them rights commensurate with their size in the country, and they demand numerical democracy."

"I share your opinion that Aoun represents an obstacle to national reconciliation and the peace process, and it is necessary to remove that obstacle. I believe that you understand the importance of timing, fearing the collapse of everything the Lebanese have achieved on the path of peace and national unity."

"Notably, Aoun's increasing rigidity, his refusal to adhere to constitutional legitimacy and government orders, has escalated following statements by major powers supporting legitimacy, on the one hand, and pressuring it, on the other, to prevent actions that any government may take if it were subjected to similar challenges to legitimacy in Lebanon."

"I would like to assure you that the continued military rebellion would make it difficult to contain the situation in Lebanon. I fear that fighting between Lebanese factions will return more violent, destructive, and intense."

"Then, the material, human, and national losses that the Lebanese will endure will far surpass any losses resulting from enabling Lebanese legitimacy to use all available means to assert its authority and enforce the law."

"I am convinced, dear Mr. President, that a clear American call is needed. One that supports the legitimate government to restore national unity, establish strong central authority, assert state authority over all Lebanese territories, and endorse its right to take any measures deemed necessary to achieve that goal."

"This would greatly contribute to the continuation of the path of security, peace, and unity in Lebanon. I agree with you that the option of using force should not be the preferred choice to end the state of rebellion. However, faced with the failure of other options, we must balance this option with one that leads to the collapse of legitimacy, and thus the collapse of everything and a return to fighting, violence, and chaos."

I agree that using force should not be the preferred choice to end Aoun's rebellion. However, we must balance this option with one that leads to the collapse of legitimacy and a return to fighting and chaos.

Al-Assad to Bush

"All of us will remain helpless in the face of a question posed by President Hrawi and his government to all of us: How can the obstacle of Aoun be removed, and how long can we tolerate this situation as a state that advises against resorting to the resources provided by the constitution and the law and the Accord Document to restore national unity, assert state authority, implement the law, and respect the public order?"

"I won't conceal that we have a serious fear that the Lebanese President might announce his resignation, holding those who supported Aoun in any way responsible for what the situation in his country may lead to. I hope you will carefully evaluate the current situation in Lebanon, taking into account the factors I have mentioned."

"I confirm our full readiness to cooperate in order to achieve the goals we both declared our keenness to achieve: national reconciliation, the establishment of a strong central authority, and asserting state authority over all Lebanese territories."

"It is important to note that the Taif Document, endorsed by the Parliamentary Council, places an obligation on Syria to provide any assistance requested by Lebanese legitimacy to assert its authority. We have agreed to this commitment before the Arab Tripartite Committee, which conveyed our agreement to the Lebanese parties."

Bush's envoy to Hrawi: Aoun is stubborn, we don't want bloodshed

On 5 February 1990, Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam received Khalil Hrawi and Antoine Chedid, President Hrawi's envoys, and they were handed a note from the American Ambassador to Damascus, Edward Djerejian: "In response to the request from the Lebanese Government to clarify the United States' position regarding the possibility of military intervention to halt the bloodshed in Lebanon, I have been instructed to convey the following to you."

"We have consistently been concerned about the loss of lives in Lebanon, and our historical preference has been for a non-military solution. However, we fully recognise the extent of General Aoun's resistance to a peaceful resolution."

"We are also concerned about the practical impact of external intervention on President Hrawi's credibility, particularly if Syria were to become heavily involved."

"At the same time, we believe that General Aoun must go, and his stubborn pursuit of personal ambitions has caused significant human suffering and will lead to much more bloodshed if it continues."

"In response to your questions regarding criticism of the Lebanese government's decision after its intervention becomes a reality, we would like to convey the following: Our historical preference is for a peaceful solution."

Khaddam to Hrawi: Geagea is just like Aoun

Regarding the negotiations with Geagea, they told Khaddam that:

"President Hrawi wants to collaborate with Geagea for several reasons. He seeks a Maronite partner within the government to counter both Mr. Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt. He is influenced by Mr. Johnny Abdo, who maintains a close relationship with the Lebanese Forces."

AFP
Members of Lebanese Forces (LF) Christian militia decorate 24 November 1990 their truck with a poster of their leader, the warlord Samir Geagea as they prepare to leave their position at Karntina, east Beirut.

"Additionally, Aoun challenges Hrawi's legitimacy, while Geagea has a different political approach and concepts that are undoubtedly more dangerous than Aoun's concepts."

Aoun challenges Hrawi's legitimacy, while Geagea has a different political approach and concepts that are undoubtedly more dangerous than Aoun's concepts.

American messages to Khaddam

On his part, Khaddam expressed that "if we compare Geagea and Aoun, it would be difficult to accept Geagea and reject Aoun. However, Aoun's problem has always been placing himself within the circle of rejection."

Despite this, according to a certain document, Khaddam recommended initiating a dialogue with Geagea to break the ties between him and Aoun. By doing so, it would facilitate handling Aoun without having to confront all the armed Christian forces.

