In March 1976, the Lebanese people sat glued to their black-and-white television sets, watching a dramatic scene that although frequent in most Arab capitals, was completely new to Beirut.
A military coup had just been staged by 59-year-old Brigadier General Abdel Aziz al‐Ahdab, a native of Tripoli who occupied Lebanese Television in Tallet al-Khayyat, interrupting broadcast at 8:30 p.m. with a statement dubbed Communique # 1.
That’s how coups were traditionally announced in the Arab world — through a series of communiques broadcast on radio, always accompanied by military parade music — before television took over as the main medium in the 1960s.
Here, Al Majalla takes a look at what became a long run of leaders in Lebanon with an army background, highlighting their histories and telling the story of how the country’s politics overlapped with its army, in a tale of generals and presidents.
An untraditional general
We begin with the story of al-Ahdab and this first coup of the television age.
He was not a traditional army general, having studied English literature and history, first at Sheffield University in the UK and then at Cairo University, before completing his military studies.
But al-Ahdab now declared martial law and appointed himself military commander of Lebanon. This was just 11 months after start of the Lebanese civil war and came as the Lebanese army was beginning to disintegrate.
Dressed in full military attire with a gun placed clearly before him, al-Ahdab called on parliament to convene and choose a new president, demanding that the incumbent Suleiman Frangieh step down within 24 hours.
But Frangieh refused to budge, holding onto power in the name of “legality and legitimacy.” He added that there were three conditions for vacating the presidency: resignation, death, or dismissal by parliament.
“None of these exist,” he said.
Al-Ahdab insisted that he had no desire to become president — echoing a line spoken so often by many Arab generals, the most recent of which was Muammar Gaddafi who had seized power in Libya seven years prior.
The Lebanon coup fizzled out quickly, failing to trigger serious support within the armed forces. Al-Ahdab was neither executed, jailed, nor banished. He lived a long life, dying at the old age of 94 in 2011.
The al-Ahdab coup — had it succeeded — would have become a primer for Lebanon, like that of Bakr Sidqi in Iraq (1936), Husni al-Za'im in Syria (1949), and Gamal Abdel Nasser and his Free Officers in Cairo (1952).
Al-Ahdab must have drawn inspiration from these ambitious officers who staged successful putsches, toppling the often democratically-elected order, dissolving both parliament and the constitution, while setting up a military dictatorship centred around the cult of their own personalities.
While many saw the al-Ahdab coup as “un-Lebanese” a closer look shows that it might have been nothing but a natural outcome after the empowerment of Lebanese officers who strove to fill the presidential seat in Baabda Palace.
This trend began with army commander-turned president Fouad Chehab in the 1950s and it lasted until Michel Aoun came to power in 2016.
Al-Ahdab tried doing it through a fully-fledged coup, while his predecessor and successors all came to power through ballots, not bullets.
Fouad Chehab: Army Commander
Fouad Chehab was Lebanon’s first general-turned president, born into the powerful dynasty of Maronite Christians in 1902. He began his military career in the Lebanon-based Army of the Levant, which served the French Mandate over the country.
Early into Lebanon’s independence, Chehab was appointed commander of the Lebanese army in 1945. He was at his office at army headquarters when news reached him that his Syrian counterpart Husni al-Za’im had staged a coup in Damascus, toppling Syria’s democratically-elected president, Shukri al-Quwatli in March 1949.
That coup unleashed the ambition of many officers in the Arab neighbourhood, with Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser and his colleagues prime among them.
They staged a successful putsch just three years later, toppling the monarchy and its king, Farouk I. It was never known how Chehab reacted to the Syrian coup of 1949, and whether or not it triggered any of his own presidential ambitions.
Angry demonstrations were already a part of daily life in Lebanon, demanding the resignation of al-Quwatli’s friend, President Bechara El Khoury.
The Lebanese president was accused, among other things, of nepotism through his son Khalil and brother Salim, and of sending the Lebanese army into an uneven battle in Palestine — a fight that many Lebanese Christians felt did not concern them.
More importantly, El Khoury was accused of amending the constitution in May 1948, allowing for an extension of his presidential term.
Chehab refused to send the army to confront the anti-Khoury demonstrations, and yet, 24 hours before caving in and resigning, the president tasked him with forming a government on 18 September 1952.
Chehab held the dual posts of premier and minister of defence for a total of 14 days, stepping down on 1 October 1952 after the election of Camille Chamoun as president.
Under Chamoun, Chehab returned to the barracks, continuing his job as army commander. Lebanon’s new president did not hide his pro-Western views, hosting an Arab summit in Beirut in 1956 to convince Arab leaders not to sever ties with Great Britain and France, in light of the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt, launched after Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal.
Chamoun only insisted on the withdrawal of the Israelis from Egypt, prompting his pro-Nasser premier, Abdallah El-Yafi , and State Minister Saeb Salam to submit their resignations and join the opposition. Chamoun tasked Sami El Solh with forming a government on 18 November 1956, appointing none other than Chehab as Minister of Defence.
A revolt broke out against Chamoun in 1958, supported by Nasser’s intelligence service, with the aim of toppling him before he sought another term. The president had already received US arms since 1953 and had given the US air force rights to use Lebanese airspace.
While Chamoun didn’t officially join the anti-communist Baghdad Pact, he did not hide his support for it. As such, he refused to join the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian military pact of September 1955.
On 27 March 1958, the opposition, led by ex-prime minister Abdallah El-Yafi and Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt announced that Chamoun’s re-election would be unconstitutional, calling for a nationwide campaign to bring him down. Chamoun responded by asking for military assistance from the Americans.
On 15 July 1958, American marines began landing on the shores of Khaldeh, south of Beirut, while US tanks headed towards the Lebanese capital. Over the next four days, 15,000 American troops reached Lebanon on 70 warships — not with the goal of keeping Chamoun in his post but securing the election of a successor.
Lebanon was too strategically important to be allowed to slip into chaos, reasoned the Americans, due to its role in combating both Nasserism and Communism.
Chamoun was convinced to not seek re-election and on 31 July 1958, parliament met and elected Chehab as successor, making him Lebanon’s third post-mandate president and the first in a line of military leaders.
President Fouad Chehab
President Chehab was a powerful, hard-edged president. However, he began his tenure by appeasing the rebels of 1958. Their leader in Tripoli, Rashid Karami, was charged with forming a new government.
Chehab adopted a policy of neutrality toward Arab conflicts, but was clearly allied to President Nasser, whom he chose as his first Arab interlocutor, meeting him on the Lebanese-Syrian borders in March 1959.
On 22 November 1960, speaking on the anniversary of Lebanon’s Independence Day, Chehab announced a policy that has since been dubbed “Chehabism” focused on comprehensive social reform.
Its main pillars were creating a new elite for the country, strengthening the armed forces and bureaucracy, which was expanding with 10,000 civil servants, mostly technocrats with no political affiliation.
He also strove to empower the executive branch at the expense of the legislative one, while strengthening the rule of the central government.
More government jobs were given to Lebanese Muslims who had formed the backbone of the opposition to Camille Chamoun, who also happened to be pro-Egypt.
Chehab tried to balance and manage sectarianism, rather than do away with it completely.
On the last day of 1961, a failed coup was staged by officers from the pro-Chamoun, anti-Nasser Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP). They took over the Ministry of Defence but were over-powered by Chehab’s army.
The coup attempt was a blessing-in-disguise for the officer-turned-president, who used it as a pretext to expand the role of his security services, known as the Deuxieme Bureau.