The letter addressed to the Lebanese President from Geagea, as received by Khaddam from Shiddid and Khaleel Hrawi, contains the following message:

"In light of our mutual commitment to a free, independent, and sovereign Lebanon, and our resolute determination to liberate the nation and harness our combined capabilities and potentials to address the crisis caused by Aoun, which poses a threat to the safety and security of Christians within the country ... I hereby convey my intention to cooperate with Your Excellency, acknowledging you and your government as the legitimate authority in Lebanon, and recognising the National Accord Document ratified by the parliamentary council as the exclusive mechanism to restore national sovereignty, reconstruct our political system, and attain peace in Lebanon."

AFP
Lebanese Christian military leader general Aoun makes the V-sign as supporters pay him a visit at Baabda Presidential palace 06 December 1989.

After Shidid meticulously read Geagea's letter, Khaddam conveyed to Hrawi:

"Very well, would you mind writing the following:"

"We have thoroughly reviewed Geagea's letter addressed to His Excellency, and we have arrived at a clear conclusion that Geagea's position towards Syria closely mirrors that of Aoun's."

"Both emphasise similar expressions and ideas, particularly the liberation slogan advocated by Aoun. Naturally, we also acknowledge the significant difference between Aoun and Geagea in terms of the latter's recognition of legitimacy."

However, considering the other points we have highlighted in the letter, this acknowledgement may not carry substantial weight practically, as Geagea's hostility towards Syria leads us to believe that he cannot be both an adversary of Syria and a friend to Syria's allies in Lebanon simultaneously."

Geagea's hostility towards Syria leads us to believe that he cannot be both an adversary of Syria and a friend to Syria's allies in Lebanon simultaneously.

Khaddam to Hrawi

"Furthermore, it cannot be disregarded that those who promote the liberation slogan and perceive Syria as their enemy may be guided by Israeli interests.'"

The following day, Hrawi sent a letter to his "dear brother, Abu Jamal (Khaddam)."

"Greetings and regards. I received your message, which Khaleel and Shiddid conveyed to me. I took a firm and transparent stance with the mediators and requested an unequivocal statement from Geagea to be publicly broadcasted by the Lebanese Forces without any alterations."

"Their response was that they sent me a draft of the statement for my review before agreeing to its broadcast, with the possibility of making some amendments if necessary."

"I insisted on the statement's broadcast before any intervention occurs and prior to my personal appeal for public assistance directed to President al-Assad and sister Syria. They agreed to do so after I assure them that the intervention will take place."

"I also inquired about their position concerning the dissolution of militias, and they assured me that they are fully prepared to cease their militia activities when the decision is made in the Council of Ministers, following the same course as other factions on the ground."

"My concern lies in the ongoing negotiations between the Lebanese Forces and General Aoun, which, due to our delay, may result in an understanding between them, potentially involving the expansion of the ministry and granting them a role in the security domain."

He went on: "I conclude with a simple political clarification: my primary focus revolves around upholding legitimacy, preserving national unity, and maintaining the established relationship with our sisterly Syria, built on mutual trust, particularly with our esteemed brother, President Abu Bassel (Hafez al-Assad)."

"Your cooperation is highly valued, and I kindly request a prompt response. I chose to address this letter to you to avoid causing any disturbance to President al-Assad."

On 8 February, Geagea sent a revised letter to Hrawi. It included significant revisions, reflecting changes in his approach.

He replaced the phrase "our hopes for liberating the country" with "our national aspirations."

He also substituted the phrase: "and the National Accord Document ratified by the parliamentary council as the exclusive mechanism" to restore national sovereignty, reconstruct our political system, and attain peace in Lebanon" with "and the National Accord Document ratified by the parliamentary council as a gateway to restoring national sovereignty, rebuilding our political system, and achieving peace in Lebanon."

Khaddam noted: "It is evident that Geagea is employing tactical manoeuvres to secure state assistance in countering Aoun and persistently opposing him until his influence is eradicated, with the intention of assuming leadership in the Christian regions currently under Aoun's control."

Regarding the Americans, Hrawi conveyed: "They understand our stance."

On 5 April 1990, Khaleel Hrawi informed Khaddam: "While the Americans favour peaceful resolutions, they acknowledge the Lebanese government's intervention due to Aoun's aggressive actions, impeding and opposing all avenues for peaceful solutions."

"The Americans firmly believe in the necessity of Aoun's departure, recognising that his futile pursuit of personal ambitions has already inflicted considerable human suffering and will likely lead to further bloodshed if it persists."

Khaddam wrote to Khaleel Hrawi: "The American stance is not our primary concern. What matters to us is ensuring continued support for legitimacy and removing any potential obstacles in its path. Both Aoun and Geagea stand against legitimacy and the National Reconciliation Document."

"Our requirement from Geagea is for him to publicly acknowledge the legitimacy and the National Reconciliation Document, as approved by the parliamentary council."

"By doing so, Geagea would transition from being an opponent of legitimacy to becoming a collaborator working within its framework. This would position him as a supporter of legitimacy, allowing us to extend assistance in resolving the situation involving Aoun."

Visit Al Majalla to read part 2 of these exchanges tomorrow.

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